

THE PHOENIX

A JOURNAL OF HISTORY
1986



THE COLLEGE OF STATEN ISLAND / CUNY

The Phoenix

Volume 3 Spring 1986

Preface

The Phoenix is a journal created by students who have written papers on history or history-related topics. It is published under the sponsorship of the History Department and is devoted to the publication of historical studies written by students who are eager to share their discoveries of the past with you. For this reason, we are sure you will find the contents of Volume 3 to be fresh and exciting.

We are proud of the commitment to scholarship and writing that these student-authors have demonstrated. Each of the articles in this volume of the *Phoenix* was accepted for publication because it displayed facility with the subject matter and a provocative point of view. Because of this diversity, the viewpoints in these essays do not necessarily represent those of the faculty of the History Department.

Ms. Paula Carlo — Co-Editor

Ms. Maryann Castelucci — Co-Editor

Dr. Charles LaCerra — Co-Editor

This issue is dedicated to the memory of Professor Herbert Foster (1925—1984)

It is more than a year since Professor Herb Foster's death and yet many of us continue to feel his loss. Coming on the heels of the passing of two other historians, Professor Stanley Plastrik and Professor Roger Moorhus, Herb's death moved us deeply. Cherished memories come readily to mind; the torn map that he used for his course on Africa and the celebration that followed the acquisition of a new one the year before he died; the diligence and patience with which he counselled hordes of students; the love with which he sketched a portrait of his wife Gert from a photograph for her anniversary gift; his joy at narrating his experience as a singer in his church choir; and his magnificent pride and dignity as he presented a paper on the Black family before the New Jersey legislature.

Professor Foster was born on December 28, 1925. He received his B.A. from Lincoln University, Pennsylvania, two Master's degrees, one in history from Rutgers and another in African studies from Syracuse University. He became an instructor at Staten Island Community College in 1970 after fifteen years as a New Jersey High School teacher. He received his Ph.D. in American history in 1981. In the 1970s he published an anthology, *From the African Slave Trade to Emancipation: Readings in Black History*, and two articles, "The Role of Africans in the Slave Trade," and, "The Ethnicity of the Ancient Egyptians." An article from his doctoral dissertation, *The Urban Experience of Blacks in Atlantic City, New Jersey: 1850—1915*, was published in 1982. In the two years before he became ill in 1983, he had presented several scholarly papers, was honored by the New Jersey Historical Commission, and was the recipient of several grants. He was on the verge of becoming a recognized scholar in the field of Black history.

Herb was a very successful teacher. I observed him constantly urging and guiding his students towards superior efforts. He took seriously his responsibility as faculty advisor to the History Club and to the student-authored *Phoenix*. Consistent with his drive for personal growth and desire to be a more effective teacher, he was involved in the Writing-across-the-Curriculum program and became an ardent defender of it.

Quiet and considerate by nature, Professor Foster was well-known and well-liked by the College Community. Though he held strong views on matters that ranged from curriculum to national and international politics, he chose not to get involved in factional politics of any variety. He preferred instead the path of persuasion and moderation and was willing to reflect on all sides of an issue. His abiding passion was the advancement of Black people and to see that they got the recognition that they deserved. Yet, he reached out to all people. He balanced his particular and universal concerns in a remarkably mature manner. He was proud to be an American and also genuinely sensitive to the aspirations of peoples from all nations. Professor Foster was a vital and beloved member of the History department.

David M. Traboulay
Chairman, History

About Our Authors

Diana Bruno was a senior at CSI in 1985. During the week, she works full-time as a florist in Manhattan and on the weekends she is a full-time student. Her major is accounting.

Holly J. Dellolio is a former CSI student who attends Ocean County College, since she moved to N.J. She is majoring in business and expects to graduate in 1986. In addition to her studies Ms. Dellolio is a busy homemaker with two young children.

Virginia Hoolahan was a senior in the CUNY B.A. program during the 1984/85 academic year. Her majors are English Literature and Political Science. One of her research papers appeared in the 1984 edition of the Phoenix. Ms. Hoolahan plans to do graduate work in American Studies.

Peter Paccione graduated from CSI in June 1984 with a B.A. in history. He is currently a graduate student at NYU where he is working towards an M.A. in Russian history. He would like to pursue an academic career in the future.

Lisa Petersen graduated from CSI in 1983 with a B.A. in history. At present she attends the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and works part-time as an associate for Goldfarb and Bate. The central focus of her curriculum is corporate law and she enjoys working on negligence cases. Ms. Petersen has a keen interest in environmental issues and is an active member of the Sierra Club.

Table of Contents

Christianity and the Mystery Cults	
Diana Bruno	6
The Nurnberg War Crimes Trials: A History and Short Discussion of Legality	
Holly J. Dellolio	14
St. Thomas Aquinas	
Virginia R. Hoolahan	24
The State and Industrialization in Russia 1861—1953	
Peter Paccione	31
The Fallacy of Self-Reliance	
Lisa Petersen	43

Christianity and the Mystery Cults

Diana Bruno

No institution of mankind exists in a vacuum. The institution of religion is no exception. The more popular religions are most vulnerable of all to the influence of other cultures and other religious ideologies. One of the world's largest and most widespread religions, Christianity, is a perfect case in point.

For many years the Christians were a Jewish sect under rabbinical law, who subscribed to Jewish traditions, dietary laws, circumcision, etc. Eventually they made a complete separation from the Jews and settled in Rome, among other places, and gained a large following. Although the Christians were persecuted in Rome, the persecution was not usually active and continuous. Most emperors tolerated Christians but some of Rome's demented rulers did hunt-down Christians. During the times of persecution, Christians held their ceremonies in secret in the catacombs. The Romans heard sketchy parts of the now famous Christian litany: "This is my blood, drink it; this is my body eat of it." This litany, heard out of context, and coupled with the morbid meeting places, spread the rumor that the Christians practiced cannibalism. Today, we know that the litany is symbolic only, but the rumors kept the Christians underground for a long while. Whenever the Christians were able to worship publicly, they faced stiff competition from Rome's myriad of mystery cults.

In stretching over such a large part of the world, the Romans could hardly help but bring parts of other cultures home with them. A large part of ancient culture was ancient religion, and so the Romans had a multitude of religions from all over their empire from which to choose.

Of all the Graeco-Roman deities, only the cults of Dionysus and Demeter had developed into widely-venerated mystery cults. Dionysus and Demeter were to meet the Egyptian cults of Isis and Osiris, the Persian sun-god Mithra, the Syrian Tammuz, not to mention the smaller cults of Apollo, Attis, Cybele, Lucius and Hercules, in the religious marketplace that was Rome. I am sure there were other cults besides these, but there was insufficient information to report about them.

In Rome it was common to belong to several of these religions at one time. Tombstones were often fashioned telling the names of all the gods and goddesses that the person had served in life. The tombstones stated that because of these services the person was entitled to eternal life.¹ It was evident that the Romans had no shortage of religion. But were they really looking for true spiritual belief, or were these cults the amusement of a well-to-do people? Did they just want to add a slight touch of the supernatural to their social pleasures? Historical accounts told by some traditional churchmen imply that the Romans were too decadent to have true beliefs in these early religions, and so these cults were of no consequence. However I think that these cults must have been a very important

influence on Christianity: How else can we account for the obvious similarities between those ancient pagan cults and the familiar modern Christianity?

Of nearly all the deities of the cults, it was said or believed that: 1. They were born on or near Christmas day; 2. They were born of a virgin mother; 3. They were born in a cave or underground shelter; 4. They led a life of toil for mankind; 5. They were called light-bringer; saviour, healer or deliverer; 6. They were beaten down; tortured or killed by an evil person, deity or group; 7. They descended into Hell, Hades or the underworld; 8. They rose again and became an inspiration and subject of adoration for mankind; 9. They promised salvation and a heavenly afterlife to their faithful followers; and 10. They were commemorated by baptism and eucharistic meals.²

Anyone raised as a Christian today knows that this simple framework follows the worship of Christ rather closely. At the same time, it holds true for pagan gods. As for the date of Christ's birth, December 25, it is shared with Dionysus, Mithra, and Apollo. Osiris and his son Horus were born December 28 and 27, respectively. I was not able to find out the legendary birthdates of the other cult gods, but it seems they too were born near the winter solstice. One of my sources states that the actual birthdate of Christ is unknown, that the December 25 date was adopted by the church in the 4th century A D.³ Probably this was to help the early Christians compete with the sunworshipping cults. It is hard for modern man to visualize the importance of the lengthening of the days to the ancients. When most men did not have calendars (and certainly not good artificial light sources) long nights were dreary and depressing. The lack of calendars made the ancients lose track of the days, and fearful that the sun would not return to lighten the sky and nourish the crops. A god whose birth brought back the sun was a welcome one to the ancients. If the early Christian fathers did indeed fabricate a birthday for Christ to coincide with the winter solstice (as evidence suggests they did), this fact alone would constitute a considerable pagan influence.

Christ's birth by the Virgin Mary is held by Christians to be one of the greatest of miracles. But his birth is no more unique than his birthday. Dionysus, too, was born of a virgin mother, as was Attis (his mother Cybele was hailed as the "Virgin Mother" long before Mary), and Perseus (Zeus and Danae — Zeus came to her as a golden shower). Zoroaster was also born of a virgin mother and probably were countless other small cult gods. Herodotus described how a ray of light descended on the sacred cow of Egypt which then conceived and brought forth Apis. This is surely an unusual virgin birth and Plutarch remarked about it in his book on Isis and Osiris. Plutarch says that all such conceptions occur through the ear. In some medieval pictures we see a ray of light descending down Mary's ear. The scholars of the period took from the reflections of a pagan to explain the conception of the Christian saviour.⁴

The third item on my list of similarities (they were born in a cave or underground shelter) may not seem to have any relevance to Christ but it does. According to St. Matthew's gospel, Jesus was born in a house; according to St. Luke's he was born in a stable. In later times, the stable is represented as being inside a cave. The cave shown at Bethlehem as the birthplace of Christ was similar to the rock shrine in which Adonis was worshipped. Many of the early peoples

that were converted to Christianity identified Christ with the gods they worshipped earlier. The adoption of it as the site of Christ's birth is another of the many instances in which early Christians adopted a pagan sacred place or rite. Many gods were worshipped in caves, such as Apollo, Cybele, Demeter, Hercules, Hermes, Mithra and Poseidon. Hermes was supposed to have been born in a cave and Mithra was believed to have been born from a rock. In the legend of the birth of the divine Ion, mythical ancestor of the Ionians, the babe was placed in a basket in a cave.⁵

Very little needs to be said about item four. All the gods previously mentioned led a life of toil for mankind. Christ's life and the miracles he performed are more elaborately described and records of his deeds are better-preserved than those of the pagan gods. Nevertheless, his turning of water into wine at Cana may have been based on similar tales told in relation to Dionysus. The Church fixed the date of the miracle to January 6. This date corresponds to the festival of Dionysus at which the changing of water into wine was believed to be an annual miracle at certain centers of his worship.⁶

In regard to the fifth point, it is not at all surprising that all these gods were called by names generally used to describe Christ. Dionysus was called Liberator and Saviour, Mithra was also called Saviour and Apollo was called Light-Bringer.⁷

Both Christ and his pagan rivals were killed or vanquished by the powers of evil. Dionysus was dismembered by the Titans, Adonis was said to have died a cruel death, Attis bled to death at the foot of a pine tree and Osiris was killed by an evil god. The worship of suffering gods was found all over Rome. The belief of the victims of sacrifice for the redemption of sins of man was very common.

All of these gods descended into an underworld and rose anew. Adonis was said to have ascended into the sky in the presence of his followers after his resurrection. Similar stories apply to Dionysus, Heracles, Krishna, Mithra and other deities.⁸ And so we see that even the story of Christ's ascension may have been based on pagan legends.

Many of Rome's mystery cults founded communions of saints and commemorated their gods with eucharistic meals. The old Egyptians celebrated the resurrection of Osiris by eating a sacrament of cake or wafer. After it had been consecrated by the priest it was supposed to become the flesh of Osiris. On March 25, in the worship of Attis followers celebrated the resurrection with a sacramental meal and a baptism of blood. The followers of Dionysus also had a sacramental meal held once a year in the innermost section of the sacred temple. Instead of wafers, flesh was to be given out to all the followers; this, too, was supposed to be the flesh of the god after consecration. Dionysus' resurrection was supposed to bring the spring back every year.

In respect to the eucharist and baptism, the followers of Mithra were probably closest to the modern Christians. Mithra's followers underwent baptism by water (which washed sins away) and a eucharistic meal of wafer. Mithra had twelve disciples like Jesus and virgin priestesses (perhaps akin to our modern day nun?).⁹ The use of virgin priestesses was widespread in paganism, for example, vestal

virgins in Rome.

