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The first issue of
The Richmond Historian
is dedicated to the late
Professor Charles Hirschfeld
for his outstanding service
to the History program
at Richmond College.

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The purpose of **The Richmond Historian** is twofold: to provide a forum from which essays of both the traditional and non-traditional outlook can be disseminated and discussed and to provide a catalyst to help stimulate research into the rich and relatively untapped sources of Staten Island history. (To meet this end ample space shall be provided for responses and rebuttals to essays printed in the journal.)

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Residential Segregation and the American City: 1860-1930; Philadelphia as a Test Case...

By Margaret Marsh

During the period from 1860 to 1930 urban America underwent a profound transformation; compact, densely settled cities evolved into sprawling metropolitan areas. Annexations and the migrations from Europe and rural America accounted for most of the spectacular growth. Metropolitanization at its most fundamental level meant the decentralization of residential settlement and the redistribution of urban functions over an expanded geographic area. Such changes resulted in significant alterations in the social structure of the city, an important aspect of which was the creation of the segregated city.

Sam Bass Warner, in his book *The Private City*, has contended that urban residential segregation developed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Referring specifically to Philadelphia, but clearly intending his remarks to have broader application, he asserts that "during the seventy years from 1860 to 1930 the residential areas of Philadelphia shifted from mild to pronounced segregation by income and ethnicity." While Warner notes that blacks had always been the least integrated of the ethnic groups; he indicates that they too, experienced an increase in segregation during that period.¹

Although Warner's viewpoint has been widely accepted by historians, my own research into settlement patterns in Philadelphia has led me to question the validity of his interpretation. Warner included only data from 1860 and 1930; because segregation was greater in the latter year he apparently assumed that a steady and gradual increase had produced this pattern. In fact, at least in terms of racial segregation, a decline during the last few decades of the nineteenth century had preceded the rise. Clearly, a considerable amount of research will be necessary to determine whether that decrease was a national phenomenon; however, there is enough evidence to propose at least a tentative

¹Sam Bass Warner, *The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of Its Growth* (Philadelphia, 1968), p. 169.

reappraisal of the way historians have viewed the development of widespread residential segregation in urban America.

While Warner included both blacks and immigrants in his appraisal, this article is primarily concerned with racial segregation. There are, however, some important relationships between the two that will have to be taken into consideration. What has emerged from my research is a pattern far more complex than a straightforward progression from lesser to greater residential segregation. One point in particular must be noted with regard to the development of segregation. In order to fully understand changes in residential patterns, the historian should go beyond an analysis of the city as a whole. It is necessary also to specifically investigate what sociologist Herbert Gans has referred to as the "outer city" — the residential communities surrounding the commercial—industrial sector.²

On the basis of a statistical analysis of Philadelphia as a whole and of six communities in the outer city, I have concluded that in both cases residential segregation by race decreased during the last decades of the nineteenth century. For the city as a whole segregation began to increase again during the first ten years of the twentieth century, although in the outer city the downturn continued until 1920. After this decline, racial segregation developed in a steady upward pattern.

There are several means used by social scientists to determine rates of segregation. One of the more efficient and reliable methods is the Index of Dissimilarity. The Index measures the proportion of a group that would have to change addresses in order to have a residential distribution identical to the group with which it is being compared. The higher the index number, the greater the degree of segregation.³ In the entire city of Philadelphia the racial Index of Dissimilarity declined between 1860 and 1900. It rose in 1910, remained stable until 1920, then increased again by 1930. (see Table 1)

²Herbert J. Gans, "Urbanism and Suburbanism as Ways of Life: a Re-evaluation of Definitions," in Robert Gutman and David Popenoe, eds., *Neighborhood, City, and Metropolis* (New York, 1970), pp. 75–77.

³For example, if the Index of Dissimilarity comparing black population to white population were 60, that would mean that 60 percent of the black residents would have to move into white residential areas in order to have a settlement pattern like that of the white population.

Table 1.

Index of Dissimilarity⁴
Philadelphia, 1860 – 1930

White Population with Black Population	1860*	47
Native Whites of Native Parentage with Black Population	1890	44
	1900	40
	1910	47
	1920	47
	1930	55

In the outer city a somewhat different pattern developed, as the following analysis suggests. The six communities that were studied comprised the area of Northern West Philadelphia. The major significance of this section was that it became, as a result of the construction of a subway-elevated line, Philadelphia's first mass residential area. Because of its position as the first middle- and working-class "dormitory" community in the city I believe that its experience with racial segregation is representative of the process in the rest of the outer city. Table 2 is an Index of Dissimilarity for Northern West Philadelphia between 1880 and 1930.

Table 2.

Index of Dissimilarity⁵
Northern West Philadelphia, 1880 – 1930

Native Whites of Native Parentage with Blacks	1880	62
	1920	45
	1930	52

As is suggested by the table, racial segregation had been very pronounced in 1880, declined by 1920, and rose again during the twenties. While the increase in segregation between 1920 and 1930 is not of great proportions, it marked

*Although the index for 1860 compares all whites to blacks, (because data by nativity is unpublished) this does not impair the validity of the relationship over the years, since the immigrant population does not become significant enough to affect the index until after 1900.

⁴In this index the wards are the basis for analysis, and the data was obtained from published census records for the years indicated.

⁵The units for analysis were the six communities: Wynnefield, Overbrook, Hestonville, Haddington, Morris Park, and Mill Creek. The data was obtained from unpublished manuscript census records for 1880 and from unpublished census tract records for the other years. Information on the intervening census years was not accessible at the time of this research. In 1930, Italians and Russian Jews, like blacks, were highly segregated from the native white population, with indexes of 52 and 55, respectively.

the beginning of a rise in racial segregation that has not yet abated in Northern West Philadelphia.

According to the index, the twenties were a crucial decade for the development of segregation in the outer city. Other types of analysis reinforced that impression. Correlation analysis based on census tract data indicated a stronger negative relationship between native whites and the foreign-born in 1920 than it did between white and black residents. By 1930 that pattern was reversed, as shown in Table 3. Briefly, the correlation analysis shows that a much stronger negative relationship existed between the white and black populations in 1930 than had been present in 1920. Conversely, the negative relationship between native and foreign-born white residents had grown weaker. In addition to the correlations, regression analysis of racial and ethnic variables also indicated that ethnicity was relatively less important than race in 1930 for determining residential distribution.⁶

Table 3. Racial and Ethnic Correlation Analysis
Northern West Philadelphia, 1920-1930

	Correlation Coefficient (r)	Variance Explained (r ²)	Significance
1920			
White Population with Black Population	-.7280	.5300	.001
Native Whites of Native Parents with Foreign-born Whites	-.8107	.6572	.001
1930			
White Population with Black Population	-.9550	.9120	.001
Native Whites of Native Parents with Foreign-born Whites	-.5569	.3101	.005

The results of the statistical research discussed above suggest that racial

⁶The correlation and regression analyses were computed from census tract data (unpublished) for 1920 and 1930. The dependent variable in the regression analysis was total population composition. The independent variables in 1920 that were found to be the best "predictors" of the dependent variable were, respectively, the proportions of Russian-born immigrants, Italian immigrants, native whites of native parentage, and blacks. The F-statistic in each case was significant at .05. The same equation was computed for the 1930 sample, using all of the same ethnic and racial variables. This time, however, the only independent variable that could be used to "predict" the dependent variable was the proportion of black population. The F-statistic again was significant at .05. None of the other variables had a significance level high enough to be included. The unpublished census data used in the calculations is available at the Urban Archives, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

segregation developed in what might be referred to as a two-stage process. First, it emerged in the older sections of the city, while in the outer city integration remained on the rise. Then it spread to the outer city. The questions that remain are why did it happen that way? Why did residential segregation decline and then re-emerge? Finally, why did the pattern that developed in the twenties become entrenched as an urban institution?

The answers to these questions seem to be related to the migration to Philadelphia of three groups: Southern Italians, Russian Jewish immigrants, and blacks from the American South. The relationship is a somewhat indirect one, and requires explanation. Initially, the overall decline in segregation apparently resulted from the stability of the black population during the last few decades of the nineteenth century. Also, during this time the immigrant population was composed of groups from Ireland, England, and Germany for the most part, all of whom were residentially integrated. This general stability was shattered after the turn of the century, as Italians, Jews, and blacks settled in Philadelphia. Most of the new arrivals, both blacks and immigrants, resided in the inner city or in the old industrial-residential sections of South Philadelphia. Thus, while the proportion of blacks in the city did not increase dramatically until the twenties, most of the newcomers were settling in a relatively small part of the city*.

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, while black southerners, Italians, and Russian Jews migrated to the inner city and to South Philadelphia, the trolleys and the subway-elevated line into West Philadelphia had opened the outer city to settlement. This allowed Philadelphians who were hostile to the newcomers as well as those who wanted to shed other aspects of the urban lifestyle to relocate in newer residential communities. Not only native whites but also native black Philadelphians fled to the outer city. Black Philadelphians fiercely resented the intrusion of the southerners. As a young black scholar who studied the migrant families noted, their resentment even extended to refusals to welcome them in the churches.⁷

Long-term black residents of the city initially seemed to have little difficulty in moving to some sections of the outer city. Blacks who moved into Northern West Philadelphia, for example, had prospered modestly and could afford the higher purchase price of a home in a predominantly residential area. In addition, they tended to settle in the relatively older parts of the outer city while affluent whites were moving to the newer ones. Finally, because the black migrations had not yet reached major proportions, the white residents of the outer city perhaps felt less threatened than did those in the inner city.

The severe housing shortage during World War I marked the last stage of the decline in segregation in the outer city. Although black families had been

*Blacks comprised about four percent of the total population in 1890, about five percent in 1900 and 1910, seven percent in 1920, and about eleven percent in 1930.

⁷Sadie Tanner Mosell, "The Standard of Living Among One Hundred Negro Migrant Families in Philadelphia," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCVII (1921), 9.

moving into white residential neighborhoods since the first decade of the century, hostility began to flare most openly when the housing crisis forced whites to remain in their homes in the face of growing black migration. They responded to the greater influx of blacks during the war years by attempting to prevent further integration. In West Philadelphia the tactics took the form of refusals to rent or to sell to blacks, even in areas where there were already some black residents. In another section of the city the action of the white population was more direct and brutal. In one incident, a black woman (a native Philadelphian) moved into a white section of South Philadelphia. Her new neighbors attacked the house, touching off a riot in which two people were killed and sixty were injured. The violence in South Philadelphia was the most extreme reaction during that period, but it reflected a mood shared by many white Philadelphians.⁸

Because the developing outer city had been the site of most of the proposed housing construction, it was particularly affected by the halt in residential building during the war years. Residents of the outer city were therefore forced to stay in their homes until the shortage was over. After 1920, when the housing industry again began to thrive, these families were able to move. They left those portions of the outer city that had been opened to settlement by the trolley and the subway-elevated line. Newer residential areas had become accessible as a result of the mass production of the automobile. Northeast and Northwest Philadelphia, Montgomery and Delaware counties, offered new opportunities to white Philadelphians. The older sections of the outer city (which only a decade before had been the new neighborhoods) were relegated to upwardly mobile blacks and other ethnic groups. Once mass suburbanization widened possibilities, the segregated city emerged.

Although metropolitan growth provided optimal encouragement for the development of residential segregation, it did not create the prejudice and hatred that was its foundation. Exclusionary practices at public places of relaxation preceded residential segregation in Philadelphia, and probably in other cities as well. On a national scale, attitudes during the twenties reinforced the hostility towards "outsiders" that produced the segregated city. Racial and nativist hatreds came into full bloom during and after World War I, producing the rash of race riots that occurred mainly in cities, the revival of the Ku Klux Klan which objected equally to blacks, immigrants, Catholics and Jews, and the blatantly nativist Immigration Act of 1924.⁹ This hostility, combined with the opportunities provided by metropolitanization, created the segregated city during the twenty years before the Great Depression.

⁸On the race riot, see Mosell, p. 3. The Philadelphia Housing Authority, whose records are kept at the Urban Archives of Temple University, studied black housing patterns during the crucial war years and again in the 1920's. Their records and files yielded much useful information on many facets of the housing situation in Philadelphia.

⁹For an excellent portrait of nativism in the United States, see John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860 – 1925* (New York, 1969).

The Council to the Queen of England, 1690: A Revaluation...

By Michael D. Fogarty

The Queen's Council of 1690, unique in English history, is considered by many historians to have been composed of self-interested incompetents and to have been a failure.¹ This was not the case. Internecine animosity, although present on the council and to some degree hampering its efficiency, did not destroy its ability to function. Far from being an ineffective body the council had several substantial accomplishments. In order to completely understand the council, its accomplishments and failures, the turmoil in which the English political system then existed must be recalled.

In August 1688, during a period of growing European unrest, William of Orange, *stadhouer* of the Dutch states, received an invitation from several prominent Englishmen to come to England to aid them in their dispute with King James.² William, although desiring to go to England, was fearful of leaving Holland while there was a large contingent of hostile French troops on the border. Then, in September 1688, Louis XIV moved his army away from the Dutch frontier, thereby enabling William to leave for England.