I think I have shown that there is a basic thread of similarity that runs through the ancient pagan cults and our modern Christian church, at least with respect to the histories of the saviours and the most important rituals. My sources also assure me that the aims of a decent life and a brotherhood of man was common to both the cults and Christianity, cleanliness from crime and confession were demanded of a neophyte. This was followed by baptism and sacrifice.¹⁰

I have said earlier that the pagan adherents of the mystery cults held the birthdates and resurrections of their gods to be holy days. Since these dates correspond somewhat to the dates of Christ's birth and resurrection we celebrate the same dates in modern Christianity.

The pagan name for the winter solstice festival is still in wide use today: Yule. Yule was celebrated centuries before the Christian era. Yule festival was celebrated by the Druids with great fires lighted on top of hills. The Druidic emblem is still used today; mistletoe is often suspended at Christmas parties. When Christianity spread throughout the Roman empire it found everywhere a heathen festival to the sun-god at winter solstice. In Rome, the Saturnalia festival was from December 21 to December 31. Temporary freedom was given to the slaves and houses were decked with evergreens. Visits, presents, rejoicing and goodwill were the order of the day. Early Christians thought the pagan holidays were wanton and idle. They disliked the dancing, revelry, drinking, and so on. However, the Romans and other pagans liked their happy holiday too much, and even after conversion to Christianity they continued to celebrate it. When the church did assign a birthday to Christ during the 4th century A.D., they made it December 25 and thereby adapted the winter solstice festival to suit their own purposes.³

The second most celebrated holiday in Christendom is Easter. (It is preceded by the fasting of Lent.) The fasting at "Lent" is an important practice of the Hindus, Chinese, and Jews. Lent was the hardest part of the year for the ancients. In hunting, game was scarce since the kids and lambs had not yet been born and agricultural winter stores were about to run out. And so, even before Lent was a sanctioned part of the Christian religion it was an important survival mechanism to be able to withstand a fast until the time of spring plenty came. The festival of spring and the rebirth of land and saviour is called Easter.

When St. Augustine visited England he found the Britons observing Easter in the Asiatic way (on a movable date). The Britons told St. Augustine that they celebrated the Christ who was put to death but rose three days later. He said, "How came you to hold the anniversary of a man's death on a movable date?" The fact that Easter shifts according to the phases of the moon, Easter being the first Sunday after the full moon upon or next after the vernal equinox, shows that it is an astronomical festival. The Britons argued that it was not simply the man they celebrated, it was also the power of life to renew itself in spring.¹² The ancient peoples had once again combined their traditional festivals and their new Christian beliefs.

According to the Venerable Bede, Easter is derived from Eostre the Saxon goddess of the east, signifying dawn and spring. In every pagan religion this time is celebrated as a revivification of nature. At this same time the Egyptians held

a festival and the palm was carried as a symbol of reproductive power and triumph long before Palm Sunday was supposed to signify the entrance of Christ into Jerusalem.

Easter may also be allied to Ishtar, the Assyrian goddess of love and fecundity. Ishtar was said to have descended into hell and later ascended. The Syrian Tammuz was first mourned and then believed to have risen at this time. Among others believed to have risen at this time besides Christ, was most notably, Dionysus.

Besides the resurrection festival that modern day Christians celebrate, there is also the custom of egg-dyeing. Today we usually reserve it as a task for children, but in ancient Egypt the dyed egg was used in religious ceremonies as a symbol of fecundity and new life. They were most notably used in the festival in honor of Osiris on the new moon of the month Phaenoth (approx. March 8). Dyed eggs were also given as gifts in the spring festivals of the ancient Greeks and Persians. Our modern custom of dyeing eggs undoubtedly came down to us from the old pagan rituals.¹⁴

May Day is another spring holiday that had its roots in antiquity. May Day was a continuation of the rites of Dionysus and the Druidic Beltane. Great fires were built around which people danced and banquets and feasts were held at this time. On May first the maypole was set up and adorned with flowers and boughs. Smaller maypoles were usually set up around the village. Bishop Grosseteste suppressed May games in Lincoln, England in 1253. The last maypole was taken down in London in 1718. It was being used as a support for Sir Isaac Newton's telescope. Regrettably, the Christians did succeed in wiping out this pagan holiday and so, little of its celebration remains today.¹⁵

May is also noted for being the month sacred to the mother Mary. In ancient times, May was also sacred to Cybele, mother of the gods. The "Floralia" was her festival and it was observed in Rome. The Italians in Genzano still practice essentially the same festival today, only it is called "Infiolata" and it is dedicated to Mary. Although May Day is lost to us, some of the spring festivals still exist regionally in the same or modified forms. Instead of being dedicated to a pagan god, they are dedicated to Mary or a Christian saint.¹⁶

The transfer of the festival of Floralia to Mary's worship is not the only case of a waning goddess's worship being taken over by Mary. However, Mary was not always considered divine and sacred. The early Christians considered Mary as a chosen, but an entirely mortal vessel for the child of God. Shortly before 400 A.D., Epiphanius denounced the women of Thrace, Arabia and elsewhere for worshipping Mary as an actual goddess. About 430 A.D., Proclus preached a sermon hailing her as a divinity, calling her mother of God and mediator between man and God.¹⁷ The worship of Isis and the influence of Egyptian thought helped Mary rise from a "vessel" to something approaching a goddess. In some parts of the world today, it may even be said that she is regarded as Christ's equal in the love of Christian worshippers. The Egyptians were able to adapt the worship of Mary quite easily. Their early stylized art had an abundance of paintings and statuettes dedicated to Isis and her baby Horus. Those same artists later did similar works of art dedicated to Mary and the Christ-child. Most of the artworks done in naturalistic style are easily recognizable as Mary and Christ, but in other

instances it is hard to tell. Is the artist adoring Isis in the new style or is it Mary? The transition in the art world seems to have followed the conversion in the spiritual one.

Since Isis was loved so well and regarded as a powerful mother goddess it probably caused the early Christians to upgrade their image of Mary. As Mary assumed the place in human affections vacated by a fading Isis and Artemis she became the undisputed Queen of Heaven.¹⁸

Both Artemis and Isis were moon goddesses and as Mary's worship grew she became associated with them. This accounts for the presence of the crescent moon in so many paintings of Mary. Isis' worship had been assimilating the cult of Venus who was reportedly born of the foam of the sea. As Mary took the place of Isis she also acquired some dominion of the sea. Mary is called "Star of The Sea" in many countries.¹⁹

In conclusion, it is easy to see that the early Christian fathers borrowed heavily from the ancient pagan cults. But is not everything derived from that which comes before? The pagan cults brought meaning and happiness (in the form of holidays like Easter and Saturnalia) to the lives of ancient peoples. If the Christians added some of the pagan rites to their repertoire in order to more easily spread the word of their visionary Christ, I see it as a good thing, of which to be proud. I would not try to deny it or hide it as some churchmen-historians do. All institutions of mankind must evolve, change with the times, or else they will become stagnant and eventually die. The long life of the Catholic Church is attributable to the fact that it did accept, change, borrow and assimilate. If the Christian fathers had not placed Christ's birthday during the winter solstice, would they have been able to compete with Mithraism? If the Christians had stood firm about their views that Mary was not divine would the pagans, who were used to worshipping a mother goddess, have been able to convert to only worshipping Christ? Did not the adoption of the mid-winter festival of Christmas make Christians more enthusiastic about their religion?

I began this paper with a Christian bias, believing that I would find only small obscure references and parallels between early cults and Christianity. Instead, I have found great portions of Christian belief filled with the rituals and beliefs of the ancients. However, it does not make Christianity less holy. What could be better than knowing that we do not worship in one small way, but rather in a religion that encompasses the rituals that come down to us as central to all of mankind?

*Submitted to Instructor Paula Carlo, HST. 201. Western Civilization to 1500.

Notes

1. Hugo Rahner, *Greek Myths and Christian Mystery*, Biblio & Tannen (N.Y., N.Y.), 1921, p. 146.
2. Edward Carpenter, *Pagan and Christian Creeds*, Harcourt, Brace & Co. (N.Y., N.Y.), 1921, p. 21.
3. Arthur Edward Weigall, *Paganism In Our Christianity*, Hutchinson & Co., (London, England), 1928, p. 55.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
7. Carpenter, p. 52.
8. Weigall, p. 88.
9. Carpenter, pp. 25—67.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
11. Joseph Mazzini Wheeler, *Paganism In Our Christian Festivals*, Pioneer Press, (N.Y., N.Y.), 1932, p. 10.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
17. Weigall, p. 121.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

Bibliography

Carpenter, Edward. *Pagan and Christian Creeds*. Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1921.

Monerieff, Phillip David Scott. *Paganism and Christianity In Egypt*. Pioneer Press, N.Y., 1913.

Rahner, Hugo. *Greek Myths and Christian Myster*. Biblio & Tannen, New York, 1921.

Sims, R.M. "Eleusinia In The 6th to 4th Centuries B.C." *Greek, Roman & Byzantine Studies* (Autumn '75, vol 16), pp. 269—279.

Weigall, Arthur Edward. *Paganism In Our Christianity*. Hutchinson & Co., London, 1928.

Wheeler, Joseph Mazzini. *Paganism In Our Christian Festivals*. Pioneer Press, New York, 1932.

The Nurnberg War Crimes Trials a History and Short Discussion of Legality

Holly J. Dellolio

On November 20, 1945, the Nurnberg War Crimes Trial began, presided over by the "International Military Tribunal." Why did American officials, who were serving as prosecutors and judges, endorse an alien trial which did not grant the defendants the same rights as one being tried in an American court? Also how could a tribunal of victors be impartial?

The basis for the ten-month trial that saw three men acquitted, seven men sentenced to prison, and twelve men condemned to death by hanging, including one who was tried in absentia, began in January of 1943 when nine governments in exile, whose countries were occupied by the Nazis signed the St. James Declaration. This made punishment of war crimes a principal goal. The Moscow Declaration, signed in November of 1943 by the United States, the USSR, and Great Britain, stated that at the time of granting any armistice to Germany, those German officers and their subordinates, members and officials of the Nazi Party responsible for atrocities, massacres and executions in occupied areas would be sent back to those countries in which the crimes were committed for trial and punishment according to the laws of those liberated countries. Those major criminals whose offenses had no particular geographical location would be punished by a joint tribunal of the Allied Governments.

These declarations were vague and ominous, full of impending retributions. Before this, in the fall of 1942, the Western Powers had agreed to the formation of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC). Shortly it began to compile lists of accused war criminals. The Soviet Union did not join the UNWCC but as the Russians were advancing on Germany, it gave even more specific warnings of retribution. This was demonstrated by the well-publicized Kharkov trials of German officials and Soviet collaborators.

The American and British authorities were reluctant to issue any warnings mainly because the Americans and British had not experienced the Nazi Occupation and also because there was a degree of skepticism regarding the war crimes reports due to the fact that during World War I, the Anglo-Americans had themselves circulated rumors of German atrocities in Belgium.

The cry by smaller Allied governments and Jewish organizations for a stronger war crimes policy had been raised before 1944, but resistance to such war crimes publicity was strongest among the military chiefs who feared that too-much threatening publicity would set off reprisals against Allied POWs. So deep was their apprehension that when advancing armies began trials in Sicily in 1943, Great Britain and the United States stepped in and quickly intervened to put a stop to the trials. By 1944, the U.S. Army refused to segregate suspected war criminals in POW camps and the British followed their lead.¹ Considering the

views of the War Department and the State Department's coolness to what it considered outside meddling, it seemed unlikely that the U.S. government would have been moved by outside pressure from the smaller Allied governments and Jewish organizations to adopt a clear policy on German war crimes.

In August of 1944, the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., began to get upset at the war crimes reports and even more incensed at the lackadaisical attitude taken by his government. While Morgenthau was on a trip to London, he was shown copies of directives that dealt with the administration of German territory.² These directives would have treated Germany as a liberated country instead of as a defeated aggressor.

Once back in Washington and armed with the directives and the Army planning book, Morgenthau went to President Roosevelt demanding that a tougher policy be developed for postwar Germany. President Roosevelt, who was in a "get tough mood" sent Secretary of War Stimson a memo stating this "handbook is pretty bad."^{3,4} The handbook had passages that showed that the Army intended to be easygoing on the Germans.