William arrived in England on November 5, 1688, and after an almost bloodless revolution, James, an unpopular Catholic monarch in a Protestant country, was forced to flee. It was not immediately known who would rule the English government, or even what shape it would take. However, after much discussion it was decided that William and Mary should be declared King and

¹Sir George Clark, *The Later Stuarts, 1660–1714* (London, 1965), p. 165; John Dalrymple, *Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland*. . . (3 vols.; London, 1790), III, 121; Elizabeth Hamilton, *William's Mary, a Biography of Mary II* (New York, 1972), p. 238; David Ogg, *England in the Reign of James II and William III* (London, 1966), p. 352.

²Sir Leslie Stephen and Sir Sidney Lee, ed., *The Dictionary of National Biography* (22 vols.; London, 1964), XVIII, 218; Clark, p. 133. The letter was delivered by Henry Sidney and was signed by Danby, Shrewsbury, Devonshire, Lord Lumley, the Bishop of London, and Admiral Russell. Sidney also conveyed secret assurances from Marlborough.

Queen after they accepted the Act of Rights which limited the power of the crown.

Feeling that the power of Louis XIV must be weakened, on May 7, 1689, William brought England into the European war against France. The English presence was not immediately felt for in 1689 their contribution was limited to an 8,000 man expedition to Flanders and military operations in Ireland. For 1690 William planned to lead his troops to Ireland personally so that James would be driven out, thereby destroying the possibility of a French base there.

In order to control the inevitable scramble for power that would follow his leaving England, William arranged for Mary to be regent in his absence. "An Act for the Exercise of the Government by her Majestie dureing his Majestys Absence" was passed in Parliament. It conferred the "Regall Power" upon Mary ". . .for such time onely dureing their joynt Lives as his said Majestie shall be absent or continue out of the Realme of England. . . ."³

Cognizant of Mary's lack of ruling experience and of the need to ensure domestic tranquility during his absence, William looked about for advisers to the Queen. To fill this need he chose ten men. They were selected for their personal political power or knowledge, and balanced according to party affiliations; a phenomenon which William, as a foreigner, was careful to observe in his political actions. In picking these men William did not delude himself into thinking they would act concordantly; and he informed the Queen which members of the group he thought could be most trusted. Those chosen were: 1) William Cavendish, Earl of Devonshire, 2) John Churchill, Earl of Marlborough, 3) Daniel Finch, Earl of Nottingham, 4) Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke, 5) John Lowther, 6) Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Monmouth, 7) Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby, Marquis of Caermarthen, 8) Edward Russell, 9) Charles Sackville, Earl of Dorset, 10) Charles Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury.* All of the above, with the exception of Shrewsbury who resigned all his offices, served on the Queen's council in its first year.⁴

*William Cavendish (1640–1707) in 1684 succeeded his father as Earl of Devonshire. He was an early supporter of William, argued for his being made King, and for his services was appointed Lord Steward of the King's Household.

John Churchill (1650–1722) left his position as commander of James's forces on November 24, 1688 and joined William. He was made a privy councillor in February 1689, and in April of that year Earl of Marlborough. In 1690 he was placed in command of all the troops remaining in England.

³Great Britain, *The Statutes of the Realme, 1225–1713* (9 vols.; London, 1822), VI, 170.

⁴Although there has been disagreement among historians as to exactly who was on the council, the above list appears to be correct. Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report of the Manuscripts of Allan George Finch, esq., of Burley-on-the Hill, Rutland...* (3 vols.; London, 1957), III, 378; and Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report on the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire, preserved at Easthampstead park...* (4 vols.; London, 1924), I, 347. See also Gilbert Burnet, *Bishop Burnet's History of His Own Time...* (6 vols.; London, 1833), IV, 88; Ogg, pp. 335–36; and Winston Churchill, *Marlborough: His Life and Times*, (2 vols.; London, 1966), I, 287, for other listings.

The council has been attacked both by its contemporaries for partisan reasons, and by recent writers who have failed to properly relate the council's actions to the political climate of the time. Every member of the council, in turning away from James, was a traitor to his King and their actions must be viewed in this light. William, an astute politician, realized the import of this phenomenon and was able to govern in spite of it. In short, the council and its effectiveness should not be viewed either in an idealistic sense where all members are expected to be in harmony, or rated on a twentieth century ideal of political loyalty.

Despite the contemporary and modern accounts concerning the discord on the council, Mary wrote of her advisers:

*As yet I have not found them to differ, or at least so little, that I was surprized to find it so, I mean the whole nine; for it has never come to putt any thing to the vote, but I attribute that to the great danger, I believe all apprehended, which has made them of a mind.*⁵

Daniel Finch (1647–1730) was appointed a lord of the admiralty in April 1679. In February 1680 he became a member of the Privy Council, and in 1682 entered the House of Lords. Although not initially favoring William's cause he eventually approved of William's being made King. Finch was appointed a Secretary of State in December 1688.

Thomas Herbert (1656–1733) became an Earl in August 1683. An early supporter of William, he was in 1690 appointed First Lord of the Admiralty.

John Lowther (1655–1700) secured several towns for William during the revolution. He was made Vice Chamberlain of the Household and in February 1689 a privy councillor. In 1690 he was appointed First Lord of the Treasury.

Charles Mordaunt (1658–1735) was an early antagonist to James and supporter of William. For his services he received many rewards including being made a privy councillor in February 1689 and Earl of Monmouth on April 9, 1689. Mordaunt was invited by the King to go to Ireland with him in 1690 but elected to remain at home.

Thomas Osborne (1631–1712) was chief minister to Charles II and a long time friend of Mary. He was forced to resign his offices in 1679 and was placed in the Tower for five years after it was learned that Charles was accepting a subsidy from France. Osborne supported William early and was made a Marquis and president of the council for his service.

Edward Russell (1635–1727) an early conspirator in favor of William, was in April 1689 made Treasurer of the navy and on July 22 Admiral of the Blue Squadron. In December 1690 he received overall command of the fleet.

Charles Sackville (1638–1706) was not very active politically. Although he concurred with the invitation to William to come to England he did little to see it carried out.

Charles Talbot (1660–1718) although holding office under both Charles II and James II was very active in support of William. He was made a privy councillor in February 1689 and in March, Secretary of State for the Northern Provinces. In June 1690 Talbot resigned all his offices.

⁵Mary to William July 7, 1690; Dalrymple, III, 93.

Upon calling the council together on June 2, William is reported to have said of Mary: "She wants experience but I hope that, by choosing you to be her counselors, I have supplied that defect. I put my kingdom into your hands. Nothing foreign or domestic shall be kept secret from you."⁶ The council was given the authority to discuss all matters, and to recommend to the Queen whatever actions they thought necessary. They were also ordered to advise the King of their activities and to delay action on all matters which could be sent to William so that his opinion could be obtained.⁷

At its first meeting the council agreed that the Catholics were to be removed from London, the militia was to be made ready, the Earl of Torrington (Admiral Herbert) was given orders to set sail with the fleet, and in the case of insurrection or invasion the Queen was authorized to give commissions to volunteers. Besides this, many particulars about foreign affairs and the council's power in such dealings were discussed. The committee was also commanded to "advise" with the Spanish ambassador and the Prince of Wldeck concerning foreign affairs and to act in concert with the Dutch states.⁸

Continuing its work the council began to delve into the state of the country, and on June 10, called for a presentation to them of a declaration of the state of the Treasury, Army and Navy. On this same date the council, in an attempt at lessening the chance of domestic turmoil, further discussed the best way to remove Papists from London.⁹

With the departure of William and 36,000 troops for Ireland, England was fearful of an invasion. To prevent a successful French invasion Admiral Torrington was ordered to keep his fleet between the English coast and the approaching French fleet. William himself was nervous concerning this point and on several occasions wrote to ensure that the fleet was properly positioned as quickly as possible.¹⁰ With a sighting of the French fleet off the English

⁶From a narrative written by Lowther, contained among the Mackintosh MSS, published in Thomas Macaulay, *The History of England from the accession of James II* (4 vols.; New York, 1960), III, 463.

⁷Finch, III, 378; from notes on committee meetings in Nottingham's own handwriting. See Appendix for a listing of those present at this and all subsequent recorded meetings.

⁸*Ibid.* p. 379. According to Stephen Baxter in *William the Third and the Defense of European Liberty, 1650-1702* (New York, 1966), pp. 271-72, "the shortage of personnel was so great that during the summer of 1690 Don Pedro Ronquillo, the Spanish ambassador helped Mary's Council of Nine on foreign affairs." This is a strong statement for which Baxter gives no citation. Nor does he give any further explanation about how much help was given, how often it was given, or what it consisted of. The council, or so it appears, consulted with Don Pedro Ronquillo as an intelligent ally, and not as a result of their own lack of experience. See William to Nottingham, June 24, 1690, Finch, II, 308; and Southwell to Nottingham, June 25, 1690, *Ibid.* p. 309, as examples of the items discussed with the Spanish ambassador.

⁹Finch, III, 379-80. The reports called for were received by the council on June 19.

¹⁰Nottingham to Southwell, June 14, 1690, Finch, II, 297; William to Nottingham, June 18, 1690, *Ibid.*, II, 300.

coast on June 22, Mary quickly became impatient with what she felt was Torrington's dilatory handling of the situation. Torrington reported on June 23 that the enemy fleet consisted of 77 men-of-war and 30 fire-ships. Nottingham, although later to question Torrington's figures, accepted these as accurate and forwarded them to William.¹¹

For personal and political motives certain members of the council attempted to have Torrington removed from command. Monmouth had requested that he be sent as a replacement. Caermarthen had suggested that Russell be sent. The Queen was unsure if William wanted any of her advisers away from the council; she also felt that Caermarthen was attempting to remove Russell from the council's deliberations, and had no great belief in Monmouth's abilities. Therefore, she rejected these suggestions. Mary wrote to William expressing her fears, and requesting that William resolve for her the question concerning advisers being sent away from the council. Mary also expressed her personal regrets at the thought of Russell's leaving the council. She did not, however, express the same regrets at the prospect of Monmouth's departure.¹²

Writing to Nottingham on June 26, Torrington further acquainted him with the seriousness of the situation facing the fleet. He reported that he now had 55 men-of-war and 20 fire-ships, and had intended to attack the French early that morning but that once the haze of the morning lifted, the French, although outnumbering him, shunned his advances. Adding a note of prudence, he wrote:

Their great strength and caution have put soberer thoughts in my head, and has made mee very heartily give God thanks they declined the battle yesterday, and indeed I shall not think my self very unhappy if I can get rid of them without fighting, unless it may be upon equaller terms than I for the present can see any prospect of.

The council of war that Torrington had convened agreed with his decisions to be willing to retire as far as the Gun-Fleet (the only place where the two fleets would be approximately equal in size) if necessary, and to avoid a battle if the French had the wind. At the end of this communication Torrington wrote: ". . . I desire you to assure her Majesty that whatever she commands shall be done, be the consequences what it will."¹³ Torrington was undoubtedly well aware of the discontent and criticism his inactivity was

¹¹Nottingham to William, June 22, 1690, Finch, II, 307; Mary to William, June 22, 1690, Dalrymple, III, 73. Alfred T. Mahan, in *The Influence of Seapower upon History: 1660–1783* (New York, 1957), p. 161, stated that Torrington did not even have lookout ships to the West. Torrington to Nottingham, June 23, 1690, Finch, II, 308; Nottingham to William, June 24, 1690, *Ibid.*, II, 312.

¹²Mary to William, June 26, 1690, Dalrymple, III, 79. I was unable to locate William's response, but later in the year councillors were sent away on other duties.

¹³Torrington to Nottingham, June 26, 1690, Finch, II, 315–16.

drawing to himself and here seems to be warning the Queen that if she ordered him to fight he would do it, but the disaster which he perceived as being the possible result of such an act would be her responsibility.

Receiving estimates of the size of the French fleet that were much smaller than what Torrington was giving them, the Council was optimistic concerning the English fleet's chances of victory in an encounter with the French.¹⁴ Feeling that if Torrington retired to the Gun-Fleet the consequences would be fatal, the Queen at the urging of the council sent orders to Torrington on June 27 demanding that upon any advantage of the wind he give battle to the French. He was further ordered not to lose sight of the French fleet so as to ensure that they did not land unopposed or depart without fighting.¹⁵ Shortly thereafter the Queen wrote to Torrington expressing her fears that if the combined English-Dutch fleet retired, the Plymouth Squadron and Admiral Killigrew would be exposed to a French attack and the way to Scotland would be opened to the French navy. The Queen also stated her belief that the number of French warships was lower than Torrington's estimates. On the basis of the intelligence she received the Queen believed the French fleet to be coming only on the expectation of meeting a much smaller fleet than that which opposed them; therefore she expected an English victory to be the outcome of any engagement with the French.¹⁶

While the council was thus engrossed with foreign affairs, internal treachery also became a serious problem. Not only were there fears of Jacobite and Papist plots and questions of Torrington's loyalty but also questions concerning the loyalty of the council members. Letters written in lemon juice containing information pertaining to the council's meetings and directed to France were allegedly intercepted by Wildman, the postmaster. Monmouth blamed the leaks on someone in Nottingham's office, whereas Mary and the majority of the council members felt that Monmouth was supplying the information to Wildman in an attempt to discredit Nottingham.¹⁷

The council, hearing that Torrington was retiring to the East, and being unsure whether he had received the Queen's orders of June 27, repeated them on the 29th. Later in the day, after listening to the Commissioners of the Admiralty, the council decided to send orders to Torrington to meet the French in battle rather than retreat farther than the South Foreland. If

¹⁴Nottingham to Duke of Hamilton, June 26, 1690, Finch, II, 316. The incorrect information which Nottingham received was supplied by Mr. Dummer. William A. Aiken, ed., *The Conduct of the Earl of Nottingham, Being a continuation by several hands of Mr. Archdeacon Echard's History of England...* (New Haven, 1941), p. 67.