President Roosevelt's support of Morgenthau shoved the War and the State Departments in a tight corner. Both Secretary Hull and Secretary Stimson, overwhelmed with war problems and in ill health, were glad of the opportunity to come to terms with Morgenthau. They readily agreed to join him and Roosevelt's close aide, Harry Hopkins, in a committee to advise the President on German occupation policy.⁵ As the committee took shape, Morgenthau presented his plan which called for a policy of pasturization aimed at reducing Germany's capacity to make war in the future. The plan went beyond deindustrialization; it envisioned an all-embracing de-Nazification and demilitarization system as well as the internment of masses and Nazi party personnel. The plan proposed that labor teams be created, made up of Nazi party leaders, government officials, and soldiers, for use as labor reparations in the Allied lands ravaged by war and Nazi occupation. It also advocated massive deportations of Nazis to the far corners of the world. Morgenthau and his supporters had no patience with involved war crimes procedures. They accepted the Allied pledge that lower level war criminals would be sent to the area of their crimes to be dealt with there. But for major war criminals, the high officials of the Nazi party and state, the Treasury department had a very effective proposal: a list of the criminals was to be given to the advance Allied military forces, who then would use the list to identify and immediately shoot captured prisoners.⁶

Morgenthau's plan drew coolness from the state department, and his plan was rejected by Secretary Stimson. Stimson was in favor of some sort of trials and group punishment. But the Stimson approach opened up the unpleasant possibility that the United States might become embroiled in an endless series of trials if Germany were to be effectively purged. And to become a permanent presence in Europe was the last thing President Roosevelt and his top advisors wanted. The most appealing aspect of Morgenthau's plan was one of "smash and run."⁷

In order to confront Morgenthau's plan with a more effective and reasonable plan Secretary Stimson ordered the War Department to draft a plan of its own.

The responsibility for developing a plan that would permanently control Germany by means of a quick and judicial action fell to Assistant Secretary McCloy. The task of designing such a plan eventually fell down the chain of command until it came to rest in a catch-all office called "Special Projects Branch."

A New York lawyer, Murray C. Bernays, was given the task to come up with a lower crimes policy that would be an effective answer to the Morgenthau plan. Bernays like most Jews of that time believed that most atrocities were committed before the war. That belief clouded his view and he could not grasp the problems that arose with this view. This view was held by both Jewish and non-Jewish refugees from pre-war Germany, who were serving as executives and advisors to the U.S. government. Quite naturally, they tended to direct official attention toward all pre-war Nazi actions, the circumstances of which they knew all too well. His primary assignment was not to develop a plan to stop the atrocities, but to formulate a system that would defer action until after the war was over, thus sparing American POW's from reprisal.

Bernays struggled with these problems throughout the first part of September, but eventually produced a memorandum of six pages entitled "Trial of European Criminals."⁸ Bernays suggested that a judicial plan would solve all problems, but in addition make all the German leaders responsible for their subordinates and to illustrate to the German people the dangers of racism and totalitarianism. In his plan, the Nazi party and German government organizations, such as the Gestapo, the SA (stormtroopers), and the SS would be charged before an international court with conspiracy to commit murder, terrorism and so forth, in violation of the laws of war. Only individual defendants would be tried by such an international court, but each defendant would be convicted and sentenced by the court. Then every other defendant of his organization would be judged to have been a criminal conspirator and would be liable to arrest, summary trial and punishment by the Allied authorities. Under this, in an international court, the prosecution would presumably contend that the conspiracy dated from the earliest days of the Nazi regime; therefore all customary time limitations applicable to war crimes would disappear and pre-war crimes could be included in the conspiracy charge. By this, the whole war crimes problem would be reduced to a few simple elements. The swift judicial procedure would satisfy the participatory demands of the most diverse groups of victims and provide the Allied occupation with a flexible instrument to clean Germany of its war-making potential.

By September 15, 1944, Bernays was satisfied that he had come up with a plan that would be the most effective answer to Morgenthau's plan and satisfy the spokesmen for the tormented victims. With this, Bernays submitted his plan and by mid-October it reached the office of Secretary Stimson, where it received a favorable hearing.⁹ But unknown to them, Roosevelt had invited Morgenthau along with him to Quebec for a conference with Winston Churchill. Morgenthau received untimely aid with his plan from Lord Chancellor Simon, who had brought his own plan along with him. So Churchill and Roosevelt both signed the Morgenthau plan, that called for pasturization of Germany along with the combined Simon-Morgenthau plan that called for summary executions of all Nazi leaders.

It was long known that Roosevelt signed the plan without approval from the Cabinet. It was not known until recently that Simon and Churchill also acted arbitrarily and independently of their government. When Morgenthau returned from Quebec, he received a rather chilly reception from Secretaries Stimson and Hull, who were incensed at his foray into top-level politics. Eventually Morgenthau's plan was scrapped because of public outcry over the plan which had been leaked to the press, probably from a source inside the State Department. The weight of the public protest nearly broke Henry Morgenthau, Jr. His difficulties were compounded when Josef Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda minister, seized these reports to stir popular German resistance by painting a picture of dire fate and mass misery which the Morgenthau plan would mean for a defeated Germany. Better to fight to death he screamed. Thus when the Allied fight began to slow down in late September and early October, much of the press attributed it to a German resistance stiffened by the menace of the Morgenthau plan. With this, the Morgenthau forces were swept from the field, Roosevelt dissociated himself from his longtime friend Morgenthau and even denied signing the Morgenthau plan.¹⁰

Thus the Bernays plan was submitted and eventually approved because Bernays totally rejected the idea of summary executions; a few quiet liquidations would not satisfy anybody. Furthermore, the Morgenthau plan would totally violate American judicial ideas and it would not cope with the thousands of second rank Nazi culprits. In his memo, Bernays boldly suggested a judicial plan that promised to solve all the existing problems. Besides, Stalin was afraid that unless there was a trial, he, Roosevelt and Churchill would be accused of having killed Hitler and company out of personal revenge.¹¹

By June 20, 1945, a modified Bernays plan was adopted by the War Department and State Department. The modification was that aggressive war was included as one of the crimes charged against the Nazi leaders. The champions of this composite proposal believed that it represented far more than a mere alternative to the ideas put forth by Morgenthau, providing as it did for the traditional device of a trial to deal with the Nazi leaders. But this traditional trial, paradoxically, would be a long step forward in developing an international law to control future aggressors.

On August 6, 1945, the London Charter was signed by nineteen nations. This ended weeks of negotiations between the Americans, French, English, and Soviets. This charter called for the creation of an "International Military Tribunal." The defendants would be charged with:

1. Conspiracy
2. Crimes Against Peace
3. War Crimes
4. Crimes Against Humanity

Of all these charges "War Crimes" is most clearly definable. Under this count, the indictment charged eighteen of the defendants with violations of the traditional laws of war because they committed acts such as mistreatment of prisoners of war, murder, and devastation not justified by military necessity. The third count simply added together the sections of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare

and the Geneva Convention that interdicted certain wartime actions against military and naval forces as well as against civilians and civilian property. Of the eighteen defendants charged with violations of the traditional laws and rules of warfare, only two were found not guilty.

The charge "Crimes Against Humanity" was employed by the prosecution to reform the rules of warfare in order to correspond to rules of the twentieth century. It charged as crimes murder, extermination, and "persecution on political, racial and religious ground", whether committed "before or during the war." The phrase added serious legal discussion and contained the seeds of legal controversy. Just so long as such acts were undertaken or executed in connection with other acts "under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal." Thus religious persecution was punishable if committed in conjunction with a war crime as specified in Count Three or in conjunction with the actions covered by Counts One and Two. By adding the phrase "before or during the war" Count Four made it possible at Nurnberg to prosecute actions that had taken place in pre-1939 Germany and in the territories the Nazis had "peacefully" occupied in 1938. The criticism of this charge is the obvious fact that there was no code of law or international agreement in existence in 1933, 1939, or even in 1944 which made it illegal to persecute religions or to exterminate populations. If one considers only statutory laws, the prosecution of pre-war and wartime acts under Count Four was an exercise in *ex post facto* prosecution, declaring an act to be a crime and punishing it as such **after** it had been committed. By 1945, mass murder of civilians had thereby evolved into an international crime; the Allied Powers had repeatedly warned the Axis leaders that such actions were criminal and would be punished. The only innovation was procedural; international public conscience had defined the crime, and the charge was not an application of *ex post facto* law. Of seventeen defendants charged with Count Four only two were acquitted.

The second count "Crimes Against Peace" states that all persons during the years preceding May 8, 1945 participating in the planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of aggression which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances. The defendants charged with this count were charged with breaking treaties and agreements such as the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919) and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) and the Havana Resolution (1928). These agreements were signed because since the turn of the century, a growing legal movement, conforming to public opinion, had sought limitations on the harshness of war. So when the Nazis secretly tore up the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1939 and launched a massive invasion into the Soviet Union, they should have known that the Soviets and public international agreement and the Allied Powers would hold their acts to be criminal. In final judgment, the Tribunal found only four of the sixteen defendants charged with count two, not guilty.

Count One, the conspiracy charge, was the most complex count. This raised many issues, one being that in modern Anglo-American legal practice prosecution is subject to great abuse, for proof of knowledge is usually difficult and may run dangerously close to the prosecution of unpopular ideas and opinions. The charge included all persons who, during a period of years preceding May 8, 1945,

participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formations or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of, Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity. The defining characteristic of the crime is an agreement or understanding between two or more persons to commit a criminal act. Even in countries where a conspiracy law has long been established, it is still a highly debatable form of prosecution. Of the twenty-two defendants charged under Count One, only eight were found guilty, and all of these were also convicted of "planning" aggressive war under Count Two.

Among the most glaring inconsistencies and inequalities that serve to invalidate the Nurnberg and related trials was their failure to deal with the subject of aerial bombardment. Instead the Doenitz submarine service was singled-out for condemnation as if there was a difference between a torpedo from below and a bomb from above. The crime of Grand Admiral Carl Doenitz for which he was convicted was in reality the effective professional direction of the wartime navy of his country, a "criminal standard" under which any career military or naval officer could be convicted. Admiral Doenitz was charged with counts one, two, three; he was found not guilty on count one, and guilty of counts two and three. His only crime was to be chosen by Hitler in his final days to become the successor of the Third Reich. Doenitz did not even become head of the Navy until 1943 and was not even considered a member of the General Staff and High Command until 1943.

It has been suggested that the parties to the Charter had no power to provide for the punishment of crimes committed in Germany, by Germans, against other Germans, in some cases before the war began. But nations cannot condone the actions of other nations. A provision in the Charter declares that the community of nations, must assume responsibility for punishment of such cases. International law, or the law that governs between states, has at times like the common law within states, a twilight existence which is hardly distinguishable for morality or justice until the sanction of the court attests to its jural quality. Some things in this charter are one time things. Certainly, we should be upset when another nation slaughters its people. A case in point is the Pol Pot Regime in Kampuchia. Pol killed off the people in various ways, and we did nothing about it. Everyone was disturbed by the headlines and there were scathing editorials in the newspapers, but nothing was done!

Justice Robert H. Jackson stated at the Nurnberg Trials, "If it's to serve any useful purpose, it must be to condemn aggression by any other nations, including those which sit here not in judgment." This was not done. "Judges" do not sit in judgment on themselves, as Justice Jackson well knew. One might ask why, in view of the extent of U.S. involvement in the Nurnberg proceedings and the participation of U.S. prosecuting personnel, the basic unconstitutionality of the process did not cause a review in the U.S. courts by a writ of *habeas corpus* despite Article 26 of the London Charter annexed to the agreement providing that "The judgment of the Tribunal shall be final and not subject to review." Article 26 was intended to get the political officials of the U.S., France, England, and the Soviet Union "off the hook" at home because of the obvious legal

repugnance of the Nurnberg proceedings. Counsels for the various defendants did indeed petition the U.S. Supreme Court, but the petitions were first dodged on the grounds of "no original jurisdiction." On December 20, 1948, when the petitions were finally denied, the Supreme Court took the interesting position that, they were satisfied that the tribunal was not a tribunal of the United States. But how could the United States be part of such a tribunal and the Supreme Court deny that? This is one such example of the legal repugnance mentioned before.

Finally on June 5, 1950, the U.S. Supreme Court had to face issues, the defense counsel having secured a ruling from the court of appeals in the District of Columbia, holding that "If a person has the right to a writ of *habeas corpus*, he cannot be deprived of the privilege by an omission in a federal jurisdictional statute." Stripped-away by the ruling was all the commotion about the "international" character of the Nurnberg and other such tribunals. Pressed to find a way out, the U.S. Supreme Court mustered its legal courage and insight with the final sidestepping ruling that, "A non-resident enemy alien, especially one who has remained in the service of the enemy, does not even have qualified access to our courts." **That** was how the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the issues. Justice Hugo L. Black in his dissent, exposed the utter hypocrisy of the Supreme Court decision. He wrote: "This court cannot, and despite its rhetoric on the point does not, deny that if they (the defendants) were imprisoned in the United States our courts would clearly have the jurisdiction to hear their *habeas corpus* complaints. Does a prisoner's rights to test the legality of a sentence then depend on where the government chooses to imprison them? We ask only whether the Military Tribunal was legally constituted and whether jurisdiction to impose punishment for the conduct charged. Such limited *habeas corpus* review is the right of every citizen of the United States civilian or soldier . . . Any contention that a similarly limited use of *habeas corpus* for these prisoners would somehow give them a preferred position in the law cannot be taken seriously."¹²

Another most confusing issue about this trial was the way the defendants were chosen. They were selected during the London Conference and individual countries submitted their own lists rather than one uniform list composed by the UNWCC. The five most glaringly absent were — Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Josef Goebbels, Martin Bormann, and the head of the Krupp combine. The first four had been the most powerful figures in the Third Reich. The first three were most probably dead; Martin Bormann was missing, and in regard to the head of Krupp combine, the prosecution blundered badly. They named the elderly Gustav Krupp as a defendant, since the Krupp family was in the American zone and the French and Russians wanted a Krupp in the docket. The Americans did not discriminate carefully enough, and Gustav Krupp, who was mentally incompetent, was indicted when his son, who was the operating head of the Krupp combine, should have been. Ultimately the Tribunal declared that he could not be tried in absentia and his case was separated from the others.