¹⁵Mary to William, June 28, 1690, Dalrymple, III, 80; Nottingham to Torrington, June 27, 1690, Finch, II, 318.

¹⁶The merchantmen in sail with Killigrew were valued at £700,000. *Conduct*, p. 70. Mary to Torrington, June 27, 1690, Finch, III, 439; Nottingham to Torrington, *Ibid.*, II, 322.

¹⁷Dalrymple, III, 80.

Torrington refused to follow these orders Russell was instructed to have him arrested. Thereafter Russell was directed to “. . . oppose our enemies in such manner as by the advice of a Council of war you shall judge most expedient.”¹⁸

Torrington felt that as long as “. . . we observe the French they cannot make any attempt eyther upon ships or shore without running a great hazard, and if wee are beaten all is exposed to theyre mercy.” However, his own judgment notwithstanding, acceding to the prodding of the council, on June 30 Torrington engaged the French fleet off Beachy Head. The results were so disastrous for the English that the council felt it would be another four or more weeks before the fleet would again be able to go out to sea.¹⁹ Immediately after the battle Torrington wrote to Caermarthen that he had been opposed by 82 well-manned French warships and 30 fire-ships. Torrington attempted his own vindication by saying:

What the consequences of this unfortunate battle may be, God Almighty only knows; but this I dare be positive in; had I been left to my liberty, I had prevented any attempt upon the land, and secured the western ships, Killigrew and the merchantmen.

Torrington had not been left at his liberty, however, and the French had not been contained. Therefore, the French controlled the sea, and had the power to land an invading army in England, or keep William from returning from Ireland.²⁰

There are a prodigious variety of reasonable answers to the question of why Torrington was ordered to fight. 1) The council did not believe that the French fleet was as strong as it was, 2) the results of English inactivity were to be feared almost as much as a French victory, 3) English contempt of French naval ability, 4) professional rivalry between several council members and Torrington, and 5) the overwhelming pressure to do something during a crisis. It would appear that rivalries although present, did not appreciably prejudice the decision to send Torrington to fight. More important was the underestimating of French strength, a belief in English naval superiority and the pressures of the situation.

¹⁸Mary to Torrington, June 29, 1690, Finch, II, 321; Nottingham to William, July 2, 1690, *Ibid.*, II, 331. See also, *Ibid.*, II, pp. 322 and 439. Russell did not arrive at the fleet, at this time, as he was recalled upon the council's reception of Torrington's acknowledgement of the Queen's orders. Nottingham to William, July 2, 1690, *Ibid.*, II, 335.

¹⁹Torrington to Nottingham, June 29, 1690, Finch, II, 323; Committee of the Council to William, July 7, 1690, *Ibid.*, II, 348. The committee also informed William that six capital ships had been lost as a result of the engagement, Mahan stated that the English and Dutch burnt 16 of their own ships. Mahan, p. 165.

²⁰Torrington to Caermarthen, June 30, 1690, Dalrymple, III, 67–68.

The council is often castigated for this action and is considered by many to have been devoid, except for Russell, of any knowledge of sea affairs. This was not the case. Of the nine councillors at least six had prior professional experiences with the Navy.²¹ Considering the circumstances and that the council did not tell Torrington how to fight the battle, the orders were not bad. Although it is always dangerous for people far away from the scene to give rigid orders to a commander, the fault in this instance lies not with the orders but in their implementation.

The defeat created a great deal of fear and consternation in England. On July 2, Nottingham informed William of the result of the battle. Caermarthen also wrote to the King on this date and expressed his lack of confidence in Torrington's actions and suggested Sir Richard Haddock as his successor.²² With the fear of a French invasion high, on July 3 the council sent Lords Devonshire and Pembroke to the fleet with a letter from the Queen to Torrington ordering his return to London. In order to counter the danger of invasion several capital ships of from 70 to 100 guns were begun to be fitted out, and seamen were ordered to man them. It was hoped that ". . . in a very short time, 'tis said a fortnight we shall have a better fleet than before, and the French will be worse." Orders were also sent to all the Lords Lieutenant to draw together one-half of their horse militia (the militia in Kent was ordered out in full), and orders were sent to secure all Papists and suspected persons. Caermarthen then wrote to William on July 6, requesting that he return to England immediately. He also informed William of his belief that Torrington would resign; if so, Russell would refuse command of the fleet and Sir Richard Haddock would refuse sole command of the fleet but would be willing to be part of a commission.²³

On July 7 the council was finally able to settle on a plan of defense. The foot soldiers were ordered encamped at Blackheath under the direction of the Earl of Marlborough. The council also requested that the King, along with a body of troops, return to England. Meeting again on July 10, the council continued to plan the defenses of the island and ordered Torrington committed for high crimes and misdemeanors. The leaders of the City of London appeared before the Queen in council on July 11, and placed at her disposal their militia of 9,000 men and 6,000 auxiliaries. They also promised to raise one regiment

²¹Churchill had sailed with the fleet as early as 1690; Finch in 1679 was a lord of the admiralty; Herbert, in 1690, was the First Lord of the Admiralty; Mordaunt was in the Navy in 1675 and in 1687 command a Dutch squadron in the West Indies; Osborne was a treasurer of the Navy in 1671; Russell was in the Navy from the 1670's.

²²Caermarthen to William, July 2, 1690, *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series; of the Reign of William and Mary, May 1690—October 1691* (5 vols.; London, 1898), II, 46.

²³The Queen also resolved to send a "person of quality" to the Dutch States to acquaint them with her resentment of Torrington's actions. Caermarthen to William, July 6, 1690, C.S.P.D., II, 52; Caermarthen to William, July 7, 1690, Dalrymple, III, 133. Nottingham to William, July 3, 1690, Finch, II, 335; *Ibid.*, III, 382. See also, *Ibid.*, II, 335, and Mary to William, July 3, 1690, C.S.P.D., II, 46.

of 1,000 dragoons which were to be commanded by officers appointed by the Queen. Then on July 12, Marlborough, with the consent of the council, gave orders to the army and ordered the Admiralty to scout the French fleet. The King, according to a "News-Letter" of July 15, informed the Queen that he could now spare 15,000 men if they were needed.²⁴

Caermarthen, on the 13th of July wrote to William expressing his continuing fear of a French landing. On the 15th Nottingham wrote that he felt the French invasion ". . . will be in a few days or not at all. . . ." He also reminded the King of the weakness of England's defenses, which consisted of 5,000 foot and 1,000 horse and dragoon regulars, plus the militia ". . . on which your Majesty will not much rely. . . ." Nottingham informed the King of his fear, which he felt was shared by the other council members, that ". . . if the French should suddenly land, they might in a few days be masters of London. . . ." Nottingham was also very apprehensive of murmurings in England.

*All of which makes your Majesty's return so necessary that nothing should delay it, but the impossibility of it with safety to your person; but however, I presume your Majesty will send a very considerable body of your troops, and think it much better to hazard them than a whole kingdom.*²⁵

Parliament, having been prorogued by William on May 20, was to reconvene in mid-July 1690. Monmouth, feeling that the holding of immediate elections would help his party gain Parliamentary seats, in a fulsome gesture offered Mary £200,000 from the next session of Parliament if she would dissolve the one then prorogued and order new elections. Mary refused to accept this bribe although she did need money. Therefore, on July 15 representatives of the council and Privy Council asked the City of London for a loan of £100,000. The city resolved to grant this request on July 22, and payment began almost immediately.²⁶

²⁴Finch, III, 382. On July 9, Caermarthen again requested that the King return home and asked him to send some small arms for defense. Caermarthen to William, July 9, 1690, C.S.P.D., II, 57. Nottingham to Southwell, July 12, 1690, Finch, II, 355; *Ibid.*, III, 383. Torrington was placed in the Tower the same day he was arrested, was court-martialled and acquitted on December 8–10. Although acquitted he was never given another command. Finch, III, 383; Downshire, I, 357.

As if the council did not have enough problems at this time, feeling that the inner council was receiving all her attention, the Privy Council refused to act unless the Queen was present. Mary to William, July 10, 1690, Dalrymple, III, 98.

²⁵Caermarthen to William, July 3, 1690, C.S.P.D., II, 64. Nottingham to William July 15, 1690, Dalrymple, III, 62–64; see also Finch, II, 360.

²⁶Mary to William, July 15, 1690, Dalrymple, III, 101; Finch, II, 378.

The internal workings of the council began to degenerate rapidly and on July 17 Mary wrote to William

Till I know whether you come or no, I can not resolve to write you all that has past this day, till which time I thought you had given me wrong characters of men, but now I see they answer my expectation of being as little of a mind as of a body. ²⁷

This cryptic letter certainly hints at increased machinations on the council. Although I have been unable to ascertain exactly what action affected Mary so greatly it must have been quite serious. For the Queen had already seen the council's faults not only in their daily workings, but especially in the "lemon letters" affair and in the bribe attempt by Monmouth, neither of which affected the Queen as much as this. The council was also in a great deal of turmoil in regard to who should command the fleet after the removal of Torrington. The Admiralty wanted Russell to take sole command of the fleet. He refused. Therefore, Mary favored a commission. The King concurred with the Queen's suggestion, but the Admiralty wasn't satisfied, and the council members were split.²⁸

On July 23, the members of the Admiralty appeared before the council and were very argumentative concerning the command of the fleet. Dalrymple accused "some of the cabinet" for encouraging the Admiralty's high-handedness in this situation. Although there is no supportive evidence for this accusation, it is quite possibly true since at least one of the councillors had a favorite; and many of the councillors had a serious interest in naval affairs. The problem of finding a suitable replacement for Torrington continued, and on July 31, the King wrote to Nottingham: "We write to the Queen as regards the command of the Fleet." He does not elaborate as to what he wrote, but on August 5, 1690 Nottingham informed the King that Sir Richard Haddock, Mr. Killigrew and Sir John Ashley were appointed commissioners of the fleet by the Queen.²⁹

While this was going on the threat of invasion was dissipating. The cost of the defeat at Beachy Head was very light in physical terms, as England suffered

²⁷Mary to William, July 17, 1690, Dalrymple, III, 102.

²⁸Finch, II, 378; Dalrymple, III, 22. Dalrymple greatly overstated the force of personal animosity shown by the council members during this discussion.

²⁹Mary to William, July 24, 1690, Dalrymple, III, 22; Finch, II, 378. William to Nottingham, July 31, 1690, Finch, II, 389. Nottingham to William, August 15, 1690, *Ibid.*, II, 398-99.

The Navy was to prove to be a thorn to the council once again, over the subject of naval promotions. The problem occurred when the admiralty sent to Mary a list of four men from which she was to choose two who would be promoted to admiral. One of the four was Marlborough's brother, and Caermarthen was bitterly opposed to his promotion. Rather than further alienating at least one member of her council; the Queen wisely refused to act on this matter until the King returned. Mary to William, August 13, 1690, Dalrymple, III, 120; Finch, III, 120; Churchill, I, 287.

no more damage than the burning of the village of Teignmouth by the French on July 29. By the beginning of August the French had departed and the English militia had been dismissed.³⁰

During the early part of August the council was kept busy with both internal and external affairs. They continued to give orders to the fleet and to conduct foreign affairs; ordering among other things a squadron to intercept the French from Galway, 25,000 crowns sent to Denmark, and an exchange of prisoners.³¹ On August 7, Marlborough, with Nottingham also present, appeared before the Queen with a plan to send a force to invade Ireland. The Queen was unwilling to make a decision on such an important matter, of which she knew so little, and so Marlborough wrote directly to the King.³² Marlborough received his answer from Robert Southwell, the King's Secretary in Ireland, who wrote that the King fully approved Marlborough's plan and desired it be carried out as soon as possible. It was only at this time, after the King's reply, that the other members of the council were informed of Marlborough's proposal. Mary informed William on August 22 that the majority of the councillors did not favor the plan and did not oppose it only because it was William's order.³³

The council on August 23 directed the Admiralty to supply Marlborough with whatever marine regiments he requested. Then, on August 25, Marlborough received his orders, which directed him to reduce the cities of Cork and Kinsale. After taking the cities Marlborough was to station garrisons in them and then return home with the remainder of his force. The purpose of this expedition was to cut Ireland off from French reinforcements. Mary gave the admirals their orders on August 26, and Marlborough embarked on August 30. Due to bad weather he was unable to set sail until September 17. The expedition proved to be highly successful and one of the major victories of the year for the English.³⁴

³⁰Caermarthen to William, August 12, 1690, C.S.P.D., II, 95.