Bormann was tried in absentia since his existence or death could not be proven or disproven. Being tried in absentia was authorized by the Allied agreement that had established the tribunal. The Russian government wanted to have some of their prisons on trial. They put forth two names: Robert Ley and Hans Fritzsche.

Ley, who managed the German Labor Service, committed suicide before the trial began, and Fritzsche was only there because Goebbels was dead and Fritzsche happened to be one of the few middle level officials in the Propoganda Ministry who were captured. Maybe this trial would have a better credibility level if some of the defendants were a little bit credible. Fritzsche was tried and acquitted.

The judges who sat on the Tribunal were not impartial. Most of the judges and prosecuting teams wrote the charter; I feel that the judges and prosecuting teams should have been divorced from the proceedings in London and Nurnberg. At the most, their conduct, to say the least, was very questionable. One of the judges, Francis Biddle, reveals in his article on Nurnberg, in *American Heritage*, vol. xiii, no 5 August 1962, that the U.S. judges knowingly permitted the Soviet prosecutor to submit false evidence against the defendants. Further Justice Jackson hosted a party for visiting Andrei Vishinsky, the notorious prosecutor of the bloody Stalin purges; at which American judges joined in a toast by Vishinsky, "To all German prisoners, may they all be hanged!" By any ethical standards of bar associations in the western world such 'Judges' should have disqualified themselves.

For the times, this was probably a fair trial, more fair than if the Russians had conducted the trials. But I feel that it was not fair enough. People wanted to forget about the war and its unpleasantness. This was the most direct way to deal with Germany and to wash hands in the process. But for something like that to happen in these times, public outcry would overwhelm prosecutors and judges and our own government just like public outcry overwhelmed Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

*Submitted to Professor Luther Carpenter, HST 200, Historical Method.

Notes

1. Again there are countless indications of this attitude in the respective British and American files. A general Foreign Office file includes a generous sampling, including a U.S. War Department's nonsegregation order to Gen. Eisenhower, issued January 1, 1944. FO371/38990,fo
2. Morgenthau, and nearly every other high-ranking U.S. Government official involved in this question has recounted the events in some kind of memoir. Lt. Col Bernard Bernstein seems to be the one who gave the directive to Morgenthau. *Morgenthau Diary* (Germany), vol. I, pp. 450, 462
3. "Memorandum of Conversation with the President", Nov 15, 1944, Edward Stetinus Papers, Box 724, The Univ. of Virginia.
4. FDR to the Secretary of War, August 26, 1944, *Morgenthau Diary* (Germany), vol I, pp. 443.
5. The committee idea apparently originated with Morgenthau and then championed by Stimson. *Morgenthau Diary* (Germany) vol I. pp. 447
6. "Post-Surrender Memorandum", Sept. 4, 1944, and Treasury Conference Minutes, Sept 4, 1944, *Morgenthau Diary*, (Germany) vol. I, pp. 495, 503—09
7. One anonymous War Department official, having fun at their expense, writing a two-page memo to Stimson on Sept 19, outling various fanciful ways to wreck the German economy. "Memorandum To The Secretary of War", Sept 19, 1944, "The Papers of Henry L. Stimson", Roll #110, Yale University
8. The transmission cover letter by Bernays is in Trial and Punishment File 1, Box 4, *Bernays*. The memorandum appears at various points in the federal records and in Bernays papers. The most readily accessible in McCloy to Stimson, October 27, 1944. (January 1943—December 1944 file) Box 15, Assistant Secretary
9. Transmission letter by Bernays, Trials and Punishment File 1, Box 4, *Bernays*. Bernays also prepared a chronology of the developments up through late December 1944, War Department G-1, RG 165, War Crimes, 000.5, Box 313, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.
10. October 27, 1944, conversation with Ambassador Winat, "Diaries of Stimson". An interesting discussion of FDR's loss of memory is in Donald R. McCloy (ed) *Conference of Scholars on the Administration of Occupied Areas*, 1943—1955, (The Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Mo.,

1970) p. 20)

11. Clark Merr to FO, #399, November 25, 1945 CAB 21.
12. Frederick Williams in *American Mercury*, August, 1957

Sources

Doenitz at Nurnberg: A Reappraisal

“War Crimes and the Military Professional”

H.K. Thompson, Jr. & Henry Strutz, Co-editors, Amber Publishing Corp., N.Y. 1976

Reaching Judgment at Nurnberg, Bradley F. Smith;
Basic Book, Inc. Publ., N.Y. 1977

Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law — “Selected Essays”, Herbert
Weshcler, Harvard University Press, MA 1961

Crimes of War, Gabriel Kolko, Richard A. Falk and Robert Jay Lifton. Vintage
Books, NY 1971

Nurnberg, a fair trial?; H. Phleger & C. E. Wyzanski, Jr. *Atlantic* 177:60—70
April 1946

Nurnberg defended: with reply. H. Weschler, *Fortune* 35:29—30 April 1947

St. Thomas Aquinas

Virginia R. Hoolahan

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225—74) believed there are four types of law (Eternal, Natural, Human and Divine) that control and order human existence. All of these types are known and participated in to varying degrees by man, and are essential to the fulfillment of his destiny, to the playing-out of his role in the design of the universe.

Eternal law, the fundamental rules by which the universe is governed, is God's will. This law is abstract and unchangeable. It is the same for all people, in all times and under all circumstances. Yet, is known only to God. But while no one can know all of the Eternal law, every living creature partakes of it in a limited way. This participation is made possible through the reflection of Eternal law in what Aquinas calls Natural law.

It is through Natural law that all creatures have had embedded in them an instinctual knowledge of certain aspects of God's law. Man, however, in addition to this instinct, has the faculty of reason, and so he alone is aware of the presence of Eternal law and can see its effects in the world. Reason has given man the ability to know the difference between good and evil and to make moral choices. His knowledge of Eternal law is, therefore, much fuller, and his participation and responsibility — made possible through Natural law — are thus much greater and significant.

Human law is the third type that Aquinas speaks of. It is needed because man's knowledge of the Eternal and Natural laws is imperfect — limited to certain general principles and by the individual's own capacity of understanding — and because even if these principles are known, not all men obey them freely. It is the function of Human law to show how these general principles are to be adhered to by applying them in specific detail to human affairs. For example, the principle of Natural law that it is wrong to harm another is translated by Human law into direct prohibitions of acts such as murder and assault and accompanied by specific penalties to compel obedience from all.

Divine law is the fourth kind Aquinas describes. Man has a spiritual as well as a physical nature and has been destined for more than his life here on earth. He has the supernatural goal of an afterlife, and for this purpose Natural law is not sufficient. Therefore, Divine law — God's express commands as revealed in the New Testament and the words of Christ — has been given to man by God to supplement his imperfect knowledge. It alone can give guidance when Natural and Human laws fail. Natural law imparts to man a general instinctive knowledge of the principles of right and wrong, but it is not specific enough in telling him how to achieve salvation. And Human law, which is based upon Natural law, is wholly inadequate for that task. For not only is Human law fallible — often contradictory and unclear — but it is unable to know or to legislate concerning

man's interior state. Human law may prohibit murder but it cannot, nor should it, seek to control the hate in a man's soul. This is the province of Divine law, which will give man the grace and direction needed for salvation.

In examining Aquinas' typology, I find myself in agreement with his categorizations of Natural and Human laws, but not with those of Eternal and Divine laws. I am quite comfortable with the idea of a Natural law — a code of universal ethics, or moral principles, which all men share despite different cultural and historical circumstances. But I do differ with his insistence that Natural law is derived from, or is only a partial reflection of a greater Eternal law. I do not pretend to know the order of the universe, but I believe it is entirely possible (and in fact more likely) that those moral principles which we call Natural laws are no more than what the name implies, laws which are derived from our own natures as social creatures — as beings who have learned through time and experience how to live together. While Aquinas certainly acknowledges the social aspect of our natures, his theological grounding makes him unable to take the next step and place the ultimate evolution of and responsibility for our ethics in our own hands.

I also disagree strongly with Aquinas' views on the necessity of Divine law to perfect man's ethical or moral condition. While the New Testament and the words of Christ may be the proper path for some, it is not, nor should it attempt to be, the proper way for all. This too rigidly proscribes the routes to wisdom, to the good and the true, or in religious terms, to God. Throughout history good men have travelled many different avenues to establish, learn and live by moral codes which would lead to lives of virtue and grace. Aquinas, by limiting all of mankind to one path, would ask us to believe that individuals such as Lao-Tze, Buddha or Plato would be wrong if they were to defend and prefer their own ways to knowledge. It is obvious that men such as these, by whatever road they travel, would be among the "blessed" who have achieved very special insights into the heart of the universe.

While I may not agree with Aquinas' typology, I find that I can accept his definition of law, which is as ageless as it is clear and succinct: "An ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated."¹ For while modern man may reach this conclusion by more secular, non-Thomistic routes of reasoning, this definition is as viable today as when it was written in the thirteenth century.

According to Aquinas, first and foremost a law must be an act of reason, for "All law proceeds from the reason and will of the lawgiver: the Divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of God; the human law from the will of man, regulated by reason" (p. 111). As we have seen earlier, it is through reason that man participates in and understands his role in the divine plan. If man were to abandon reason, he would be acting irrationally, "unnaturally," and thus in contradiction of Natural law. It follows that any laws made in such a manner must also be irrational and in violation of Natural law, hence they must be void since they ". . . would savour of lawlessness, rather than of law . . ." (p. 4).

The second element in this definition is that the law must be framed for the good of all. Aquinas believes that the end of law is human happiness — and since

he is a social and political animal, man's happiness can only be found within a social unit. Thus any law designed to promote the welfare of all citizens will have the effect of promoting the good of all the individuals who comprise that society. Accordingly, a just law is not framed to cover only specific individuals or situations, but is a general statement designed to apply to a majority of people, over a long period of time and under numerous circumstances. Since certainty is not possible in human affairs, Aquinas notes that there may be times when the law is inappropriate, but he asserts that so long as the law works out well in a great number of cases, then it is a valid law.

Aquinas does make an important exception to this ideal. For he not only allows the law to "know" individuals, but also to be set aside when ". . . a precept, which is conducive to the common weal as a general rule, . . . would hinder some greater good, or . . . be the occasion of some evil . . ." (p. 114). Thus, in cases where a literal application would bring harm and be beside the true intention of the law, the law's spirit rather than its letter should be observed. Moreover, he believes that where equal application would further an already existing state of inequality, it is ". . . not respect of persons if unequal measures are served out to those who are themselves unequal. . . ." (p. 115).

These views are very much in accord with modern American concepts of justice. Our system of law is based on the belief that the law knows no citizens as individuals but all as equals. Yet, like Aquinas, the American system (especially in recent years) has also acknowledged the need for "dispensing" from the law — the implications of which can vividly be seen in the social legislation of the Sixties and Seventies which extended special protection and treatment to particular groups within society.

These Affirmative Action laws — highly controversial when enacted and still a source of much vehement disagreement — established guidelines designed to assure minority access to certain types of employment, schools and housing. Some fairly-well known examples are the specially devised, less rigorous physical examinations for women applying for New York City police and fire department positions, the maintenance of "double" lists for promotion within some civil service areas to compensate for lack of promotion of minority members in the past, and the adjustment of university admission procedures to favor applicants from particular groups, thereby increasing minority enrollment.

Opponents of Affirmative Action have claimed that such preferential treatment, no matter how well intentioned, cannot be justified; that laws designed to further the interests of specific individuals or groups only serve to introduce a reverse form of discrimination and inequality, and thus violate the concept of law serving the good of all. Supporters argue that "dispensing" is necessary to redress past ills and enable disadvantaged individuals to "catch up." They contend with Aquinas that when ". . . the condition of any person requires that he should reasonably receive special treatment, it is not respect of persons if he be the object of special favor . . ." (p. 115). We see in the emotions engendered by these acts that society's attempt to find a balance between Aquinas' two ideals — to legislate only for the common good and yet be able to "know" individuals when the law fails — is still a painful dilemma 700 years later.

The third part of Aquinas' definition of law is that it must be passed by one who has care of the community. By this he means that the lawgiver must be one who holds his power legitimately, one who is a genuine representative of the people and has not seized power through violence or compulsion.

Here Aquinas raises some very interesting questions: Who has the right to issue laws and to represent the people? And looking further beyond that question, there lies the even larger one: What is the Function of the state? If, for example, as St. Augustine (354–430 A.D.) maintained, the purpose of the state is merely to impose order and the ruler is a divine punishment or test, then the question of legitimacy — how power is achieved or held — is irrelevant, and the will of the ruler is enough to make a law just. But if as believed by Aquinas, the purpose of the state is to promote the welfare of its citizens, then the questions of how rule is achieved, how it is maintained, and in whose benefit the laws are made become critical ones.

By posing these questions, Aquinas has made both the law and the lawgiver the subject of judgment by conscience and quite clearly has introduced the option of disobedience not only to the individual law, but to the ruler himself.

The final element in Aquinas' definition is that the law be promulgated — all citizens must be given formal and public notification; unless it is made known, a law has no force to bind. The issue that Aquinas deals with here is the one of predictability. Public knowledge of law is essential to a well functioning legal system. An individual must be able to judge with a high amount of accuracy whether or not his behavior is legal. If he is unable to do so, no action can be undertaken with assurance and all activities of life take on an ominous uncertainty.

As history attests, this uncertainty is a potent tool of control and is used to some degree by all oppressive states, but it was cultivated and developed to an unparalleled extent in the twentieth century totalitarian regimes of Hitler and Stalin. In these states law changed with the whim of the leader; no one could know with certainty what was illegal now, what might suddenly be illegal tomorrow, or would be made illegal retroactively. The "consistent arbitrariness" of such laws made every act a potential crime and every individual a potential criminal. According to Hannah Arendt in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, "The aim of an arbitrary system is to destroy the civil rights of the whole population . . . The destruction of a man's rights, the killing of the juridical person in him, is a prerequisite for dominating him entirely."²

Aquinas in insisting on promulgation as a requirement for making law valid and binding recognizes the dangers inherent in the secret or inaccessible decree, and the role of consistent, predictable law in maintaining a stable society.

Aquinas believes that there is a clear and necessary relationship between Natural law and Human law. As discussed earlier, Natural law (as a reflection of Eternal law) is that innate knowledge possessed by man which allows him to understand and to participate in the divine order. Through Natural law man has had imprinted in him those universal moral principles by which he is able to distinguish right from wrong and to order his actions accordingly. But since the Natural law is abstract and man's understanding of it limited to only certain very general principles, there arises the need for Human law — the mechanism by

which these general principles can be applied in a specific, detailed manner to human affairs. Thus, for Aquinas, Human law plays a vital role in linking man's daily activities to the Natural and Eternal law.

Through the nature of this link, Aquinas points out the interrelated yet separate functions of the two laws. Where Natural law is abstract and concerned with the broad, unchanging principles of morality, Human law is concrete, narrowly focused on man's social relationships and bound within culture and time. But he states that for human laws to be legitimate they must be valid not only in context and form, but in content as well; that there must be a connection between justice as defined and applied by Human law and the eternal, valid principles of justice of the Natural law.

It is necessary, therefore, for Human law to have a standard outside itself. Without the "moral yardstick" of Natural law against which it may be measured, Human law would be judged only within the most narrow of frameworks: justice and morality would be relative to form, place and historical moment.

By requiring that Human law be bound by the moral guidelines of Natural law, Aquinas demands that man's moral conscience not be determined solely by the society within which he lives. If an individual's concept of good and evil is based entirely upon what his state's institutions, traditions and leaders tell him it ought to be, then he will be unable to judge the actions and laws of that society by any standard beyond habit and expediency. Without reference to any measure outside one's narrow cultural circumstances, right and wrong, just and unjust become empty words whose definitions shift with the changing demands and needs of a particular society at a particular time.

I believe that Aquinas' fear is a valid one. The need for human law to be bound by fundamental moral considerations has been demonstrated time and time again. We have seen all too often the damage done by those societies and individuals who either know no morality or only their own peculiar version of it. For example, if one lived in Nazi Germany then the highest morality would be to cleanse the state and ultimately the world of all "undesirables," by spilling the blood of millions. Such a morality, twisted out of any recognizable shape, could only grow in a world completely turned in on itself, a world which could not recognize any goals, any purposes, any standards other than its own. Or, if one lived during the religious wars of the sixteenth century then the highest morality would be to slaughter those who did not worship God precisely as one did.

When the laws of a society are not measured against any standard other than its own, the validity of those laws becomes increasingly difficult and in some instances, impossible, to judge; thus mindless obedience rises to become the highest virtue. I agree completely with Aquinas that man must be able to examine the morality of all laws from a perspective outside his own culture and the emotions and pressures of the moment. When he does not, injustice and tragedy result.

Clearly, then, Human law and Natural law are closely related. But according to St. Thomas they are not interchangeable. Both have different functions. While Natural law gives man a moral standard with which to judge his laws, Human law gives man the means to order his daily activities in accordance with those general moral guidelines. While Human law must function within the parameters

established by the principles of Natural law, this should not be understood to mean that Human law should attempt to interpret and enforce those moral codes in all areas of human existence. This would be neither possible nor desirable.

Human law is designed to regulate man's relationships with his fellow men, not to suppress all vices or lead him to perfection. It can, for example, prohibit one man from harming another or from seizing his property, but it cannot know or control a man's inner desires or thoughts. While I acknowledge that the line between private interest and public good is a very uncertain and thin one, I maintain with Aquinas that those areas which do not effect or bring harm to any other person must be left within the domain of the individual's conscience.

I believe this is true for the following reasons. First, man's understanding of the moral code is variable. Interpretations differ from society to society and within the same society in different periods. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this can be seen in the varying interpretations of the moral principle that it is wrong to do harm to another human being. As a general principle, this statement is noncontroversial and brings wide and ready assent. But as it is narrowed down into ethical statements, religious doctrines and human law, the consensus is lost. For example, does this general principle mean that one should never kill? Or does it mean that one may kill under certain, limited circumstances, such as war? Does the state have a right to put to death citizens convicted of particular crimes? Is it wrong to remove life-saving medical treatment from a terminally ill patient? Is abortion murder? The list could go on and on. The more narrowly we apply the broad ethical statements to human activities the more complicated and ultimately unresolvable such questions become.

Second, in the attempt to legislate public morals lies the very great danger of one dominant group imposing its particular vision of truth and virtue on the rest of the public. One thinks immediately of the late, unlamented "Blue Laws" and Prohibition, and of current laws dealing with gambling, drug abuse, sexual conduct, prostitution — all more honored in the breach than in the observance. Any "vice" laws that do not reflect attitudes of the majority of the public cannot be enforced effectively or to any good purpose. And even if such enforcement were possible, the question still must be asked whether any one group's code of morality should be imposed on any other group. Experience has shown that laws attempting to graft artificial virtues onto an unwilling public will not take hold, but will be viewed as unwarranted interference, resisted and flouted.

The results are widely-disobeyed laws, the placing of quite respectable, "average" citizens in the category of lawbreaker, and an inevitable weakening of respect for all laws. Such mistaken attempts to legislate morals do not lead men to virtue or to happiness and often create greater evils in their wake — and so seem to stand in complete contradiction to Aquinas' philosophy and definition of law.

*Paper submitted to Professor Nathan Greenspan for credit in Political Science 201.

Notes

1. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Treatise on Law (Summa Theologica, Questions 90–97)* (Chicago: Regnery Gateway), pp. 10–11. All further reference to this work will be cited parenthetically within the text of the essay.
2. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), p. 451.

Bibliography

Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973.

D'Entreves, A. P., ed. *Aquinas: Selected Political Writings*. Translated by J.G. Dawson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965.

Thomas Aquinas, Saint. *Treatise on Law (Summa Theologica, Questions 90–97)*. Chicago: Regnery Gateway.

The State and Industrialization in Russia 1861—1953

Peter Paccione

The economic modernization of Russia, when compared with that of the West, has one very distinguishing characteristic — the central role of the Russian state in such modernization. The role of the state in the industrialization of Russia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was fundamental; the state, rather than private enterprise, was the institution which propelled industrialization. This was in keeping with the Russian historical tradition of “revolution from above,” that is, the tradition of the state being in control of the economy and being the agent of important economic change.

The event that revealed the backwardness of preindustrial Russia was its defeat in the Crimean War. This defeat in 1856 finally convinced the Russian government that far-reaching reform of the social and economic structure of the country was necessary if it was to be considered an equal of the Western powers. At the time, the base of the economy was the institution of serfdom. Most of the peasantry were either serfs, state peasants, or appanage peasants (owned by the tsar). Industry had actually declined since 1800. The greatly inadequate railway system was a major factor in the loss of the war. The economy as a whole was overwhelmingly agricultural, much more so than any of the Western powers.¹

The most important of the reforms undertaken by the state in the 1860's was the abolition of serfdom in 1861. The provisions of the emancipation were very limited from the point of view of the peasantry. The peasants received inadequate amounts of land, were required to pay heavy redemption payments, and the village commune (**obshchina**) was retained. Land was not privately owned, but held in common.² There has been debate as to the effect of the emancipation upon industrialization. The historian Alexander Gerschenkron suggests that the preservation of the **obshchina** and the difficulties encountered by peasants who wanted to leave it, were obstacles to the growth of an industrial labor force.³ But there is no doubt as to the importance of the abolition of serfdom. A feudal institution had been abolished, and the peasantry now had a freedom of movement which did not previously exist.

Another important development was the establishment of the State Bank in 1860. Through it, and the rest of the banking system, the state would finance much of the industrialization of the coming decades. The State Bank was the center of the Russian credit system. The banks were “not only the creditors of many industrial enterprises but also their founders, cashiers, directors of their current accounts, the managers and owners of their shares and their basic capital.”⁴

The Ministry of Finance was the agency of the Russian government which was most responsible for the economy. It owned the State Bank, the Treasury, and the Mint; controlled the state factories and mines; and had responsibility for taxes, tariffs, and regulation of private business.⁵ In short, the Ministry of Finance

oversaw both industry and trade.⁶ The mail and telegraph services were owned by the Ministry of Communications, and the Ministry of State Domains had charge of the state lands. The arms factories were owned by the army or navy.

The first post-reform industrialization program was that of Finance Minister Michael Reutern (1862–78). Reutern devised the system whereby the ruble would be strengthened by increasing the gold reserve. This would be done by increasing exports until a favorable balance-of-trade would be reached. A stable ruble would then attract more foreign investment. The only products which Russia could export were agricultural, primarily grain. Therefore, the peasants were forced to sell more of their crops, and were pushed to the margin of subsistence. But the system was a limited success. It caused a small increase in economic growth in the 1860's and 1870's.⁷

More ambitious was the program of Finance Minister Nicholas Bunge (1881–87). To increase agricultural productivity, he reduced the tax burden of the peasantry. To help industrial growth, he increased tariffs on imported products. The state began to nationalize the railroads and build new railway lines.⁸ Up to this time, the railway system had been mostly privately-owned. The lack of coordination between the lines resulted in serious problems during the Turkish war of 1877. The state had encouraged the building of new railway lines by guaranteeing the debts of the railroad companies.⁹ As a result, the railway system had grown from 2,195 miles in 1862 to 13,980 in 1878.¹⁰ Bunge's policy was to organize the Russian railway system into a single network, of both state and private lines, in which rolling stock could be interchanged and traffic coordinated.¹¹ Bunge's successor, Ivan Vyshnegradsky (1887–92), continued the policies of his predecessors, greatly increasing grain exports and reducing imports with tariffs, notably the high customs tariff of 1891, which was to remain until 1917.¹² His policy of forcing the peasantry to pay higher taxes and to sell more of their grain resulted in the famine of 1891 and his downfall. In 1891, there was a crop failure, and because of the high taxes, the peasantry had no money to fall back upon.¹³

The next Minister of Finance, Sergei Witte (1892–1903), who had a background in the railroad business and had been Minister of Communications, was the first finance minister to attempt a deliberate program of rapid industrialization. In his first budget report, Witte outlined what was to be his basic policy:

The Minister makes bold to say that as a result of the special historical conditions of its political structure and development, fiscal policy in our fatherland cannot be contained in the strictly limited framework of the financial needs of the government, as they are traditionally understood. In the understanding of the Russian people the sincere conviction prevails that it is within the power of the government authority to be concerned with everything touching the needs and the welfare of the people. In all cases of public misery, whenever it assumes considerable proportions, the people turn to the authority of the Tsar with their hopes and their trust. Considering the weak development

of the habits of self-help among the population, the whole burden of coping public misfortune falls inevitably upon the government.