³¹Finch, III, 385–86.

³²Mary to William, August 7, 1690, Dalrymple, III, 117. In *Conduct. . .*, p. 86, Nottingham is quoted as saying that he proposed the attempt upon Cork and Kinsale to Marlborough. After speaking to the Queen, she “. . . Ordered them not to mention it to the Cabinet Council till there came an answer from the King.” Of this subject, Churchill wrote: “Inspired by Danby, the Council vetoed the project, but since Marlborough was supported by Admiral Russell and aided by Nottingham, the Queen referred it to the King. Churchill, I, 288. This is not true, Mary wrote that all but Nottingham were against the plan. Mary to William, August 26, 1690, Dalrymple, III, 128.

³³Southwell to Nottingham, August 7, 1690, Finch, II, 414; Henry Horowitz, *Revolution Politics: The Career of Daniel Finch Second Earl of Nottingham, 1647–1730* (London, 1968), p. 123. Mary to William, August 22, 1690, Dalrymple, III, 125.

³⁴Finch, III, 386; Finch, II, 436; Churchill, I, 293. The orders were drafted by Nottingham.

The King arrived at Kensington, England, on September 10, 1690, thereby putting an end to the necessity of the Queens council for 1690. The usefulness of the council, however, was not ended. It was soon revived and served during William's absences until 1694 and the death of Mary. After the Queen's death the Lords Justices received a commission from the King and corresponded with him through Secretary Blathwayt.³⁵

When the mixed feelings and emotions present after the revolution are taken into account it can only be concluded that the council did function effectively. Although there was a great deal of personal animosity and petty bickering, the council as a whole never allowed this to supersede the national interest, as it was then perceived. There is no evidence of treason, in the sense of giving direct aid or information to the enemy (an admittedly low standard) levelled against any member of the council in 1690. The closest any member came to treasonous activity (which was a common pastime among the English aristocracy of the period) was the writing of the "lemon letters." And they, although treasonous in a sense, did not involve giving information to the enemy. If they were, as is commonly believed, a part of Monmouth's plot to discredit Nottingham, he had no intention of sending the information to France. Neither is there any evidence of council members disobeying any direct royal order, or even refusing to obey the edicts of the council.

The council had two interrelated main goals. 1) Insuring domestic tranquility, and 2) aiding the English war effort. Although England's resources were stretched dangerously thin the council was able to see that William was supplied throughout the campaign, while keeping part of the fleet involved in harassing the French. Domestically, and here was the council's greatest achievement, in a civil war situation England was able to remain politically stable, even after a devastating defeat at sea. Part of the credit for this stability must go to the fact that Parliament was not sitting and therefore factions were not as serious a problem as they might have been. However, the only reason Parliament could be prorogued while William was away was the existence of the inner council. At the council, factions although obvious, were never as pervasive as they would have been in Parliament.

If there is any blame to be placed for the activities of the council it must all ultimately fall upon William, since it was he who named the councillors, and it was also he, who, by leaving England, necessitated its very existence. William had not expected the council to work in complete harmony and neither did he expect it to be treasonous. This was a reasonable assumption. For as a result of their early support of William the members realized from a selfish standpoint that an England subservient to France could not serve their best interests. Therefore, if for no other reason, the majority of the council members would have been hard pressed to actively support James over William in 1690.

Of the councillors, Caermarthen was the most active and usually effective. Nottingham was also a very strong figure and was present at as many of the

³⁵Ogg, p. 332.

council meetings as his schedule would permit. Marlborough although active did not have the political power of Caermarthen and Nottingham. Mordaunt will be remembered more for his negative effect than for his positive; but he was active. Russell was not a very strong voice on the council itself, but he had the Queen's ear. Herbert and Cavendish, although present often, do not appear to have been very involved in the council's deliberations. Only Lowther and Dorset were less involved.

Mary had no previous experience of this kind and appears to have taken the reigns of government only out of love for William and for the perpetuation of the monarchy, not from a desire for power. Early on she felt intimidated at council meetings and wrote of her actions: "I am as silent as can be. . . ." Caermarthen wrote differently of her behavior, saying: "Her Majesty is very diligent at cabinet councils, and whenever anything concerns you [William] either personally or in having your orders obeyed, she is not only very active, but very strict. . . ." ³⁶ Although Mary was not a strong personality her position as sovereign was such that she was able to govern the council, and with the aid of the council the kingdom.

³⁶Mary to William, July 2, 1690, Dalrymple, III, 75; Caermarthen to William, June 23, 1690, C.S.P.D., II, 36.

Appendix

The council minutes recorded by Daniel Finch encompass a time span of 97 days. The number of meetings recorded as being held during this period is 32. There were other meetings, of which I have been able to identify five, and undoubtedly there were more.* Considering the council members many other duties, the attendance at these meetings was high. Taking into account the information contained on the chart on the following page:

- 76.8% is the lowest possible overall attendance rate for the meetings recorded by Finch.
- 78.9% is the average attendance rate when the Queen is excluded.
- 80.0% is the highest possible attendance rate for the meetings recorded by Finch.

The following symbols are used on the chart:

P. = present N.P. = not present ? = insufficient information

Whenever there are two symbols in one space this indicates that there were two meetings held on one date.

*These meetings were held on July 5, July 11, July 22, July 23, and August 20.

	MARY	CAVENDISH	CHURCHILL	FINCH	HERBERT	LOWTHER	MORDAUNT	OSBORNE	RUSSELL	SACKVILLE
JUNE 2	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.
JUNE 10	N.P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	P.
JUNE 11	?/?	P/p	P/p	P/p	P/p	P/np	P/p	np/p	P/p	P/p
JUNE 17	P.	P.	N.P.	?	P.	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	P.
JUNE 19	N.P.	N.P.	P.	?	P.	P.	N.P.	N.P.	P.	P.
JUNE 21	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
JUNE 23	P.	N.P.	P.	?	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.	P.
JUNE 24	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.
JUNE 29	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.
JULY 2	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.
JULY 3	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.
JULY 7	?	P.	P.	N.P.	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.	P.
JULY 10	P.	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	N.P.
JULY 12	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	N.P.
JULY 15	?	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.
JULY 19	?	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	P.
JULY 29	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.
JULY 31	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	N.P.
AUGUST 5	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	N.P.	N.P.	P.
AUGUST 16	P.	N.P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.
AUGUST 19	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	N.P.
AUGUST 22	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
AUGUST 23	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
AUGUST 26	P.	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.
AUGUST 29	N.P.	N.P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	N.P.
AUGUST 30	P.	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.
SEPTEMBER 2	P/np	P/np	np/np	P/p	P/np	P/p	P/np	P/p	P/p	P/np
SEPTEMBER 3	N.P.	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.
SEPTEMBER 4	?	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	P.
SEPTEMBER 6	N.P.	P.	N.P.	P.	P.	P.	N.P.	P.	N.P.	N.P.

Ideology in American History...

By Charles Hirschfeld

In his presidential address to the Organization of American Historians, Professor John Higham has presented an interpretation of the broad sweep of American history that is significant for the understanding and historiography of the American experience.¹ Some historians will dismiss his views as a passel of nebulous generalizations that blur the particularities of time and space. In my opinion, however, he has perceptively and with sound historical imagination applied the sociological and anthropological concepts of culture and the sociology of knowledge to the evolution of American society. His synthesis illuminates some dark and confused areas of American history in cogent, meaningful terms. It may not be the last word on the subject — indeed, there is a serious lapse in the argument as applied to the twentieth century — but it offers a challenge to historians to flesh out and sharpen the broad interpretive framework he has sketched.

Professor Higham's interpretation reflects his long-time interest in cultural and intellectual history.² Its main theme is the quest for community and "the possibilities and limits of social solidarity" in a society undergoing continuous and disruptive change. He focuses on the "integrative mechanisms" that united the people in the face of the centrifugal tendencies generated in the process of modernization. He briefly describes three main "adhesive forces" operating in American history — the primordial, the ideological, and the technical, — those which, in his view, functioned largely through consent, excluding, for brevity's sake, the political and economic processes and structures which operated through coercion or manipulation. While this distinction may not be a very precise one, it clearly reflects Professor Higham's primary interest in ideas and

¹ John Higham, "Hanging Together: Divergent Unities in American History," in *Journal of American History*, vol. LXI, (1974), pp. 5-28.

² See Professor Higham's articles in part II of *Writing American History: Essays on Modern Scholarship* (Bloomington, Ind., 1970).

attitudes, in intellectual history and in social thought, rather than in the staples of political and economic history.

The essay sketches the sequential development of the successive but overlapping forms of community from the seventeenth century to the present. After a brief look at the earliest form of unity in America, the primordial (following anthropologist Clifford Geertz), based on tradition, kinship, and a sense of place, Professor Higham turns his attention more fully to its successors, the Puritan, the Protestant, and the American ideologies. As he sees it, the brief hegemony of the Puritan ideology in the seventeenth century was followed by an ideological revival which served to unify American society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Protestant and the American ideologies, despite some inherent tensions, together functioned as the most powerful integrative force during the early stages of modernization, cementing a social order dissolving in mobility, diversity, and innovation. Protestantism, evolving as a non-theological creed of evangelical morality, assimilated to a secular national value-system which stressed equality, individual freedom, and material prosperity, and the resulting convergence sanctioned an acquisitive, individualist and unrestrained exploitation of the resources of an undeveloped continent.³ This national ideology consisted of three basic beliefs: the collective mission of America to realize democratic and Christian ideals for all men; the desirability of diverse, decentralized loci of power held together in loose structural unity; and the ideal efficacy of unrestrained individual freedoms. Professor Higham sees the force of this ideology as reaching its apogee about the middle of the nineteenth century, and continuing, with declining impact, well on into the twentieth. Within the period of its hegemony, escalating and conflicting interpretations of its central tenets resulted in the temporary breakdown of national unity in the trauma of the Civil War.

Thereafter, according to Professor Higham, the ideological bond was gradually weakened and eventually displaced by the emergent forces of "technical unity." These constituted a new system of social relations produced by the development of capitalist industry and the technological and organizational revolutions, with their imperatives of rationalized, bureaucratic, and technical processes and specialized expertise. Although technical integration initially spread under the aegis of the national ideology, it vitiated the force of ideals with its emphasis on matter-of-fact technique. In the twentieth century, technology, scientific methods, and organized bureaucracy rather than ideational drives and idealistic ends came to shape the structure of society and dominate the behavior of the American people. At times, during the progressive period and the New Deal years, ideological impulses flared up in efforts to combine democratic ideals with corporate processes and technical methods. But these were only temporary deviations from the long-term trend,

³Professor Robert N. Bellah has denominated the components of the national ideology as "the biblical tradition" and "utilitarian individualism", in his article "New Religious Consciousness", *New Republic*, vol. CLXXI, (Nov. 23, 1974), p. 34.

and the progress of the corporate industrial order could not be stayed. By the 1970's, Higham's version of American history ends in the dissipation of ideological fervor and the dissolution of the promise of technical integration in a wasteland of faceless, mass alienation. The quest for a new synthetic social principle, a new basis for community, he insists, goes on. Professor Higham can only speculate hopefully on the possibility of some balanced combination of all three integrative mechanisms, with ideological passion leavening the primordial and technical forces in some viable community.

Professor Higham's interpretive survey of American history is a most cogent one. He is especially perceptive in putting the American experience in the context of the modernization process and in emphasizing the quest for community in the course of change from an underdeveloped nation to a fully developed corporate-industrial order, with all the strains of the process and the cultural responses thereto. His interpretation is not altogether new,⁴ but never before has it been applied so broadly and convincingly to the whole sweep of American history, in conformity, on the whole, with the facts as we have them and congruent with the terminal outcome in the present. Professor Higham is especially authoritative on the role of ideology in the nineteenth century. He has successfully elaborated and demonstrated the importance of the American-Protestant ideology, the civic religion of the common-economic man, in forging the bonds of national unity and sanctioning the competitive, acquisitive behavior of the American people in an expanding, agrarian democracy. Theoretically, Professor Higham's most significant contribution may be the establishment beyond cavil of the central role of ideology as an integrative and supportive mechanism of the social order generally.

One wonders, therefore, why he feels it necessary, when dealing with the twentieth century, to downgrade the role of ideology to the point of nullity and to place the burden of social integration on technological processes and structures. Why does he distinguish between ideology and technical integration and focus on the direct impact of the material forces to the neglect of the cultural responses? Certainly, there is no denying the all-embracing and powerful material effects of the burgeoning technological-corporate order. But is it not likely that the material realities of "technical unity" also generated their own ideological response, in the same way that the dynamics of modernization in the nineteenth century produced the American-Protestant ideology? Did not twentieth century social and economic developments bring conflicts in their train — between the older value-system and the new realities, between capital and labor, farm and factory, city and country, big business and small business, immigrants and native-born, as well as between different regional interests — conflicts which had to be bridged and reconciled by new overarching ideological orientations? Did not the new exigencies of America's involvement in foreign affairs require new conceptions of its role in the world?

⁴See Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York, 1963), and Robert H. Wiebe, "The Progressive Years, 1900–1917," in William H. Cartwright and Richard L. Watson Jr., eds., *The Reinterpretation of American History and Culture* (Washington, 1973), pp. 425–442.

Did not the emerging corporate order and world empire produce a new ideology that would make them acceptable to the American people, and integrate and strengthen the nation, especially in the face of foreign ideological and political threats?

If the answers to these questions are in the affirmative — as I confidently believe they must be — then Professor Higham's survey of ideological change in the twentieth century must be modified. What has happened has not been the passing of ideology, *per se*, but the passing of one ideology from a position of hegemony and its gradual replacement by a different and conflicting one. Specifically, the new ideology of liberalism (whose principles are detailed below) was formulated in the early years of the century in response to the development of the technological-corporate order and in opposition to the older dominant evangelical-democratic belief-system. Liberalism, after long and often bitter confrontations with the older ideology and institutions, slowly spread by pressures and persuasion and eventually in modified form came to dominate the American scene in the years 1945—1965. In the process, its initial idealistic thrust toward a utopian reconstruction of American society and culture, so marked in the progressive (including World War I) and New Deal periods, was gradually dissipated. Liberalism ended up in pragmatic acquiescence as the rationale of the corporate-liberal order vaunting its supremacy in the world and uniting the people in a community of interests, real and imagined, rather than ideals. Since 1965, the liberal ideology, battered by foreign wars and crises, inflation, depression, corruption, and the resulting loss of viability and legitimacy of American institutions, has increasingly come under attack. The liberal social order and its values have been rejected by greater numbers of Americans who found no satisfaction in them and were indeed, as Professor Higham states, seeking, with overblown expectations, new modes of belief and experimenting with new institutions. At the present moment, the American social order and its ideology are at a stage of indeterminacy, with liberalism taking sour and negative forms, and well on the road to desuetude. There are no ideological formulations, amidst the confused welter of ideas and ideals, capable of offering viable alternatives to the mass of Americans. We now have, in short, not the end of ideology, but the beginning of the end of the liberal ideology and the desperate search for new values and institutions to replace the corrupt remnants of the old with a vision of new sounder order.⁵

Professor Higham's failure to chart a truer course of ideological change in the twentieth century (as outlined above and elaborated below) springs, first of all, from his narrow definition of ideology and, secondly, from his inability to discriminate sufficiently between the democratic agrarian ideology and its twentieth century liberal counterpart. He defines ideology as an "explicit system of general beliefs that give large bodies of people a common identity and purposes, a common program of action, and a standard of self-criticism." It

⁵See Bellah, "New Religious Consciousness," pp. 36—40.

arises in response to the strains and fractures in a culture, offering a new basis for social cohesion. Higham rejects the "rigid totalistic" definition, with the pejorative connotations of the anti-ideologists (such as Edward Shils, Daniel Bell and S.M. Lipset), as well as the "looser usage" in which ideology is defined as "any rationale for a social loyalty." He also excludes the broad, amorphous, and "unreflective" fund of social beliefs and traditions of a people. For Higham, as for most sociologists, ideology is a relatively precise, formal statement of ideas, values, and goals, which may or may not be present in a society and which may be more important at one time than at another. Moreover, he tends to stress the ideal elements in the ideological formula, its altruistic (or following Mannheim, the "utopian") standards and goals. This favorable bias is implicit in the undertones of regret at the alleged passing of the age of ideology and in his expressed hope that in the future, a revival of ideology would challenge the rather acquiescent forms of unity and, in Professor Henry David Aiken's words, serve as "counter-rhetoric" to prosaic realities.⁶ Professor Higham, in short, defines ideology in rather restricted, time-bound and normative terms.

A more fruitful definition, I believe, would be closer to Mannheim's "total conception of ideology" and Gramsci's inclusive formula.⁷ It would broaden the meaning of the term to embrace the comprehensive, dominant cultural system of any society, its pervasive world-view expressed in all aspects of social and individual life. As such, it includes both the formulations of intellectuals, in their roles as servants of power or critics of its distribution, as well as the congeries of beliefs and attitudes of the people at large. The former may be relatively explicit statements but in the course of diffusion, as they come to be shared in varying degrees and more or less consciously by the mass of people, are transformed into what has been described as the "vaguely recalled and half-dreamlike allegiances and prejudices,"⁸ that are no less effective in shaping behavior.

In this view, ideology functions primarily as the rationale for the status quo, serving to insure the legitimacy of the existing order and reflecting the interests of the dominant classes. In the course of time, however, ideology takes on universal qualities that transcend the temporal and class-bound limits and assumes the character of social-cultural absolutes. It thus becomes for the believers more than a mask for the interests of the dominant classes and a justification for the prevailing distribution of power. Moreover, ideological statements may also be made, as Professor Higham contends, in response to the

⁶Henry David Aiken, "The Revolt Against Ideology," in Chaim I. Waxman, ed., *The End of Ideology Debate* (New York, 1968), pp. 252-253.

⁷Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1936), p. 56; Antonio Gramsci, *The Modern Prince and Other Writings* (New York, 1957), p. 63.

⁸David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "The Intellectuals and the Discontented Classes," in Daniel Bell, ed., *The Radical Right* (Garden City, N.Y., 1964), p. 115.

strains in the culture, to the gaps between the cultural norms and the social realities. As such, they may modify the dominant value-system in the effort to bolster its effectiveness by strengthening the forces of cohesion and building viability into the existing order. Or they may criticize existing social relations and affirm new values embodying a vision of a preferred alternative.⁹ In this broader conception of ideology, the account of the American ideological evolution in the twentieth century would be more than a passing chapter in the history of ideas. It would be treated as a necessary and integral feature of the changing American experience, of the transformation of an undeveloped "colonial" society of the nineteenth century through the process of modernization into a mature, advanced industrial and imperial power.

In the revised version, as I see it, the dominant American-Protestant ideology was confronted in the last quarter of the nineteenth century with profound social and economic change. The development of the corporate-industrial economy produced social dysfunctions, poverty, conflicts, and a loss of homogeneity that threatened social cohesion, and, above all, a gap between the dominant ideology and realities. Contrary to Higham's belief, many voices were raised at the end of the nineteenth century against the abuses of the new order and the subversion of the old. Vehement criticism and protest were voiced in the rhetoric of the agrarian revolt and in the works of Henry George, Edward Bellamy, and Henry Demarest Lloyd as well as of Mark Twain and William Dean Howells. The angry dissenters predicted social catastrophe and insisted that survival of the democratic nation demanded a regeneration of the old morality and its adaptation to cope with the new conditions.¹⁰ They called for the purification of the political and economic process and the restoration of the sovereignty of the people. These widespread popular sentiments achieved symbolic expression in the anti-trust, anti-plutocratic, anti-boss, and nativist movements, which flourished well on into the 1920's. The ultimate goal of the dissenters was the reform of society along the lines of the old egalitarian, individualist order with its Protestant morality, restoring, in effect, the ideal conditions of the past.

The agrarian-progressive reformers, looked to government to take limited, negative action and act, in T. H. Green's formula, as a "hindrance of hindrances": to control concentrated economic power in order to restore equality of opportunity and clear the choked channels of democracy. Essentially, however, they were ambivalent about, if not hostile to the nationalizing and statist tendencies of the times. And their efforts and hopes were swallowed in the relentless advance of corporate technology.

Not until the first decade of the new century did critical urban intellectuals undertake the needed reconstruction of the old national ideology. They

⁹Robert A. Haber, "The End of Ideology as Ideology," in Waxman, p. 186.

¹⁰See Henry Nash Smith, *Mark Twain, The Development of a Writer* (Cambridge, 1962), p. 139; Larzer Ziff, *American Eighteen Nineties: Life and Times of a Lost Generation* (New York, 1966).

rejected entirely as outmoded the old agrarian values and worked to elaborate "a new scale of national values" in consonance with the new order of things. The "fertile amalgamation" of "democratic ideals" and "bureaucratic techniques" was the work of a few "radical progressives" or "liberals" (as they called themselves after 1915) like Herbert Croly, Walter Lippmann, and John Dewey. The new "liberalism" redefined democratic theory in terms of functional process rather than status, in socialized rather than individualist terms. It sought not equality of opportunity, but equity of achievement and rewards. It proposed, not to abolish special privilege, but to extend privileges to all the truly deserving. The liberal intellectuals recognized the existence of organized interest groups as inevitable and proposed to integrate them all in the national interest, to make differentiated society whole through cooperation for the common national ideal. Individualism was to be preserved in the socialized order through individual participation in the organized group and social process.

The chief agency of liberal reform was the state, which was to be given increased powers to effect the desired changes. Its main functions were to promote economic growth and prosperity by positive management of the economy, stimulating industrial cooperation and efficiency, and effecting a more equitable distribution of the wealth, i.e., social justice, especially for labor. The ultimate ideal of the liberal ideology was a socially integrated nation and organic community, with well-being and freedom for all to realize the highest quality of life in fulfillment of human desires. This new America was to work positively to extend its way of life to the rest of the world.

The means to the goal were pragmatic and technical rather than moral. The horizons of liberalism were national, not local or sectional; collectivist rather than individualist; and internationalist as well. The liberals rejected the suspicious isolationist stance of the old American ideology and advocated cooperation with Europe, Latin America and Asia in the creation of a democratic, peaceful world order in which American ideals and interests could flourish to universal benefit. On the most general level, the new ideological formula combined power and progress, technique and organization with the ideals of social justice, using organized political and economic power to ideal ends and grounding ideals in the realities of power in the pursuit of the American promise on a world scale.

In the pre-war years, these liberal ideas were far from being generally accepted and remained the property of a small group of intellectuals, with affinities to conservative nationalists like Elihu Root and Henry Stimson on the right and to moderate socialists on the left. In fact, they were essentially antithetical to the prevailing ideological orientation of the great body of traditional progressive reformers.¹¹

¹¹See Otis L. Graham Jr., *The Great Campaigns: Reform and War in America, 1900–1928* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971).

The coming of the war underlined the essential differences between the new liberalism and traditional progressivism. The liberal intellectuals were encouraged by the preparations for war and American entry. They did not bemoan the war as a calamity that would destroy liberal reform. Indeed, they saw it as a great national experience that would unite the American people in a common cause and move the nation toward the cooperative commonwealth at home and toward a liberal anti-imperialist world order. The liberals believed that the exigencies of war were impelling the country toward the realization of their ideals. And the course of events bore them out as the nation mobilized in "war socialism" to achieve its highest production ever, with liberal tax and labor policies amidst widespread prosperity.¹²

As it turned out, the war-time euphoria of the liberals was much too sanguine, based as it was on a giant rationalization and a large measure of self-deception as to the realities of power and the role of intellectuals. The post-war debacle at Versailles and the resurgent reaction in Washington and across the country forced them to draw back from the effervescent idealism of the pre-war years. In the 1920's, abashed by the conservative political reaction as well as by the cultural backlash, they became suspicious of the power of the centralized state, disillusioned with politics and dubious about the validity of popular opinion. They gave up their comprehensive idealistic program and redefined liberalism as a method of inquiry, akin to science, designed to discover the truths of the social process as well as the proper techniques by which they might be applied. As liberal reformers, they no longer hoped to reconstruct the social order but sought piecemeal experimental solutions to specific problems. There was no longer a royal road to reform, only limited access to specific improvements. Basic social change, moreover, was seen as a glacially slow and largely unconscious cultural process, impervious to social engineering. Defeated but not destroyed, dismayed but not despairing, liberalism persisted in chastened form along more realistic lines. Liberals put their hopes in the "machine process" as the agent of the inexorable assimilation of American society to liberal principles. They even consoled themselves with the observation, not without a basis in fact,¹³ that their ideas were being realized in American political and economic life and affecting the cultural scene, in education, philosophy, social thought, and popular morals, the reactionary backlash notwithstanding. Liberalism as ideology, it would seem, was not on the road to extinction after the war but continued to make its way in modified form, shorn of its effervescent qualities and attuned to the realities of the developing corporate-industrial order.

It was this limited, highly pragmatic version of liberalism that informed the

¹²Charles Hirschfeld, "Nationalist Progressivism and World War I," in *Mid-America*, vol. XLV, (1963), pp. 139-156.

¹³See *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (New York, 1933), chapter I, xi-xxv, which describes the evolution in a liberal direction of the social, political, and economic institutions during the post-war decade.

programs of the New Deal, which focussed on "the new imperative" (in Walter Lippmann's phrase) of government responsibility for economic recovery. There was a revival of idealistic fervor and of hopes of reconstructing American society and the world during the Depression and the war years. But these were swallowed up in "the new industrial state" that emerged in the post-war years, when corporate liberalism reached its fullest development and the liberal ideology finally achieved its hegemony on the American scene. Between 1945 and 1965, the liberal synthesis of democracy and technology was embodied in the dedication of the American people on all levels to their common interest in economic growth and mass consumption. Democratic ideals literally materialized in the pragmatic, secularized, consumer-oriented, corporate order whose fruits were generally accepted by the American people. The proclamations of the end of ideology in the 1950's reflected this consummation of the end of utopian thinking in acceptance of the soothing realities of Eisenhower America. Liberalism had triumphed as fact and been accepted as idea.