In other words, says historian Theodore Von Laue, Witte saw the state as "fully responsible for the entire economy of Russia."¹⁴ In the same report, Witte called on the state to develop the natural resources of the country through industrialization:

Financial policy should not fail to pay attention to the undesirable effects of excessive thrift in meeting the growing demands, but on the contrary, should give reasonable assistance to the development of the productive forces of the country. Such a policy should show better results also in regard to government finance and raise not only the welfare of the population but also its paying powers and increase the sources of government revenue. In order to attain these ends one must above all aim at removing the unfavorable conditions which cramp the economic development of the country and at kindling a healthy spirit of enterprise in accordance with the natural conditions and demands of our national industries.¹⁵

At the time, the share of the national economy owned by the Russian government was larger than that of any other Western country. The state was the largest landowner, possessing about 38% of Russian territory, including 60% of the forest lands. Most of the railway system was state-owned, as were the metallurgical and armaments industries and mining.¹⁶ The central feature of Witte's program was the expansion of the railway system. This would stimulate the production of metallurgical and other heavy industries supplying material for railroad construction, and industries (such as fuel) which serve the railroads. This would in turn stimulate the growth of light industries. Thus the state would be the catalyst of economic growth and modernization, but it would also create the conditions in which private enterprise could expand.¹⁷ This was done with state financing of private industry. The State Bank was reorganized in 1894, one of the reforms being the granting of industrial loans.¹⁸ Foreign investment was also important. In 1900, about 28% of the capital of the private sector was foreign. By 1919, the figure was 33%. In those years, foreign investment increased 85%.¹⁹

Almost half of the government's income came from indirect taxes on consumer goods. Although Witte tried to shift the tax burden away from the peasantry, taxes on such goods as sugar, kerosene, tobacco, and matches, which were used by the peasantry, were increased. In 1892, all indirect taxes were increased by 11½%. Besides indirect taxes, the peasants still had to pay redemption dues to the state. The resulting heavy burden prevented the peasantry from improving its traditionally low standard of living. The tax money of the peasantry was being used for investment by the state in industry rather than for the peasants' own consumption.²⁰

Other sources of government income were the tariffs, especially the customs tariff of 1891, and profits from the state liquor monopoly.²¹ The industry in which

the state took the largest role in financing was the railway system. It was the centerpiece of Witte's program, and its expansion was to stimulate the growth of the rest of Russian industry. The state invested its funds into the railroads, and guaranteed the interest on loans to private railroads. The banks issued special loans for railroad building.²²

The result of the Witte system was that industrial production more than doubled. Railroad mileage increased 73.5%; pig iron production tripled.²³ Steel and cast iron production increased 2½ times, and that of coal more than doubled, between 1892 and 1902. In the same period, oil production increased 243%, and that of chemicals 177%. A modern industrial center was created in the Ukraine, mostly with foreign investment.²⁴ The average rate of industrial growth in 1885–89 was 6.10%, in 1890–99, 8.03% (from 1894 to 1899, close to 9%), in 1900–06, 1.45%, and 1907–13, 6.25%.²⁵

Industrial growth slowed after 1900 because of depression, social unrest and revolution, and after Witte resigned in 1903, state investment in industry declined. Industry continued to expand, but at a more gradual pace.

The most important economic development between 1900 and World War I was the land reform program of Prime Minister Peter Stolypin (1906–11), enacted in a series of measures between 1906 and 1910. The reform made it possible for the peasantry to leave the **obshchina** easily, or to consolidate their scattered holdings into one farmstead. The motive behind the reform was to create a class of peasant proprietors who would have a vested interest in the status quo and who would be loyal to the government. Another feature of the reform was the abolition of redemption payments. By 1916, about 2 million peasant households had set up private farms.²⁶ Many peasants took advantage of the reform to leave the **obshchina** and move to the cities. Thus the reform program futhered industrialization.²⁷

By 1913, it was apparent that since 1890, Russia had undergone an industrial revolution, although compared with the Western powers, it was still far behind. The statistics for 1913 included:²⁸

coal	29.2 million tons
oil	10.3 million tons
pig iron	4.2 million tons
steel	2 billion kilowatts

The impact of war, revolution, and civil war could be seen in the figures for 1921; Russian industry had nearly collapsed:²⁹

coal	9 million tons
oil	3.8 million tons
pig iron	100,000 tons
steel	200,000 tons
electricity	520 million kilowatts
indexes (1913 equals 100):	
gross industrial production	31
large scale industry	21
agricultural production	60

In agriculture, the seizure of land by the peasantry during the revolution had

turned Russian agriculture into one of small holdings, again held in common in village communes, and farmed for subsistence.³⁰

In December 1917, the Soviet government had established the Supreme Council of National Economy (VSNKh). Its function was officially defined:

The organization of the national economy and state finance. With this object VSNKh elaborates general norms and the plan for regulating the economic life of the country, reconciles and unites the activities of central and local regulating agencies (the council on fuel, metal, transport, central food supply committee, and others of the appropriate peoples' commissariats: of trade and industry, food supplies, agriculture, finance, army and navy, etc.) . . .³¹

VSNKh was responsible only to the Council of People's Commissars (cabinet of ministers); it was to nationalize and control industry and banking and plan industrial development. It was the central agency through which all important industry would be administered. VSNKh was composed of divisions (**glayki**), each in charge of an entire industry. There were also provincial and local Councils of National Economy (**Sovnarkomy** and **Gubsovnarkomy**), which controlled smaller local industries.³² VSNKh was thus the Soviet equivalent of the tsarist Finance Ministry, with its responsibility for industry and banking, although the Soviet state now provided for nationalization, central control, and central planning. From the beginning, the Soviet government intended to take a more direct role in regulating the Russian economy than the tsarist government had.

In the War Communism period (1918–21), the government policy towards industry was all-round nationalization. By late 1919, 80–90 percent of large-scale industry had been nationalized.³³ The severe food shortages during the civil war forced the government to resort to seizure of surplus grain from the peasantry (**prodrazverstka**).³⁴

In 1921, with the end of the civil war, the Soviet government implemented the New Economic Policy (NEP). This policy was a partial return to private activity to help in rebuilding the devastated economy. Small-scale industry was reprivatized, private trade was again permitted, and **prodrazverstka** was abandoned and replaced with an agricultural tax (**prodnalog**). However, the state retained control of the "commanding heights" of the economy: heavy industry, banking, railroads, mining and foreign trade.³⁵ Gosplan (the State Planning Commission) was established in February 1921. Its function was to "work out a single general state economic plan and methods and means of implementing it."³⁶ While no central planning was implemented during the NEP period, the intention of the Soviet state to institute a planned economy had already existed at the beginning of the period.

Throughout the NEP period, agriculture continued to be primarily in the hands of peasant owners of small holdings. In 1928, 97.3% of sown land was farmed by individual peasants, as compared to 1.2% farmed by collective farms and 1.5% farmed by state farms.³⁷ The contradiction of having a state-owned industrial sector and a privately-owned agricultural sector revealed itself in the "scissors crisis" of 1923, when prices of industrial goods exceeded those of 1913 while

agricultural prices declined to below the 1913 level.³⁸ The NEP was a temporary expedient, an adaptation to the conditions created by the peasant land seizures. The peasantry at this time still comprised the majority of the Russian population. In Lenin's words, NEP was a "compromise between the proletariat which puts its dictatorship into practice or holds the State power in its hand, and the majority of the peasant population."³⁹ Peasant hostility became apparent in 1927 when the government encountered peasant resistance in its procurement of grain.⁴⁰ This was the beginning of the end of NEP.

Other factors which ended NEP were the consolidation of state control over the economy and the wearing out of the old industrial plant dating from tsarist times. With the rise of Stalin in the late 1920's, the economic atmosphere gradually changed to one of increased control of the state over the economy. In 1926, VSNKh began to increase its control of production and distribution of important goods such as metals. Coordination of the activities of VSNKh and Gosplan increased. The possibility of central planning was becoming realized. In October 1926, the fifteenth party congress called for "the strengthening of the economic hegemony of large-scale socialist industry over the entire economy of the country." In June 1927, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree calling for a "united, all-union plan, which, being the expression of economic unity of the Soviet Union, would facilitate the maximum development of economic regions on the basis of their specialization, . . . and the maximum utilization of their resources for the purpose of the industrialization of the country." Investment was increased, and the role of Gosplan was upgraded. The first Five year Plan was approved by the sixteenth party congress in April 1929.⁴¹ This was a plan for crash industrialization.

There remained the question of how to deal with the peasantry. In the economic debate of the 1920's, the "left opposition" economist Yevgeny Preobrazhensky had advocated crash industrialization financed by "primitive socialist accumulation," whereby the peasantry would be forced to provide food for the cities, grain for export, and taxes for state investment. Preobrazhensky called it **perekachka** (pumping) of the peasantry.⁴² In late 1929, Stalin put this theory into practice, ordering forced collectivization of agriculture. With collectivization it became possible for the state to procure grain and collect taxes from the peasantry without resistance. Whereas under NEP, the peasants grew for their own consumption and sold their surplus to the state, under collectivization they were forced onto collective farms and produced primarily for the state. Under Stalin, as under Witte, the peasantry was forced to bear the burden of financing the industrialization of Russia.⁴³

There was no foreign investment involved in the industrialization of the 1930's; all financing had to come from inside the country. Most of the money for state investment came from taxation, especially the turnover tax, begun in 1930. The turnover tax included excise taxes on consumer goods such as liquor, salt and matches, sales taxes on industrial consumer goods such as textiles and sewing machines, and the tax which was derived by procuring grain from peasants at a low price and then selling it to consumers at a higher price. Other sources of income included the sale of compulsory bonds, profits from state enterprises,

and increased printing of money.⁴⁴ On the collective farms, the peasants were allowed to maintain private plots of land for farming; however, the state levied a high income tax on profits from the sale of this produce. The state charged high prices for consumer goods, paid low prices for grain, and often requisitioned grain. Through these methods, and through other taxation, the state appropriated much of the peasants' income, forcing them to reduce consumption and to divert more of their income into state investment into industrialization, as it had done under Witte.⁴⁵

As the period of the first Five-Year Plan continued and the administration of the economy became increasingly complex, the state economic apparatus was reformed. The number of divisions and subdivisions of VSNKh continued to increase until 1932, when it was abolished and its functions were taken over by several commissariats (ministries) dealing with different parts of the economy; the largest of these was the Commissariat of Heavy Industry. Banking and credit were also reformed. Control of credit was increasingly centralized through the State Bank.⁴⁶

The results of the first Five-Year Plan were impressive, notwithstanding the fact that the plan targets and later upward revisions were unrealistic and were unfulfilled. First, the figures for 1928 ought to be considered for comparison.⁴⁷

	1928	1932
Coal	35.4 million tons	64.3 million tons
Oil	11.7 million tons	21.4 million tons
Pig iron	3.3 million tons	6.2 million tons
Steel	4 million tons	5.9 million tons
Electricity	5 billion kilowatts	13.4 billion kilowatts
National income	24.4 billion rubles	45.4 billion rubles
Gross industrial production	18.3 billion rubles	43.3 billion rubles
Gross agricultural production	13.1 billion rubles	16.6 billion rubles

The drafting of the second Five-Year Plan, covering the years 1933 to 1937, was made in a more realistic atmosphere, and was called the "return to sober planning." The selected results for 1937 were:⁴⁸

	1937
Coal	128 million tons
Oil	28.5 million tons
Pig iron	14.5 million tons
Steel	17.7 million tons
Electricity	36.2 billion kilowatts
National income	96.3 billion rubles
Gross industrial production	95.5 billion rubles
Gross agricultural production	20.1 billion rubles

The Stalin system stood the test of World War II. The industrial sector underwent conversion to wartime production, and, as the Germans advanced, factories and workers were relocated to the east. About 1,360 factories, and a third of the factory working force, were moved to the Urals, Western Siberia, Central Asia, and other areas. A new industrial complex was built in the Urals, producing iron, steel, and armaments. Metallurgical and fuel industries were

established in Siberia and Central Asia. But the economy did suffer grievously from the wars, especially in 1941, the year of the German invasion; and in the occupied areas in the west.⁴⁹

After the war, the Soviet Union faced the task of reconversion and reconstruction. In August 1945, Gosplan was ordered to draft a fourth Five-Year Plan in which pre-war output would be exceeded by 1950. If official statistics are to be believed, this was accomplished. The selection figures for 1940 and 1945, and the results of the plan, were:⁵⁰:

	1940	1945	1950
coal	165.9 million tons	149.3 million tons	261.1 million tons
oil	31.1 million tons	19.4 million tons	37.9 million tons
pig iron	14.9 million tons	8.8 million tons	19.2 million tons
steel	18.3 million tons	12.3 million tons	27.3 million tons
tractors	66,200	14,700	242,500
electricity	48.3 billion kilowatts	43.2 billion kilowatts	91.2 billion kilowatts

With the death of Stalin in 1953, the days of Russian industrialization were over. By then, the Soviet economy was mature and developed; there was no more need of crash programs and rapid change. In the Russian tradition, it was centralized and administered by a massive bureaucracy.⁵¹

The historian William Blackwell notes five general characteristics which functioned during both the tsarist and Soviet periods and are present in Russian economic history. They are bureaucracy, military mobilization, tribute, slavery (convict labor), and violence.⁵² Bureaucracy and military mobilization are consequences of Russian geographic and historical conditions and are deeply rooted in Russian history. The Russian state, both tsarist and Soviet, has been a centralized bureaucracy. In the Soviet state, this tradition is exemplified by central economic planning. Industrialization and modernization in Russia has often been spurred by military necessity. Tribute is the extraction of grain, labor and taxes from the peasantry. Both the industrialization programs of Witte and Stalin were financed primarily in this way. Forced convict labor, including that of political prisoners, was utilized in both tsarist and Soviet times, but used more widely in the latter. Violence was used especially by Stalin, as in forced collectivization of agriculture.