From about 1965 on, the liberal corporate order has been coming apart. It has reached the limits of viability in its development and assumptions, and its promises and rewards have increasingly turned to ashes in the mouths of people. What will emerge cannot be foreseen, and the future is as cast in shadow as it is lined with hope.

White Historians: Black Slaves...

By Michael Greenberg

"The planters had a saying, always of course with an implicit reservation as to limits, that a negro was what a white man made him."

U.B. Phillips — American Negro Slavery

"When they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination — indeed, everything and anything except me."

Ralph Ellison — The Invisible Man

Historians have become increasingly aware of the failure of their profession to intelligently explore the complexities of the black experience in the United States. An area particularly sensitive to this criticism has been the treatment of the Afro-American under slavery. Eugene D. Genovese, commenting on the consequences of this failure, claimed that not only was the historian uninformed about the everyday life of the slave "but to make matters worse, he may well think he knows a good deal, for the literature abounds in undocumented assertions and plausible legends." Writing in *The New York Times*, C. Vann Woodward discussed the situation with uncharacteristic bluntness; "Black history was white history. Denied a past of his own, the Negro was given to understand that whatever history and culture he possessed was supplied by his association with the dominant race in the New World and its European background."¹

This failure to treat Afro-American history in its own terms was extensively discussed by Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman in *Time on the Cross*. Their analysis was marred, however, by both their tendency to dismiss most of the previous work on slavery as primarily ideological and their own faulty model of slave life. Although they provided important detail on the physical condition and family structure of the slaves, most of their discussion of slave mores and values proceeded from their assumptions rather than any evidence that is provided. They claimed that the Afro-American slave was an industrious and disciplined worker, committed to a Puritanical morality and other values

¹Eugene D. Genovese, "American Slaves and Their History," in *New York Review of Books*, (December 3, 1970), pp. 34–43. C. Vann Woodward, "American History (White Man's Version) Needs an Infusion of Soul," in *The New York Times Magazine*, (April 30, 1969). C. Vann Woodward goes on to claim that most black historians tended to accept the white view. This is not a fair appraisal of the work of many Afro-American scholars who continually challenged the complacent attitude of their white colleagues. Most of their efforts, however, were ignored. Their contributions are summarized in Robert William Fogel and Stanley Engerman, *Time On The Cross* (2 Vols., Boston, 1974), II, 192–213.

usually associated with the Victorian middle-class.² Engerman and Fogel made extensive use of neo-classical economic theory, a theory saturated with the assumptions of Marshall's England. Their work for all its sophisticated technique turns out to be as traditional as *Gone With The Wind*. It is one in a long line of studies of Afro-American slavery which reveal more about the author than the subject under investigation. Rather than escape from the myths of the past they have added to them.

This essay attempts to explore some of the standard works on Afro-American slavery and the slave. A consistent pattern running through all these discussions is the tendency to treat the slaves solely in terms of white assumptions on the "inherent nature of the Negro." There were, however, alternative approaches and images of the black slaves which if pursued could have seriously undermined the prevailing racist stereotypes. They tended to be ignored. The scientific approach to the role of race developed, not as an attempt to explore the legitimacy of racist theories, but rather to provide them with a basis in "fact." When historians in the twentieth century began to study the institution of slavery, their work whatever its strengths in other areas did little more than repeat and lend further legitimacy to the accepted stereotypes of the Afro-American slave.

One of the first influential "studies" of the Afro-American was conducted by Thomas Jefferson. His strictures on the nature of the blacks reflected conventional attitudes, and his public and systematic treatment of the subject furthered their degradation. Those who sought to counter Jefferson's position defended the biblical view of creation and stressed the role of environment. The standards used by all participants in this discussion were the institutions and values of Anglo-American civilization. Dr. Benjamin Rush attributed black skin to a mild form of leprosy and recommended bleeding, oxygenated muriatic acid and the juice from unripened peaches as possible cures.³

There was, however, an alternative defense of the African which, despite the prominence of its author, received little attention. John Wesley, drawing on accounts of Africa by traders and others who had lived in or visited the continent, described it as a viable and developed community. Although his Africans tended to sound like good Methodists, his account stressed the political and economic development that the different societies in Africa had achieved. He quoted from a correspondent of the Royal Academy of Sciences at Paris, who had lived in Africa for five years, who said that although the

²*Ibid.*, Appendix C; *passim*, Vol. I, Chapters IV, VI, and the Epilogue.

³Jefferson's views are found in Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia*, edited with an introduction and notes by William Peden (Chapel Hill, 1955), pp. 139-140. An excellent discussion of the attitudes of the period is found in Winthrop Jordan, *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812* (Chapel Hill, 1968), Chapters VII-XVI. Racial theories are discussed in Thomas F. Gossett, *Race: The History of an Idea in America* (Dallas, 1963), Chapters I-III. Rush's ideas are analyzed in William Stanton, *The Leopard's Spots: Scientific Attitudes Toward Race in America, 1815-59* (Chicago, 1960), Chapter I.

people were illiterate, they ‘. . .reason so pertinently concerning the heavenly bodies. . .that with proper instruments, they could become excellent astronomers.’

The people on the Gold and Slave Coasts live in a remarkably well-ordered society. “The inferiors pay the utmost respect to their superiors; So wives to their husbands, Children to their Parents. And they are remarkably industrious; all are constantly employ’d; the men in agriculture, the women in spinning and weaving cotton.” Although “heathens” they are an extremely religious and law abiding people. He claimed that the Africans were “. . .far more mild, friendly and kind to Strangers, than any of Our Forefathers were.” They excelled the Europeans in justice, mercy, truth, and honesty. “Upon the whole therefore the Negroes who inhabit the coast of Africa, from the river Senegal to the Southern bounds of Angola, are so far from being stupid, senseless, brutish, lazy, barbarians, the fierce, cruel, perfidious Savages they have been described. . . .”⁴

Wesley tended to idealize and romanticize the African, but his account does provide an approach to the study of Africa and the Afro-American which undermined the facile assumptions of the period. It would be ignored through most of the nineteenth century.⁵ Jefferson’s uniformed and illogical assertions were better suited to the needs of the period, and would gain the sanction of science by the time of the Civil War.⁶ Wesley did not examine the Afro-American community under slavery, and accepted the standard descriptions of the blacks in the New World. His belief in equality, in fact as theory, allowed him to turn these accounts against the institution of slavery in a forceful manner.

Allowing them to be as stupid as you say, to who is that stupidity owing? Without question it lies altogether at the door of their inhuman masters: Who give them no means, no opportunity of improving their understanding: And indeed leave them no motive, either hope or fear, to attempt any such thing. They were no way remarkable for stupidity, while

⁴John Wesley, *Thoughts Upon Slavery* (London, 1774), pp. 5–10.

⁵The image of “darkest Africa” either as an expression of geographical ignorance, or as one of cultural arrogance, was a nineteenth century invention. Relative to their knowledge of the world in general, eighteenth century Europeans knew more, and cared more, about Africa than they did at any later period up to the 1950’s. Phillip D. Curtin, *The Image of Africa: British Ideas and Action, 1780–1850* (Madison, 1964), pp. 9–10.

⁶Gossett, *op. cit.*, Chapter IV. Stanton, *op. cit.*, *passim*. Also influential were the ideas of Edward Long in Curtin, *op. cit.*, pp. 43–46.

*they remained in their own country: The inhabitants of Africa where they have equal means of improvements, are not inferior to the inhabitants of Europe.*⁷

During the Ante-bellum period the position and condition of the black population forced its way into the national consciousness. But even those most sympathetic to the demands of the black community tended to accept the traditional stereotypes of the Afro-American. The Southern defense of slavery rested in part on the assumption of black inferiority. Two views tended to dominate this thinking; the savage African, and the civilized and docile slave. This view of the black as passive, unaggressive, meek and true Christians was accepted by many Northern opponents of slavery. Even those who rejected any notion of inherent racial differences attempted to avoid the issue. Both the abolitionists in the North and the apologists for slavery in the South sought to minimize the role of blacks in the anti-slavery crusade. The major use made of the ex-slaves was as testimonials to the horrors of slavery. White abolitionists resisted attempts by blacks to speak and act in an independent manner. The abolitionists were a small minority within the anti-slavery movement, much of which was explicitly racist. An important reason for the success of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* was its ability to depict the horrors of slavery without threatening the prejudices of its audience. Harriet Beecher Stowe's blacks are simple God fearing folk, whose purpose in the novel is to symbolize the fate of pure Christian spirituality in an America that continues to tolerate slavery. Her major concern was the need to bring the United States back to its original purpose through a process of religious regeneration. *Uncle Tom's Cabin* had little to say on the question of emancipation, but recognized that it would necessitate colonization.⁸

⁷Wesley, *op. cit.*, pp. 21–22.

⁸The most informed general discussion of white attitudes during this period is found in George M. Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817–1914* (New York, 1971), Chapters I–V. Abolitionist attitudes are discussed in Leon F. Litwack, *North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790–1860* (Chicago, 1961), Chapters VII–VIII; Benjamin Quarles, *Black Abolitionists* (London, 1969), Chapter III; Frederickson, *op. cit.*, Chapter I. On the relationship between racism and anti-slavery see *Ibid.*, Chapter V; James A. Rawley, *Race and Politics: "Bleeding Kansas" and the Coming of the Civil War* (Philadelphia, 1969), *passim*; Eugene H. Berwanger, *The Frontier Against Slavery: Western Anti-Negro Prejudice and the Slavery Extension Controversy* (Urbana, 1967), *passim*. The relationship between racism and the defense of slavery is discussed in William Summer Jenkins, *Pro-Slavery Thought in the Old South* (Chapel Hill, 1935), Chapter VI; Frederickson, *op. cit.*, Chapters II–III. The fullest statement of this aspect of the South's defense of slavery was developed by Samuel A. Cartwright, "Slavery in the Light of Ethnology," reprinted in E. N. Elliott, ed., *Cotton is King and Pro-Slavery Arguments* (Augusta, 1860), pp. 689–728. Harriet Beecher Stowe's racial attitudes are found throughout *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. They are "naturally patient, timid, unenterprising, home-loving and affectionate." "Tom, who had the soft, impressible nature of his kindly race, ever yearning toward the simple and childlike. . ." Her ideas are discussed in Frederickson, *op. cit.*, Chapter IV; Harriet Beecher Stowe, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*.

In 1855 Herman Melville published *Benito Cereno*. It is one of the most remarkable discussions of black-white relations within the context of slavery written before the Civil War. It remains a forceful and penetrating exposure of the mythical quality of white attitudes toward the Afro-American. The inability of whites to go beyond stereotypes in their comprehension of the black community is the underlying reality of *Benito Cereno*. Amasa Delano, Captain of a New England whaler, attempts to aid a Spanish slaver in distress. On boarding the ship he finds what appears to be utter chaos. Whites and blacks surround him begging for food and water, while above the throng are four elderly black oakum-pickers and six blacks scouring rusty hatchets. The ship is commanded by Captain Benito Cereno, drained of physical and spiritual strength, barely able to exercise his command. His personal servant, Bado, however, treats him with respect.

Sometime the negro gave his master his arm, or took his handkerchief out of his pocket for him; performing these and similar offices with that affectionate zeal which transmutes into something filial or fraternal acts in themselves but menial; and which has gained for the negro the repute of making the most pleasing body-servant in the world; one, too, whom a master need be on no stiffly superior terms with, but may treat with familiar trust; less a servant than a devoted companion.

The situation on board the ship alarmed Captain Delano but he was unable to comprehend what had happened. The only apparent source of order are the oakum-pickers. Don Benito's attempt to detail the difficulties he has undergone is occasionally interrupted by Bado. He is not annoyed at this, but thankful for Bado's help in keeping order. "Ah, Master' sighed the black, bowing his face, 'don't speak of me; Bado is nothing; what Bado has done was but his duty.'" One of the younger whites is cut on the face by a slave. Benito dismisses this as a "sport of the lad." Captain Delano grows suspicious of Don Benito, but is unable to make any sense out of what has taken place. "If Don Benito's story was, throughout, an invention, then every soul on board, down to the youngest negress, was his carefully drilled recruit in the plot: an incredible inference."

Bado offers to shave his master, and although Delano believes the offer to be ill-timed he attributes it to the "servant's anxious fidelity." Bado selects the sharpest razor and begins his work. At the sight of the razor Don Benito shudders. "You must not shake so master. See, Don Amasa, master always shakes when I shave him and yet master knows I never yet have drawn blood, though it's true, if master will shake so, I may one of these times." Captain Delano indicates that he doubts Cereno's story. Before the latter can reply the razor draws blood.

"See, master—you shook so—here's Bado's first blood."

No sword drawn before James the First of England, no assassination in that timid King's presence, could have produced a more terrified aspect than was

now presented by Don Benito.

"Poor Fellow," thought Captain Delano, "so nervous he can't even bear the sight of barber's blood, is it credible that I should have imagined he meant to spill all my blood, who can't endure the sight of one little drop of his own?"