Gerschenkron agrees that military considerations largely determined the first rapid industrialization of the 1890's, as they had influenced the economic policies of previous tsars, such as Peter the Great (1696—1725). In the title essay of his book, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*, Gerschenkron writes that "the state, moved by its military interest, assumed the role of the primary agent propelling the economic progress of the country."⁵³

In the nineteenth century, there was a sizeable private sector in Russia. Families such as the Guchkovs, Konovalovs, and Morozovs made industrial fortunes. Religious outcasts, such as Jews and Old Believers, (a sect of Orthodox fundamentalist dissenters) were industrialists and bankers. Before 1861, some peasants were permitted to engage in business under the legal protection of their lords; a few became industrialists.⁵⁴ But the only institution which could carry out the kind of economic modernization which Russia required in order to become

an advanced industrial power was the state. Only the state could command the financial resources necessary for rapid industrialization. This was true under Witte as it was under Stalin. The Russian private sector was small and ineffective compared to those of the Western countries, especially Britain and the United States, where laissez-faire policies resulted in gradual industrialization. As Gerschenkron writes in another essay, in Russia "government action took the place of what in other countries was achieved through the pull of a growing free market, or through forced savings generated either by credit creation or by the impact upon current income of previously accumulated claims."⁵⁵ In the Russian historical tradition, it has been the state which has dominated the economy and has carried out any fundamental economic transformation, in both the industrial and agricultural spheres. The state imposed serfdom in 1649 and abolished it in 1861. Peter the Great introduced the first industrial policy; Sergei Witte began the modern industrialization of Russia. The modern Soviet economy is the creation of Stalin, who nationalized the entire economy, implemented super-industrialization and central planning, and collectivized agriculture. The taxation policies of Witte and Stalin illustrate another point: in order to catch up with the West, the Russian state will demand sacrifices from its people.

Submitted to Professor Manuel Dobos. HST 575. Soviet Eastern European Economic History.

Notes

1. Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR* (New York: Penguin, 1982) p. 11.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 20—21.
3. Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 120—121.
4. Lionel Kochan, *The Making of Modern Russia* (New York: Penguin, 1981), p. 176.
5. William L. Balckwell, *The Industrialization of Russia* (New York: Crowell, 1970), pp. 26.
6. Theodore Von Laue, *Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia* (New York: Atheneum, 1974), p. 74.

7. Blackwell, pp. 27–29.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
9. Von Laue, p. 14.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 26–27
13. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 73–74.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
19. Nove, p. 18.
20. Von Laue, pp. 101–102.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
22. Kochan, p. 199.
23. Nove, p. 13.
24. Von Laue, pp. 267–268.
25. Olga Crisp, *Studies in the Russian Economy Before 1914* (London: Macmillan, 1976), p. 111.
26. Nove, p. 22.
27. Gerschenkron, pp. 134–135.
28. Nove, p. 14.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
32. Blackwell, pp. 70—71.
33. Nove, p. 69.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 83—85.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
39. Kochan, p. 271.
40. Nove, p. 150.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 143—144.
42. Blackwell, pp. 94—95.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
44. Nove, pp. 210—211.
45. Blackwell, p. 103.
46. Nove, pp. 214—216.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 192.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
49. Blackwell, pp. 147—148.
50. Nove, p. 293.
51. Blackwell, p. 150.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 168.

53. Gerschenkron, p. 17.
54. Blackwell, pp. 19—21.
55. Gerschenkron, p. 126.

Bibliography

- Blackwell, William L., *The Industrialization of Russia*. New York: Crowell, 1970.
- Blum, Jerome, *Lord and Peasant in Russia From the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.
- Crisp, Olga, *Studies in the Russian Economy Before 1914*. London: Macmillan, 1976.
- Gerschenkron, Alexander, *Continuity In History*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.
- Gerschenkron, Alexander, *Economic Backwardness In Historical Perspective*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966.
- Kochan, Lionel, *The Making of Modern Russia*. New York: Penguin, 1981.
- Lyashchenko, Peter I, *History of the National Economy of Russia to 1917*. New York: Octagon Books, 1970.
- Nove, Alec, *An Economic History of the U.S.S.R.* New York: Penguin, 1982.
- Von Laue, Theodore H., *Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia*. New York: Atheneum, 1974.
- Von Laue, Theodore H., *Why Lenin? Why Stalin?* Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964.

The Fallacy of Self-Reliance

Lisa Petersen

I will examine the concept of self-reliance, with the transcendental theory that supports it, as found in the works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, Walt Whitman, and Edgar Allan Poe. I will explore the background of the Romantic movement, using the works of artists to illustrate its characteristic themes. V.L. Parrington's critique of the Romantic writers provides insight into the development of the theories of self-reliance and transcendentalism. The fundamental philosophy of these Romantic writers presents solitude and communion with nature as the ideal, as opposed to the restrictive world of society with its complex web of norms and customs. Nature was idealized and offered as a solution to alleviate man's frustrations in a restrictive world. Yet this self-reliance concept, briefly practiced by its expounders, was not a complete success or solution. The Romantic writers ultimately felt drawn back into society. This demonstrated that perhaps self-reliance was difficult to execute, and that man has a practical need for social organization to support his economy and culture.

In America, there was a turning-away from Europe after the Revolution and the War of 1812, and introspection ensued. This led to an excitement of the emotions and moods in the attitudes of Americans. An awe at the wide expanse of the country, fear of the Indians, and the loneliness of the frontier were a few emotions that were elicited. Also, the change in America from villages to cities caused the frontier and nature to be emphasized and idealized. The cities were dirty and crowded and lacked any public sanitation system.

The period between 1829—1862 witnessed a steady march of democracy in the growth of the franchise and the wide availability of property. The 1828 election of President Jackson achieved universal manhood suffrage and the growth of political parties developed. The Andrew Jackson hero image promoted the agrarian myth that idealized the common man. A belief was developed that the common man was best and that he must settle on the western frontier. Society in urban areas (cities) became more complex than agrarian or farm society. In the country, an independent family unit was based on tradition, simplicity, and culture. The emphasis was on cooperation and sharing of tasks, with few outside demands. On the contrary, a different society developed within the cities. The home became the place of residence, and the family pursued separate objectives. A Romantic image of the mother as the guardian of the household and of virtue and chastity emerged from this.

Nature was a fundamental element of the Romantic movement, particularly in the development of the theories of transcendentalism and self-reliance. Nature was idealized by Romantic painters. The Hudson River School was devoted to landscape painting and was directed by Thomas Cole. One painter from this school, Asher Brown Durand, painted "Scene From Thanatopsis" (1850). This painting

was based on the poem entitled "Thanatopsis" by William Cullen Bryant. "Thanatopsis" means "meditation on death," but the poem, far from being gloomy, extols the grandeur of nature as "thine eternal resting place," "one mighty sepulchre" in which we may take comfort as members of the "innumerable caravan of humankind."¹ This painting by Durand culminates the techniques employed by other Romantic painters. The style of the painting is expressed in its capture of nature as a mysterious force imbued with magical qualities. Durand has captured the mystery and splendor of nature through the use of gold tones and the surreal effects of the clouds.

Thomas Cole illustrates my theory that man lives in an interconnected world. He creates a world which can be enjoyed and contemplated in solitude, yet he ultimately relies on the interactions of society to sustain itself. Unlike Durand, who advocates an extreme self-reliance, Cole appears to qualify this concept by illustrating the need for a social order for the achievement of people's individual needs in his painting entitled "View on the Catskill." On the other hand, he does not wholly dispute the claims of self-reliance in that within this painting there are illustrated havens for individual repose and recreation. The people in this painting are involved in separate pursuits encompassed within a beautiful panorama of nature. Man, woman, and child are all present in this pastoral setting, manifesting a continuation of life and posterity. This would be impossible to achieve with a strict adherence to the concept of self-reliance.

Romantic writers did influence society and helped to shape their culture. This demonstrates that the fundamental thesis of self-reliance is not tenable since the Romantic artists and writers were never fully isolated or apart from their society and culture. According to R.W. Harris, [it was] by the Romantics' "simple appreciation of wild scenery [that] they were interpreting a general opinion."² A few components of the Romantic movement outlined by R.W. Harris illustrates both the foundation of culture and tradition of this movement, and the necessity of social interactions to develop the concept of self-reliance: ". . . a new sense of history, of people retaining their ancient traditions through long periods of time, and expressing them in poetry and song on long winter evenings, and all this taking place against a background of nature, not yet evolutionary, but pursuing its 'unvarying course' regardless of man's fate."³

Romantic writers advocated escape into the woods to contemplate nature. Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman were espoused, and practiced, to a limited extent, important philosophical concepts that included self-reliance and transcendentalism. Although there exists an idealized portrayal of nature and the glorification of the common man in the themes of Romantic literature, the important concepts of self-reliance and passive disobedience were developed. R.W. Harris supports my idea: "The sensuous nature of much of romantic poetry should not obscure the fact that romantic poets were often concerned with serious attempts to arrive at answers to philosophical, social, and even political problems."⁴ The concept of self-reliance developed by the Romantic writers had a far-reaching social impact. The theory proposes a total faith and dependence on the individual and stresses non-conformity to conformity to society's norms and established regulations. Self-reliance is in essence a rejection of the customs and traditions

held by society, and opts for an uninhibited, natural life-style in direct communion with nature and God.

The transcendental concept founded by Ralph Waldo Emerson must also be explained to provide a broader picture of self-reliance. This is a concept that the individual and every living creature was a part of the 'Over-Soul' (God), and that God transcends the material and is found in nature. God transcends natural creations and forms a unified whole. Man must go where he is surrounded by nature and consequently by God. Emerson's views on self-reliance are the following: "To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men — that is genius. Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal since; for the inmost in due time becomes the outmost, and our first thought is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment."⁵ This excerpt incorporates a religious perspective into the concept of self-reliance. Another important statement by Emerson is the following: "Trust thyself; every heart vibrates to that iron string. Accept the place the divine providence has found for you."⁶ Emerson proposed an escape from society and ugly reality by a retreat into nature: "To go into solitude, a man needs to retire as much from his chamber as from society."⁷ The rationale of transcendentalism is used to support the concept of self-reliance. Emerson claims that transcendentalism is the basis for the concept of self-reliance in his discussion of the individual: "His experience inclines him to behold the procession of facts you call the world, as flowing perpetually outward from an invisible, unsounded centre in him . . . From this transfer of the world into the consciousness, this beholding of all things in the mind, follow easily his whole ethics. It is simpler to be self-dependent. The height, the deity of man is to be self-sustained, to need no gift, no foreign force. Society is good when it does not violate me, but best when it is likest to solitude. Everything real is self-existent."⁸ Man is able to grasp the meaning of self-reliance, and to strive for it, once an understanding of the transcendental concept of oneness with nature and the universe has been achieved.

Emerson, as a Romantic writer, did not present a full view of the concept of self-reliance. Although he advocated self-reliance and often retreated into the solitude of the Concord countryside, he also recognized the importance of society and remained in it. He took an active role in lecturing his philosophy and concept to various audiences and traveled widely, meeting and corresponding with some of the greatest philosophers and poets of the day. He was able to influence the society in which he lived, and to help shape its culture through his lectures. Although Emerson advocated a reliance on the self and proposed solitary communion with nature, he realized the need to be part of society. The following illustrates my conclusions: "In 1836, with the publication of his first book, *Nature*, he began to gather about him those like-minded contemporaries and then, as time went on, those younger admirers and even disciples who were to demonstrate to him that, in "thinking alone" and in "speaking his own mind", he was thinking and speaking for a whole age."⁹ In his publishing efforts, Emerson adhered to a rather strict concept of individualism. In pursuing his concept of self-reliance, Emerson was more concerned with the individual search for truth and morality.