During these events Captain Delano's thoughts dwell upon the negroes' good humor and natural propensity for service. "When to this is added the docility arising from the unaspiring contentment of a limited mind, and that susceptibility of bland attachment sometime inhering in indisputable inferiors. . . it is easy to see why they are preferred as servants. He himself enjoyed the company of blacks and took to them ". . . just as other men to Newfoundland dogs." Don Benito is nearly killed by Bado when he attempts to warn Delano. After a fierce struggle the blacks are subdued. During his testimony Captain Cereno claimed that although only a few blacks planned the insurrection all supported it.⁹

The response to **Benito Cereno** at the time, and up until the Second World War reveals a great deal about the attitudes of white society to the blacks and to slavery. Whether sympathetic or hostile to Melville's portrait most critics viewed the story as an example of the potential triumph of pure evil represented by the blacks over innocence represented by Captain Delano. Initially **Benito Cereno** was published in **Putnam's Magazine**, and then as part of **The Piazza Tales**. At the time, the work was largely ignored. Later critics dealt with the work in more detail. Writing in 1929 Lewis Mumford criticized Melville for omitting negative aspects of Cereno's character. The result was that "the world is mortified for Don Benito by the remembrance of the human treachery he has encountered: no later benefaction, no radiance of sun and sky, can make him forget it." As late as 1972 William H. Shurr wrote that "his [Melville's] point is that ordinary people cannot recognize the good in its pure form; just as the ordinary person, Captain Amasa Delano, cannot recognize the extreme of pure evil when he encountered it in **Benito Cereno**."¹⁰

⁹Herman Melville, **Benito Cereno** in Charles Neider, ed., **Short Novels of the Masters** (New York, 1964), pp. 52-124.

¹⁰The first in depth studies of **Benito Cereno** were written in 1947. Stanley Williams in "Follow Your Leader" and Rosalie Feltenstein in "Melville's **Benito Cereno**" ignored the question of slavery. The treatment of **Benito Cereno** is discussed by Joseph Schiffman in "Critical Problems in Melville's **Benito Cereno**," in **Modern Languages Quarterly**, Vol. XI, (September, 1950). His contention that Bado is the moral hero in **Benito Cereno** is challenged by Sidney Kaplan, "Herman Melville and the American National Sin: The Meaning of **Benito Cereno**," in **Journal of Negro History**, Vol. XLII, (January, 1957), pp. 11-37. Both Robert Forrey, "Herman Melville and the Negro Question," in **Mainstream**, Vol. XV, (February, 1962), pp. 23-32, and Eleanor E. Simpson, "Melville and the Negro: From **Typee** to **Benito Cereno**," Vol. XLI, (March, 1969-1970), pp. 19-38, successfully contend that Melville was opposed to slavery. Warren D'Avezedo, "Revolt on the San Dominick," in **Phylon**, Vol. XXLI, (2nd. Quarter, 1956), pp. 129-140, claims that the work is an excellent discussion of the effects of slavery on the perceptions of whites of blacks. "In every way **Benito Cereno**, as a story of the relationship between Negroes and Whites, is far in advance of its time." The best analysis of **Benito Cereno** on this level is Jean Fagan Yellin, "Black Masks: Melville's **Benito Cereno**," in **American Quarterly**, Vol. XXII, (Fall, 1970), pp. 678-689.

Melville's discussion of the inability of whites to perceive the reality of the Afro-American challenged many of the assumptions of the period. What is significant in his account is not that the slaves rose up in anger and attempted to destroy their tormentors. Racist theory could account for these occasional outbursts of fury. What should have been most upsetting was the discipline and organization of the blacks; their sense of purpose and their ability to control what was taking place. Melville focussed on the slave regime's most vulnerable area, its legitimacy. The planters' notion of a loyal and dependent slave was not a convenient fantasy but the basis of his moral order. If the slaves dependency was a mask, then the planters' notion of a loyal and dependent slave was not a convenient fantasy but the basis of his moral order. If the slaves dependency was a mask, then the planters' position was based solely on force. The North could take little comfort from *Benito Cereno*. Uncle Tom would forgive; Bado would seek justice.

Although the performance of black troops during the Civil War had a positive effect on white attitudes in the North, by the end of Reconstruction a racism, in many respects more virulent and powerful, dominated the treatment and conception of the blacks. The natural and social sciences lent their prestige to the belief in racial inferiority. A study of some of the important magazines published in the last part of the nineteenth century found blacks consistently referred to as "niggers, darkies, coons." etc. It was generally accepted that the South should be allowed a free hand in its approach to the problem of race relations. The *New York Times* endorsed the South's attempt to disenfranchise the blacks as dictated by "the supreme law of self-preservation." Charles Eliot, president of Harvard College, supported the segregation of Southern colleges, saying Harvard would also be segregated if it had a significant number of black students. The views of the South were deferred to in questions of current policy and in the study of the past. The first area to reflect this tendency was Reconstruction. The Southern view on this crucial period would not be

Yellin claimed that, "in *Benito Cereno* Melville used well established literary versions of the Negro as happy slave, unfortunate victim and exotic primitive, displayed their falseness, and destroyed them. . . After *Benito Cereno* the masks again became the conventions of our literature. It would take a long time for America to produce another literary artist who would be able to expose them, and still longer to create a writer who would be able to tell it like it is." For a sampling of reviews at the time see Hershel Parker, ed., *The Recognition of Herman Melville: Selected Criticism Since 1846* (Ann Arbor, 1967), pp. 81-84; Lewis Mumford, *Herman Melville* (New York, 1929), p. 246. This criticism is also made by F. O. Matthiessen, *American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman* (New York, 1941), p. 508; William H. Shurr, *The Mystery of Iniquity: Melville as Poet, 1857-1891* (Lexington, 1972), pp. 153-154. A good overall discussion of *Benito Cereno* can be found in Richard Fogle, "Benito Cereno," in Richard Chase, ed., *Melville a Collection of Critical Essays* (Englewood Cliffs, 1962), pp. 116-124. Van Wyck Brooks in *The Times of Melville and Whitman* (New York, 1953), claims Melville was deeply concerned over the question of slavery. *Ibid.*, p. 178. For a general discussion of the treatment of slavery by American writers see Lorenzo Dow Turner, *Anti-Slavery Sentiment in American Literature Prior to 1865* (Washington, 1929). As John W. Blassingame has demonstrated, clearer and more objective views of the Afro-American slave could have been constructed through use of the slave narratives; John W. Blassingame, *The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Ante-Bellum South* (New York, 1972). Although these narratives were extensively read they had little impact on white attitudes and preconceptions. Charles H. Nichols, "Who Reads the Slave Narratives?" in *Phylon Quarterly*, Vol. XX, (Summer, 1959), pp. 149-156.

effectively challenged until the 1950's, and it still dominates popular perceptions of the period.¹¹

It is not surprising that the North would also defer to the South in the discussion of slavery. The acceptance of the Southern view on the nature of slavery and the Afro-American slave was confirmed with the appearance of U. B. Phillips' *American Negro Slavery* in 1919.¹² Phillips was a brilliant and thorough historian. His work was well documented, and contained important insights. He was sensitive to many of the crucial aspects of the slave regime; its development over time, the relationship of law and custom, the different kinds of slave societies in the Americas, the importance of African backgrounds, and the importance of the issue of slavery at the Constitutional Convention. His detailed discussion of the economics of slavery, and his descriptions of tobacco, hemp, sugar and cotton farming are still useful today. There is much that is valuable in his work, and hopefully his racism and apologetic tone will not lead future students of the South to ignore him. As a Southerner he was sympathetic to the Old Regime and with few reservations accepted its view on slavery and the slaves.

Despite his grasp of many important aspects of the slave regime, the immediate impact of his work on the study of Afro-American slavery was ambiguous at best. The extent of his scholarship and the coincidence of his views with the attitudes prevalent at the time combined to sanctify his findings. But beneath the detailed and apparently objective character of his scholarship was a view of slavery and the Afro-American which reinforced and further justified the racism of the period. The defense of slavery ultimately rested on establishing the "inferiority" of the slaves. Phillips claimed that slavery was a school which allowed a "superior" people to civilize the "barbarian". It was a suitable form of racial control and provided an effective system of economic management. Its impact on both races was positive. The intimacy of plantation society, although occasionally punctuated with violence, tended to produce affection and kindness. "In the actual regime severity was clearly the exception, and kindness the rule."

The benevolence of the planters was inherent in the logic of the master-slave relationship. "Severe and unyielding requirements would keep everyone on edge; concession when accompanied with geniality and not indulged so far as to cause demoralization would make plantation life not only tolerable but

¹¹Gossett, *op. cit.* Chapter XI; Frederickson, *op. cit.*, Chapters VII–XI. On the relationship between Social Darwinism and racism also see Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (Boston, 1955), Chapter IX; the classic analysis of the establishment of segregation in the South is C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (New York, 1955, new ed., 1964), *passim*; see also Woodward's *Origins of the New South: 1877–1913* (Baton Rouge, 1951), *passim*. The treatment of Reconstruction is discussed in Bernard Weisberger, "The Dark and Bloody Ground, Reconstruction Historiography," in *Journal of Southern History*, Vol. XXV, (November, 1959), pp. 427–447.

¹²U. B. Phillips, *American Negro Slavery: A Survey of the Supply, Employment and Control of Negro Labor as Determined by the Plantation Regime* (New York, 1918); see also his *Life and Labor in the Old South* (Boston, 1929).

charming.” He argued that “there was clearly no general prevalence of severity and strain in the regime.” In contrast with the impersonal relations of today’s business system “. . .the planters were commonly in residence, their slaves were their chief property to be conserved, and the slaves themselves would not permit indifference even if the masters were so disposed.” The slaves “. . .insisted upon possessing and being possessed in a cordial but respectful intimacy.” Phillips recognized that every plantation was not an Arcadia, but he believed that many came close. Plantation slavery “was less a business than a life; it made fewer fortunes than it made men.”

Phillips also dealt with the effects of slavery on the blacks. On the average, the planter amply provided for their material and spiritual needs. Since most would have been unable to provide for themselves this was indeed fortunate. Under the plantation regime the African was transformed into the American Negro. “The traits which prevailed were an eagerness for society, music and merriment, a fondness for display whether of person or dress, vocabulary or emotion, a not flagrant sensuality, a receptiveness toward any religion whose exercises were exhilarating, a proneness to superstition, a readiness for loyalty of a feudal sort, and last but not least, a healthy human repugnance toward overwork.” When viewed from a different perspective, much in Phillips’ descriptions indicates the ability of the slaves to maintain an independent lifestyle and culture. Phillips described in detail the continuing influence of African beliefs and customs, but dismissed them as “superstitions”. Imprisoned by his own racism he was unable to evaluate or comprehend the material he had so painstakingly collected.

Phillips concluded that it was only natural for the slaves to be grateful to those who lived in the “. . . ‘Big house,’ as the darkies loved to call it.” The “. . .relations on both sides were felt to be based on pleasurable responsibility.” The “. . .American Negroes rule not even themselves. They were more or less contentedly slaves, with grievances from time to time but not ambitions.” The plantation was a social settlement where the African would be civilized. The “despotism” of the plantation “was. . .beneficial in intent and on the whole beneficial in effect.” Phillips’ enthusiasm for the good old days occasionally got the best of him. The Afro-American slave with “lazy pasts and reckless futures; lived in each moment as it flew, and left ‘Old Massa’ to take such thought as the morrow might heed.”¹³

The first important criticism of Phillips’ view of plantation life was developed by L. C. Gray in his monumental study *History of Agriculture in Southern United States to 1860*.¹⁴ Gray minimized the difference between free and slave labor. Investment in slaves was rational in an economic sense, and

¹³Phillips, *American Negro Slavery*, pp. 291–294, 306, 309, 322–324, 329, 401, 436, 450–452, 454; Phillips, *Life and Labor*, pp. 194, 196–200.

¹⁴Lewis Cecil Gray assisted by Esther Katherine Thompson, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States* (2 Vols., Gloucester, new ed., 1958).

the system was fairly efficient. Both force and incentives operated to achieve a high degree of specialization and worker efficiency. Gray discussed the different classes within white society and minimized the distinctive qualities of the planter class. "With the expansion of Southern Agriculture, class distinctions became more and more similar to those of present-day America — that is, they were based largely on differences of wealth, with some recognition of differences in education and breeding, and between old wealth and new wealth."

Gray accepted the racist views of Phillips and generally felt that the Africans benefited from their enslavement. Committed to bourgeois values and institutions, he recognized that slavery had its negative aspects. It robbed an individual of pride, and although slavery educated the ". . . African barbarians in the rudimentary elements of civilization. . . it offered no promise of a higher development to the black man." Despite the evils of the system the ". . . Negro was usually a contented, joyous, rollicking, care-free individual." He was "ignorant of any other condition, free from responsibility, with his simple physical needs well provided for, the Negro was frequently, a veritable child of the sun." His conclusions on the effects of the master-slave relationship were similar to Phillips'. "With the simplicity of children they accepted their condition of subordination, identified themselves with the family of the master, took pride in its social position, rejoiced in its good fortune, and felt keen sorrow in its losses and misfortunes."¹⁵

During the 1930's there were a number of important projects and studies which dealt with slavery. The Works Projects Administration interviewed thousands of ex-slaves, and a number of important studies of the black community in the South were conducted. These studies confirmed the presence of a diverse and viable black community, a people who despite all the difficulties of their caste and class, successfully maintained a sense of pride and decency. They contain important insights into the degree to which an African past combined with slavery to sustain a separate identity and culture. They provided a wealth of material on family life, folklore, religion and the attitudes of the black community towards whites, their present condition and their past. They indicate the degree to which the blacks rejected the legitimacy of their position. and their method of dealing with it.¹⁶ Until recently this material was

¹⁵*Ibid.*, Vol. I, Chapters XIV, XX, XXI, and XXII.