He did not incorporate his pragmatic experiences within society as an integral part of his philosophy. His philosophy, especially the concept of self-reliance, was based on idealistic rather than pragmatic social principles. I therefore conclude that his self-reliance theory emphasized the austere features of the individual in the world. He omitted the aspect of cultural and materialistic social dependencies. He appeared to be emphatically making a philosophical point and felt that other aspects (social and economic) would diminish the integrity of his concept of self-reliance. He viewed it as a concept isolated and apart from worldly and practical concerns.

Thoreau took a different approach than Emerson in that he attempted to practice the theory of self-reliance in his daily life, thereby using an idealistic concept in a practical way. Parrington, in depicting the difference between the two Romantic writers, claims that Emerson: “. . . was not a Thoreau to love his Walden Pond for its own sake, and it needed an effort of the will to send him as far as Auburn wood, to lie on his back and translate nature into metaphysic.”¹⁰ Emerson appeared to be on a higher intellectual and refined cultural level than Thoreau. In *Walden*, Henry David Thoreau explores the freedom of choice between nature and society as confronted by man. He opted to live a natural way in seclusion from society. He built a house by Walden Pond in Concord, Massachusetts. He worked manually to support himself for about two years and thereby managed to be self-sufficient. In this experiment of autonomy and self-reliance, Thoreau was able to experience the result of his decision when confronted with freedom of choice. He was faced with the choice of either following society's conventions or rejecting them and living a natural life. Thoreau chose a life in close association with nature. Thoreau claims: “I would rather sit on a pumpkin and have it all to myself, than be crowded on a velvet cushion.”¹¹ With this statement, he rejects the luxuries, bustlings, and pleasures of society and instead welcomes a life of quiet, if uncomfortable, solitude. Thoreau's observation that: “The masses of men lead lives of quiet desperation”¹² implies that the majority of people are unhappy in this world of artificial rules. Yet Thoreau felt compelled to leave the woods and solitude behind and to rejoin society after two years of absence from it. He claims: “I left the woods for as good a reason as I went there. Perhaps it seemed to me that I had several more lives to live, and could not spare any more time for that one.”¹³ I looked into his journal entry for more information on this, and I found the following: “But why I changed? Why I left the woods? I do not think that I can tell . . . Perhaps I wanted a change. There was a little stagnation, it may be. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon the world's axle creaked as if it needed greasing . . .”¹⁴ The ‘stagnation’ that Thoreau experienced might have resulted from isolation from his fellow-men and society. The last line suggests that Thoreau felt the need and felt compelled to return to society to ‘lubricate’ it with his new thoughts and perspectives.

Thoreau's method of dealing with society's conventions was through the use of ‘civil disobedience.’ It was a form of passive resistance that later influenced such people as Mohandis Gandhi in his fight for India's independence from the British empire. Thoreau employed passive resistance in the poll-tax incident.

Thoreau had refused to pay the poll-tax, since he opposed the principle behind it — America's involvement in a war with Mexico. Thoreau makes the following observations as he is jailed: "But, wherever a man goes, men will pursue and paw him with their dirty institutions, and, if they can, constrain him to belong to their desperate odd-fellow society."¹⁵ In this passive resistance, he opted not to pay the poll-tax and resigned himself to the consequence of his action — jail. By this action, he makes it apparent that he resents confining himself to society's rules and regulations.

This act of civil disobedience had wide ramifications. Mohandas Gandhi utilized this principle in his movement. He preached this principle to this people, and at one point almost sacrificed his life in a fast to emphasize the importance of abiding by this principle. Unlike Thoreau, whose act was an individual social protest, Gandhi realized the significance of this concept and utilized it on a larger scale. Gandhi emphasized 'non-cooperation' — a concept based directly on Thoreau's writings — in his struggle for India against the British imperialists during the early 20th century. The derivation of the term 'Satyagraha' as defined by Gandhi illustrates the significance of the movement: "I therefore corrected it to 'Satyagraha.' Truth (Satya) implies Love, and Firmness (Agraha) engenders and therefore serves as a synonym for force . . . that is to say, the Force which is born of Truth and Love or Non-Violence."¹⁶

Parrington illustrates another example of passive resistance, which supports the concept of reliance on the self or individual rather than on society: "They were far more interested in God than in Caesar, and they found it impossible to divide loyalties that too often clashed. When Caesar essayed to impose his will upon theirs, when he put their ideals in jeopardy by demanding allegiance to laws, they did not approve, they quietly denied him sovereignty and followed their own paths."¹⁷

Walt Whitman, like Thoreau, chose to live in a natural way rather than in an 'artificial' society of perfumes and manners. His poem entitled "Song of Myself" is an appreciation of nature and of himself as an individual. The first line is indicative of a strong sense of self-reliance and the faith in the individual: "I celebrate myself."¹⁸ In the second section of the poem, he rejects the 'artificial' society and prefers nature for his contemplations. He is able to record his thoughts and feelings in the solitude of nature. In his description of his ongoing physical processes which he observes while resting in a natural location, he concludes with a message to the reader to be self-reliant and to trust yourself as an individual: "You shall not look through my eyes either, nor take things from me. You shall listen to all sides and filter them from yourself."¹⁹ Society appears to be a restricting and contrived influence on his life. In his rejection of society for a natural milieu he experiences a revitalizing release, which he communicates to society through his works. A picture of restrictive society is presented by Whitman: "What living and buried speech is always vibrating here . . . what howls restrained by decorum."²⁰ In this, a depiction of man's frustrations at being restrained and oppressed by society's rules of conduct is manifested. The ramifications of the sense of freedom that Whitman experienced in the secluded natural location, alone with the sea, is illustrated: "Cushion me

soft . . . rock me in billowy drowse . . . Capricious and dainty sea! I am integral with you . . . I too am of one phase and of all phases."²¹ Whitman experienced elation in his self-reliance and contemplations of nature.

Although Whitman enjoyed his solitary visits on the farm of his friend Harry Stafford at Twin Creek in New Jersey, he did not live apart from society. As Edgar Lee Masters has noted: "His Celtic blood was clearly manifested in his disposition to be among crowds, to talk with passers-by, to search out new friends, to learn about people, and to fellow with them . . . There was something else: he loved the flesh of humanity, he wanted to be in affectionate touch with it, to feel it and to identify himself with it."²² By this excerpt, one can feel Whitman's need for contact and experiences with society.

Poe was a romantic poet who used nature to express his emotions in a type of art form. According to Edmund C. Stedman: "Accept him, then, whether as poet or romancer, as a pioneer of the art feeling in American literature. No man ever lived in whom the passion for loveliness so governed the emotions and convictions . . ." "²³ His poem "The Sleeper" paints a visual image of a dead young maiden through the use of nature. In the first stanza of this poem, the "vapour" appears to have a soothing quality conducive to "sleep." This 'sleep' of the young maiden is actually death: "Because Poe imagined death as a 'conscious slumber'."²⁴ As a romantic poet, he used scenes from nature and emphasized passion over reason in his works. The ideal concept that he focused on is the death of a beautiful young maiden. The Romantic writers stressed an escape from society into nature. Poe was inspired by nature to elicit strong emotions in his poems, yet his main themes centered on an aspect of society — the death of a young maiden. Poe would be unable to write about this subject unless he maintained contact with society. Poe practiced self-reliance in the solitude of nature to a limited degree in order to express and define his emotional reactions. Yet Poe relied on society to provide the subject material for his major works.

Parrington's analysis of the transcendental movement and the concept of self-reliance supports my thesis: "Idealists though they were, they could not escape meddling with the real which encompassed them on all sides — with institutions, laws, society, with the state itself . . . Transcendentalism may have run into its follies, but foolish in its critical judgment — blind to the gap between profession and reality — it was not."²⁵ Romantic writers and philosophers, although espousing idealistic concepts devoid of pragmatic implications, did involve themselves in society and helped to shape their culture. They did not practice on more than a temporary basis the concepts that they developed. They realized that these idealistic concepts were hard to carry out and did not fully apply to real-life situations.

In *Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Representative Government*, John Stuart Mill sums up the social need for interactions: "It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to suppose that it is one selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have no business with each other's conduct in life, and that they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one another, unless their own interest is involved. Instead of any

diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the good of others.¹¹²⁶ The choice between nature and society, as proposed by the Romantic writers in the form of self-reliance based on transcendental concepts, did not take this basic human need for interaction into account.

The concept of self-reliance, as espoused by Ralph Waldo Emerson and utilized by 19th century Romantic writers such as Whitman and Thoreau, had a basic flaw. The dichotomy between nature and social organization that resulted from the romantic movement (and self-reliance in particular) was difficult to practice. Dependence on and the importance of a community and an established social order is a necessary function and an integral part of the history of man. I have explored the background of the Romantic movement, using examples from art to illustrate its characteristic themes. I have then examined the works of major poets, writers and philosophers of the Romantic era. The authors analyzed were Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, and Edgar Allen Poe. Vernon Louis Parrington gave insights into the development of the concepts of self-reliance based on transcendentalism. These Romantic writers have presented solitude in nature as the ideal, as opposed to the restrictive conventions of an oppressive society. Yet the self-reliance concept was not tenable as a permanent solution. Although briefly practiced by these writers, they were ultimately compelled to return to society for various reasons. I admire their efforts at establishing an alternate philosophy from what was happening in their social circumstances — the development of the cities and the industrial revolution. I also recognize that as a practical solution it could not work, as illustrated by the actions of these Romantic writers. They espoused this philosophy on an idealistic level, yet pragmatic events and the need for society intervened to show the inadequacy of their concepts.

Paper submitted to Professor Luther Carpenter for credit in Historical Method. History 200.

Notes

1. John Canady, *What Is Art?*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), p. 25.
2. R.W. Harris, *Romanticism and the Social Order 1780—1830*, (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1969), p. 18.
3. Harris, p. 19.
4. Harris, p. 312.
5. Hugh P. MacDonald, *The Power of Emerson's Wisdom*, (New York: Pageant Press, 1954), p. 45.

6. MacDonald, p. 46.
7. MacDonald, p. 81.
8. Brooks Atkinson, *The Complete Essays and other Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, (New York: Random House, 1950), p. 89.
9. Perry Miller (ed.), *Major Writers of America*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962), p. 479.
10. V.L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1930), p. 389.
11. Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*, (New York: Harper & Row, Inc., 1961), p. 47.
12. Thoreau, p. 8.
13. Thoreau, p. 426.
14. Henry David Thoreau (Philip Van Doren Stern, ed.), *The Annotated Walden*, (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., 1970), p. 88.
15. Thoreau, p. 227.
16. Louis Fischer (ed.), *The Essential Gandhi*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962), p. 87.
17. Parrington, p. 385.
18. Walt Whitman, (Mark Van Doren, ed.), *The Portable Walt Whitman*, (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1973), p. 32.
19. Whitman, p. 33.
20. Whitman, p. 39.
21. Whitman, p. 54.
22. Edgar Lee Masters, *Whitman*, (New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1937), p. 28.
23. William Allan Neilson, (ed.), *American Fiction*, (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1917), p. 329.
24. Miller, p. 387.

25. Parrington, p. 385.

26. John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Representative Government*. (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1950), p. 177.

Bibliography

Atkinson, Brooks. *The Complete Essays and Other Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. New York: Random House, Inc., 1950.

Canaday, John. *What Is Art?* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1980.

Dunham, Barrows. *Man Against Myth*. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co., 1947.

Fischer, Louis (ed.). *The Essential Gandhi*. New York: Random House, Inc., 1962.

Gabriel, Ralph Henry. *The Course of American Democratic Thought*. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1940.

Harris, R.W. *Romanticism and the Social Order, 1780--1830*. New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1969.

Hofstadter, Richard. *The American Political Tradition*. New York: Random House, Inc., 1973.

MacDonald, Hugh P. *The Power of Emerson's Wisdom*. New York: Pageant Press, 1954.

Masters, Edgar Lee. *Whitman*. New York: Biblo & Tannen, 1937.

Mill, John Stuart. *Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government*. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1950.

Miller, John C. *The Young Republic (1789--1815)*. New York: The Free Press, 1970.

Miller, Perry (ed.). *Major Writers of America*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962.

Neilson, William Allan (ed.). *American Fiction*. New York: P F Collier & Son Co., 1917.

Parrington, V.L. *Main Currents in American Thought*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1930.

Thoreau, Henry David. *Walden*. New York: Harper & Row, Inc., 1961.

Thoreau, Henry David (Stern, Philip Van Doren, ed.). *The Annotated Walden*. New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., 1970.

Whitman, Walt (Van Doren, Mark V, ed.). *The Portable Walt Whitman*. New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1945.