¹⁶George P. Rawick, ed., *The American Slave: A Composite Autobiography* (19 Vols., Westport, 1972), at the time a number of works were published based on part of this material. B. A. Botkin, ed., *Lay My Burden Down: A Folk History of Slavery* (Chicago, 1945). *The Negro in Virginia*, Compiled by Workers of the Writers' Program of the Works Projects Administration in the State of Virginia (New York, 1940, new ed., 1969); Writers' Project, Louisiana, *Gumbo Ya—Ya* (Boston, 1945); Kay Orland Armstrong, *Old Massa's People: The Old Slaves Tell Their Story* (Indianapolis, 1939); John B. Cade, "Out of the Mouths of Ex-Slaves," in *Journal of Negro History*, Vol. XX, (1935), pp. 294—337. A study of the blacks after emancipation which has much to say about the black community during slavery is Charles G. Johnson, *Shadow of the Plantation* (Chicago, 1934); also see Hortense Powdermaker, *After Freedom: A Cultural Study in the Deep South* (New York, 1936, new ed., 1966). In a number of important studies W. E. B. DuBois provided the most comprehensive picture of the Afro-American experience.

ignored by most students of "the peculiar institution."

At this time an important study of the black community was published which directly challenged the accepted view on slavery, and the slaves. Herbert Aptheker writing from a Marxist perspective wrote one of the first studies of slavery by a white which recognized the full humanity of the blacks. Unwilling to accept racist explanations on the behavior of the blacks during slavery, and convinced that slavery was an inhuman and oppressive system, Aptheker set out to demonstrate the resistance of the Afro-American to their plight. He exhaustively searched the newspapers and other records in the South for evidence of slave discontent. He uncovered a great deal of material which seriously questioned the notion of the contented slave. He went further, however, and argued that the slave resisted at every opportunity, and had by the time of the Civil War established a revolutionary tradition. Like other students of black history Aptheker attempted to fit the slave into a preconceived model and thus undermined the impact of his work.¹⁷

Although the work of anthropologists had effectively demolished the legitimacy of the various racial interpretations of history, it was not until the Second World War that racism came into general disrepute. Various aspects of Phillips' work came under criticism, and a new synthesis was needed.¹⁸ In 1956 Kenneth Stampp's *The Peculiar Institution*¹⁹ was published and immediately gained widespread acceptance. Stampp's work was well suited to the emerging consensus approach to American history. Consensus historians denied the existence of fundamental conflict in the past, stressed the hegemony of the liberal tradition, and were extremely critical of the progressive historians' emphasis on conflict. This process, which John Higham referred to as the homogenizing of American history, reinforced the dominant outlook of the 1950's period. This conservative mood was reflected in the approach to the black community. The integration of the Negro into the mainstream was perceived as the last great reform. Stampp's work deemphasized the distinctive quality of Afro-American traditions and culture, and minimized the difficulties that the response to integration might create. "In so far as the Southern 'race problem' grew out of such external differences as skin pigmentation, it has

¹⁷ Herbert Aptheker, *American Negro Slave Revolts* (New York, 1943); w. E. B. DuBois, *Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860-1880* (New York, 1935).

¹⁸ Particularly important in the attack on racist theories was the work of Franz Boas. See Gossett, *op. cit.*, Chapter XVI, "The Scientific Revolt Against Racism". The major criticism of Phillips methodology was by Richard Hofstadter, "U. B. Phillips and the Plantation Legend," in *Journal of Negro History*, Vol. XXIX, (April, 1944), pp. 109-124; see also Kenneth Stampp, "The Historian and Southern Negro Slavery," in *American Historical Review*, Vol. LVII, (April, 1952); John Hope Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of the Negro Americans* (New York, 1947). Phillips' views on Africa and race were attacked by Melville Herskovits, *The Myth of the Negro Past* (New York, 1941), Chapters I-IV.

¹⁹ Kenneth M. Stampp, *The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South* (New York, 1956).

always been an artificial problem created by white men who by the nineteenth century had made an obsession of these racial superficialities." His attitude on the question of the relevance of racial differences was clearly stated in the book's preface:

I have assumed that the slaves were merely ordinary human beings, that innately Negroes are, after all, only white men with black skins, nothing more, nothing less.

He realized that this assumption implied a radical break with the past treatment of slavery: "This gives quite a new and different meaning to the bondage of black men; it gives their story a relevance to men of all races which it never seemed to have before."

Stampp attacked the various racist justifications of slavery, and the myth of African backwardness. He minimized the early discrimination against the blacks, and emphasized the ambivalent legal position of the first Africans in Virginia. Building on the work of Frank Owsley, he stressed the importance of the middle class yeoman-farmer. He concluded that only a few large planters, a small minority of the white population, benefited from "the peculiar institution". Stampp's model of the plantation was similar to Gray's. "A fact that was somehow lost in this legend (of aristocratic planters) was that these entrepreneurs operated their estates and made their fortunes in a competitive society in which success was the reward of careful financing, shrewd management, and a constant search for the most efficient methods of utilizing slave labor." Yet a careful reading of both Stampp's and Phillips' analyses of the planter class reveals a striking degree of similarity in the evidence presented; what is different is their assumptions. Phillips assumed the centrality of the aristocratic non-business aspects of the regime, which were distorted by the influence of the market. Stampp described it as a business enterprise, distorted by aristocratic pretensions. He noted that "the traits ascribed to the legendary genteel planter might even have been a handicap in the struggle for success."

Underlying this difference is their approach to the treatment of the slaves. Stampp emphasized the long hours and the hard work that was demanded from the slave. He found that on some plantations slaves were overworked, and in most cases the planters viewed the slaves in pecuniary terms. He did admit, however, that "after lands and slaves had remained in the hands of a single family for several generations, planters sometimes developed a patriarchal attitude toward their 'people' and took pride in treating them indulgently." During the growing season the slaves worked fifteen or sixteen hours a day, including time allocated for meals and rest. During the nineteenth century conditions improved. He attributed the better treatment of the slaves to the closing of the slave trade and the fact that "unquestionably the ante-bellum planter who coveted high rank in society responded to subtle pressures that others did not feel." His discussion of this aspect of the oppressive conditions of slavery was reduced to the claim that "the evidence does not sustain the

belief that free laborers generally worked longer hours and at a brisker pace than the unfree." He concluded that according to the standard of the period the slaves were not overworked ". . .but it was not a light work routine by the standard of that or any other day." Stamppp's analysis of plantation life and labor, although lacking the analytical precision of Phillips, is not that dissimilar. It is at best a corrective of some of the latter's more exaggerated claims.

Stamppp assumed that since the slaves were ordinary human beings they would prefer to be free, and that their compensation was less than they deserved. They would therefore resist slavery whenever possible. His chapters on slave resistance and the tyranny of slavery are an outstanding contribution to the study of slavery. The result of this day-to-day resistance was that ". . .a thread of violence was woven into the pattern of southern bondage." He later admitted, however, that this pattern of resistance may have served more to support than to weaken the regime.

A spirit of independence was less likely to develop among slaves kept on the land, where most of them became accoustomed to having their master provide their basic needs, and where they might be taught that they were unfit to look after themselves. Slaves then directed their energies to the attainment of mere "temporary ease and enjoyment": "their masters," Olmsted believed, "calculated on it in them-do not wish to cure it-and by constant practice encourage it."

An indication of the force of the divergent approaches of Stamppp and Phillips, and its ability to overcome similar kinds of evidence is indicated in Stamppp's analysis of religion, incentives, holidays and Christmas presents, and Phillips' discussion of slave revolts. Stamppp includes these admittedly mitigating aspects of the regime in the chapter titled "To Make Them Stand In Fear," while Phillips discusses resistance to slavery in the chapter, "Slave Crime".

Stamppp's discussion of slave life is confused and at times contradictory. It contains many insights, but ultimately failed to come to terms with the distinctive quality of the Afro-American community under slavery. Committed to a view which minimized the distinctive aspects of black life, Stamppp failed to appreciate the viability of the community he attempted to analyze. Unlike Genovese's analysis, where the discussion of the slave community complemented the study of forms of resistance, Stamppp's treatment undermined the position he developed in "The Troublesome Property." Stamppp claimed that as with most people the slaves sought recognition, but that slavery cut-off most of the possibilities for advancement. A few might gain prestige as leaders within the community, or because of their successful defiance of the master. Others gained status because they served as house servants or artisans. These were the exceptions; the rest had to be content with less. Some gained a sense of pride in doing their work well, others in the wealth of their masters, or in their light complexion. Little was left of their African past, and the pressures of slavery made a stable family life extremely difficult.

This resulted in a "casual attitude" toward marriage and ". . .the failure of any deep and enduring affection to develop between some husbands and wives." "Here, as at so many other points, the slaves had lost their native culture without being able to find a workable substitute and therefore lived in a kind of cultural chaos."

Although Stampp detailed the religious practices and folk customs of the slaves, he dismissed them as ". . .the simple diversions of a poor, untutored folk— activities that gave them physical pleasure or emotional release." Slavery robbed the African of his heritage and denied him access to any alternative. "In slavery the Negro existed in a kind of cultural void. He lived in a twilight zone between two ways of life and was unable to obtain from either many of the attributes which distinguished man from beast." His description of the psychological and cultural impact of slavery was similar to the model developed by Stanley Elkins.

*The average bondsman, it would appear, lived more or less aimlessly in a bleak and narrow world. He lived in a world without schools, without books, without learned men; he knew less of the fine arts and of aesthetic values than he had known in Africa; and he found few ways to break the monotonous sameness of all his days. His world was the few square miles of earth surrounding his cabin — a familiar island beyond which were strange places (up North where people like him were not slaves), frightening places ("down the river" where overseers were devils), and dead places (across the ocean where his ancestors had lived and where he had no desire to go). His world was full of mysteries he could not solve, full of forces which he could not control. And so he tended to be a fatalist and futilitarian, for nothing else could reconcile him to his life.*²⁰

With the publication of *Slavery* by Stanley Elkins the study of slavery had reached its logical conclusion.²¹ Elkins does not even attempt to study the institution of slavery first hand, but assumed that slavery had reduced the African to Sambo. He described the psychological mechanisms by which the black population under slavery became docile children. A conservative, he was concerned with the importance of institutions, and his study of slavery reflected this interest. Although initially his argument was accepted by many, it also focussed attention on the problems of cultural survival. The debate over the Elkins' thesis forced many to begin to study the experience of the black community under slavery in a serious way.²²

²⁰*Ibid.*, passim.

²¹Stanley Elkins, *Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life* (Chicago, 1959), Chapters I—III.

²²Blassingame's study *op. cit.*, *Passim*, was in part an attempt to provide an alternate psychological model to Elkins.

Up until the 1960's the attempt by white scholars to understand slavery and the slave followed a fairly consistent pattern and was not dissimilar from the previous polemical discussion of these issues. Although each of these studies purported to be a careful and detailed examination of slavery and the slaves, the slaves were rarely viewed in their own terms, but were transformed into instruments designed to serve a larger view. Material or interpretations which failed to fit the preconceived pattern were either omitted or explained away. With the exception of Aptheker there was little awareness that the blacks were capable of responding to their plight in an intelligent and creative manner. Even those most sympathetic to the blacks portrayed them primarily as passive victims. Aptheker's analysis contained its own distortion, in that the slaves became worthy of study only when they directly challenged the system.

During the 1960's two closely related developments altered this situation. The civil rights movement helped to increase the influence and the number of black scholars at the same time that it focussed attention on all aspects of the Afro-American experience. In addition the development of the New Left and their insistence that history be written from the "bottom up" reinforced the demand that the history of slavery reflect the point of view of the slave. This resulted in a number of important essays and monographs dealing with the everyday life experiences, family structure and community life and outlook of the Afro-American slave. These scholars have drawn upon the slave narratives, interviews with ex-slaves, black folk traditions, black music and religion, as well as the traditional sources that have been used in previous discussions tend to support the proposition that the blacks under slavery were neither dehumanized automatons, nor whites in black skin. They succeeded in wresting from the planters some control over their material and cultural existence. Building on their African heritage they created an autonomous community, with its own values and lifestyles. They actively shaped the world around them, and were not passive recipients of guidance from above.²³

²³The most comprehensive analysis has been Eugene D. Genovese's *Roll, Jordan Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (New York, 1974). Other important studies are: Blassingame, *op. cit.*; George P. Rawick, *From Sundown to Sunup: The Making of the Black Community* (Westport, Conn., 1972); Vincent Harding, "Religion and Resistance Among Antebellum Negroes, 1800-1850," in August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, eds., *The Making of Black America* (2 Vols., New York, 1969); Sterling Stuckey, "Through the Prism of Folklore: The Black Ethos in Slavery," in *The Massachusetts Review*, Vol. IX, (Summer, 1968), pp. 417-437.